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Several questionable officer involved shootings and perceived abuses of authority 
disproportionately involving minority citizens have resulted in public outcry, protests, and 
nationwide scrutiny of police in recent years. The resulting police legitimacy crisis has prompted 
agencies to rapidly equip officers with body-worn video cameras (BWCs). BWC advocates 
lauded the findings of an early study that attributed significant reductions in use of force 
incidents and citizen complaints to the devices and it is this and a handful of other short-term 
studies upon which the claims of these benefits are predicated. However, subsequent research 
has produced mixed findings and the sustainability of any reductions remains questionable. The 
limited knowledge concerning the impact of BWCs on the aforementioned outcomes is 
problematic considering the potential negative impact of unrealistic expectations and the expense 
of BWC program maintenance. The objective of this dissertation is to address gaps in the extant 
research by exploring the impact of an incremental deployment of the devices on the frequency 
and severity of use of force incidents and the frequency and outcome of citizen complaints while 
controlling for staffing, volume of officer-initiated enforcement contacts, and the Ferguson 
incident. Utilizing 86-months of secondary data collected from the Newport News, Virginia 
Police Department (NNPD) a vector autoregressive multivariate time series analysis indicates 
that BWCs were a significant factor in a substantial sustained reduction in use of force and a 
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We know that on a daily basis, officers perform their jobs with distinction and provide 
great service. They risk their lives, and this does not always receive the attention it 
deserves. The good and hard work of police officers in America is being overshadowed 
by the occurrence of what have been referred to as ‘lawful but awful’ incidents. 
- Police Executive Research Forum, 2016, p. 119 
 Michael Brown, Tamir Rice, Eric Garner, Freddie Gray, Alton Sterling, and Philando 
Castile—well-known names of African American males killed in questionable police use of 
force incidents since 2014—are examples of high-profile “lawful but awful” incidents referred to 
in the epigraph above. These and many other questionable uses force (both lethal and non-lethal) 
and other abuses of authority disproportionately involving minority citizens have resulted in 
public outcry, protests, and nationwide scrutiny of police.1 In response to the growing police 
legitimacy crisis, President Obama appointed the President’s Task Force on 21st Century 
Policing to examine the issues and make recommendations for reform. In its final report the 
President’s Task Force indicated that the legitimacy crisis is the most urgent issue facing 
policing in the U.S. today and recognized the potential of body-worn cameras (BWCs) to 
improve agency transparency and officer accountability (President’s Task Force on 21st Century 
Policing, 2015). Based on these perceived benefits, in December 2014, President Obama 
committed $75 million in federal grant funding to help local law enforcement agencies equip 
their officers with BWCs (The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 2014). 
                                            
1 The terms police/police officer used hereinafter to refer to all law enforcement 
agencies/officers with general policing responsibilities and arrest powers (e.g., municipal police 
departments, sheriff’s departments, state police/highway patrol agencies, special jurisdiction 





 Following the 2014 shooting of Michael Brown by a Ferguson, Missouri, police officer 
(which was not captured on video), the benefits of BWCs received substantial media attention 
and entered public discourse. The dialogue has focused on the increased transparency and 
improved officer behavior that the devices are presumed to produce (Schneider, 2018). Body-
worn camera advocates assert that improved officer behavior manifests in reduced use of force 
incidents and citizen complaints (White, 2014). Proponents and early implementers of BWCs 
lauded the findings of a few small studies demonstrating these positive effects, and it is these few 
studies on which the aforementioned claims are predicated (Farrar & Ariel, 2013; Mesa Police 
Department, 2013). 
 The first U.S. study to measure the impact of BWCs on use of force and citizen 
complaints was conducted at the Rialto, California, Police Department in 2012 and is frequently 
cited by BWC advocates (Ariel, 2017).  Farrar (who was the Rialto Chief of Police at the time 
the study was conducted) and Ariel (2013) reported that BWCs reduced use of force incidents by 
more than 50 percent and citizen complaints by 90 percent. However, these rather impressive 
reductions represent relatively small raw counts in an agency of 115 sworn officers—a decrease 
from 60 use of force incidents in the 12 months preceding the study to 25 during the 12-month 
trial, and 28 complaints in the 12 months preceding the study to 3 during the 12-month trial 
period (Farrar & Ariel, 2013).  
Since the Rialto study, scholars have investigated these claims with more rigorous 
research generating mixed results, but the U.S. studies that have been published are generally 
limited to the examination of use of force and citizen complaint frequency in randomized 
controlled trials of relatively short duration. Questions regarding sustainability of any reductions 





and potential changes in the proportion of exoneration and sustained complaint dispositions 
remain largely unaddressed. Furthermore, few studies have examined a potential reduction in 
officer-initiated activity, a “de-policing” effect, which some argue might occur when officers are 
equipped with the devices and could be a factor in use of force and citizen complaint reductions. 
Likewise, while police officer recruitment and retention difficulties have been widely reported in 
recent years (Morison, 2017), extant BWC studies have not controlled for potential patrol 
personnel shortages.  
Despite the sparse evidence of their efficacy to reduce use of force and citizen 
complaints, law enforcement agencies across the country are rapidly implementing BWCs. 
According to a report generated by the Bureau of Justice Statistics, 32 percent of U.S. police 
departments had begun implementation of the devices by 2013, which was more than one year 
prior to shooting death of Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri (Reaves, 2015). Just two years 
later a survey of Major Cities Chiefs and Major County Sheriff’s (2015) association member 
agencies indicated that 95 percent had adopted BWCs, were in the process of implementing 
them, or intended to implement them in the near future. The ramifications of unrealistic 
expectations concerning the impact of BWCs cannot be overstated. Such unmet expectations 
would likely exacerbate the current police legitimacy crisis. Therefore, more research is urgently 
needed to examine the impact of the devices. 
The current study of the Newport News, Virginia, Police Department’s implementation 
and four years of experience with BWCs seeks to contribute to the limited body of BWC 
literature in these areas, specifically, whether BWCs have a significant impact on the frequency 
of use of force incidents, level and severity of force employed, and the frequency and 





officer-initiated enforcement activity.  
Statement of the Problem 
 Police officers are the most visible agents of government who, under a theoretical social 
contract, are entrusted with the power to use coercive force—including physical force up to and 
including deadly force within lawful parameters—to keep order through the enforcement of law 
(Bittner, 1974). The controversy generated by the authority to coerce compliance with lawful 
orders, detain, and arrest, using physical force to do so, if necessary, is compounded by the 
ability of officers to exercise considerable discretion in the course of their enforcement activity 
(Walker, 1993). Moreover, police officers have a great deal of autonomy because they are 
frequently geographically separated from supervision (Weitzer, 2015). Police officers are 
expected to bring their coercive power to bear on myriad situations involving crime and/or 
disorder to achieve some sort of resolution (Bittner, 1974).  They are expected to exercise sound 
judgment and make thoughtful and proper decisions concerning matters of life and liberty of 
citizens within the confines of a complex set of laws, often in rapidly evolving, stressful 
confrontations with offenders and other hostile persons, including split-second decisions to use 
physical force. Their decisions and actions are judged by police command staff and 
administrators through the lens of agency policy, the judiciary through the lenses of 
constitutional requirements, statutes, and case law, and most importantly, in the court of public 
opinion. 
Public perceptions of use of force, abuse of authority, and the consequences.  
 While competence in addressing crime is one component in citizen satisfaction with the 
police, how officers perform their law enforcement duties is paramount. However, “regardless of 





the citizens’ perceptions are the basis of their satisfaction or dissatisfaction with police” (Kyle & 
Schafer, 2016, p. 287). Gallagher and colleagues (2001) assert that public opinion of the police is 
developed through a complex nexus of influences, but that process related factors are most 
impactful. For more than a decade before the Ferguson incident, criminal justice scholars and 
practitioners alike have observed that citizens’ perceptions of police legitimacy in the U.S. were 
less than ideal, particularly poor among minorities, and increasingly linked with the concept of 
procedural justice (Mazerolle, Bennett, Davis, Sargeant, & Manning, 2013). 
Extensive research has demonstrated that the theoretical construct of procedural justice is 
a critical factor in citizens’ perceptions of police legitimacy and explains both the source of the 
problem and the solution (Mazerolle et al., 2013; Tyler, 2014). Procedural justice in the context 
of policing is simply treating every individual in a fair and respectful manner and allowing 
citizens to have a voice during interactions with officers. According to Tyler (2014), “Procedural 
justice can be viewed as a means to attaining legitimacy (the belief that the police ought to be 
allowed to exercise their authority to maintain social order, manage conflicts and solve problems 
in their communities…)” (p. 9). Conversely, procedural injustices, even perceived injustices, 
have a negative impact on police legitimacy. Whether actual or perceived, unnecessary or 
excessive use of force and other forms of abuse of authority have serious consequences.  
While use of force in police-citizen contacts is relatively rare, when such instances do 
arise, they bring to the forefront what is arguably the most controversial aspect of the police role, 
and citizens are rightfully concerned with why, how, and against whom police use force. 
Although most use of force incidents are determined to be legally justified, as Brandl (2018) 
aptly states, “[e]ven when it is necessary and justified, the use of force never photographs well” 





policy and legal parameters, many citizens do not share the same sentiment. This is especially 
true when deadly force is used against an unarmed subject, or a given non-lethal use of force 
appears to be unnecessary or excessive, hence the public outcry and civil unrest following the 
shooting death of Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri, and the subsequent clearance of the 
officer involved from any wrongdoing (Kahn & Martin, 2016), and the public outrage following 
police use of a Taser on an 86-year-old man in Kingstree, South Carolina (Wootson, 2017). 
 Likewise, citizens are concerned with other types of police abuse of authority, including 
“verbal/psychological abuse” and “legal abuse/violation of civil rights abuse” (Carter, 1985, p. 
322). The 2009 arrest of Harvard Professor Henry Louis Gates Jr. for disorderly conduct by 
Cambridge, Massachusetts, police, which drew the comment “police acted stupidly” from 
President Obama, is one example of a perceived abuse of authority (Cooper, 2009). The arrest of 
an emergency room nurse in Salt Lake City, Utah, for obstruction when she refused an officer’s 
order to draw blood from an unconscious suspect (an action prohibited by hospital policy without 
a search warrant) is another (Wang & Hawkins, 2017).  
 These are but a few examples of questionable uses of force and other possible abuses of 
authority that have received substantial negative attention from the public. Advancements in 
video recording technology that enable anyone with a cell phone to record any event and 
instantly disseminate or even stream those recordings through social media has exacerbated the 
police legitimacy problem. Citizen captured videos of perceived police mistreatment of citizens 
have produced public skepticism concerning police enforcement activities and justification for 
uses of force (Brucato, 2015). This skepticism and increased scrutiny are fueled in part by video 
recordings that capture only a fraction of an incident, which leaves viewers to speculate about the 





leaves little doubt about officer misconduct. Social media sites such as YouTube contain 
numerous citizen-captured video recordings of police officers engaging in questionable uses of 
physical force, making questionable arrests, and threatening and/or treating citizens 
disrespectfully. Furthermore, many minority citizens relate encounters with police that suggest 
the contact may have been the result of racial profiling (Epp, Maynard-Moody, & Haider-
Markel, 2014). Actual physical abuses of authority (unnecessary and excessive force), non-
physical abuses of authority (verbal/psychological abuse and legal abuse/violation of civil rights 
abuse), or public perception of either produce considerable negative consequences. Of course, 
humanitarian concerns are of utmost importance given that the lives and liberty of citizens are at 
stake, but there are two other serious ramifications, the fiscal impact and damage to police 
legitimacy. 
First, citizen complaints concerning police abuses of authority can have a serious fiscal 
impact. For instance, of the six cases named at the outset, lawsuits filed against police agencies 
in five have resulted in large settlements or judgments: $1.5 million in the Michael Brown case 
(Patrick, 2017); $6 million in the Tamir Rice case, $5.9 million in the Eric Garner case, $6.4 
million in the Freddie Gray case (Berman & Lowery, 2016); and $3 million in the Philando 
Castile case (Smith, 2017). According to Elinson and Frosch (2015): 
The 10 [U.S.] cities with the largest police departments paid out $248.7 million last year 
[2014] in settlements and court judgments in police misconduct cases, up 48% from 
$168.3 million in 2010… Those cities collectively paid out $1.02 billion over those five 
years in such cases, which include alleged beatings, shootings, and wrongful 
imprisonment. 
 
According to Balko (2014), settlements and judgments stemming from police misconduct cases 
have cost the City of Chicago almost half a billion dollars in the last 10 years ($84.6 million in 





Over the past four years, more than 100 people have won court judgments or settlements 
related to allegations of brutality and civil rights violations. Victims include a 15-year-old 
boy riding a dirt bike, a 26-year-old pregnant accountant who had witnessed a beating, a 
50-year-old woman selling church raffle tickets, a 65-year-old church deacon rolling a 
cigarette and an 87-year-old grandmother aiding her wounded grandson. Those cases 
detail a frightful human toll. Officers have battered dozens of residents who suffered 
broken bones—jaws, noses, arms, legs, ankles—head trauma, organ failure, and even 
death, coming during questionable arrests. Some residents were beaten while handcuffed; 
others were thrown to the pavement. And in almost every case, prosecutors or judges 
dismissed the charges against the victims—if charges were filed at all. 
 
In fact, the Cato Institute’s (2012) National Police Misconduct Reporting Project calculated that 
settlements and judgments in police misconduct cases totaled $346,512,800 nationwide in 2010. 
Moreover, juries are increasingly more sympathetic to victims of police abuse of authority. On 
February 16, 2018 a Baltimore County, Maryland jury awarded $38 million to the family of a 
woman shot and killed by police (Stevens, 2018). While staggering, the fiscal impact is but one 
of the negative consequences.  
Second, and of more concern, is the negative impact on police legitimacy, which is 
invaluable in a democratic society and difficult to restore when it is tarnished. A substantial and 
growing body of research demonstrates that perceptions of fairness and treating citizens with 
respect and dignity, the primary elements of procedural justice, are most impactful in terms of 
public opinion of the police. For example, while it is obvious that a citizen who is treated 
disrespectfully by an officer is highly likely to view such an interaction as unjust and leave the 
encounter with a negative opinion of the police, Epp and colleagues (2014) found that when an 
officer stops an African American citizen and he or she either fails to explain the reason for the 
stop, or cites a seemingly trivial reason, the citizen is likely to feel they are being victimized. 
Historically, the relationship between police and minorities, African Americans in particular, has 
been strained. However, the advances in technology and media exposure of perceived 





largely constitutes the current legitimacy crisis (Kochel, 2019).  
A 2016 poll conducted by Pew Research Center found that 75 percent of Whites believed 
that police treated racial and ethnic minorities equally, but 67 percent of African Americans did 
not believe that to be the case. Similarly, three-quarters of Whites believed that police were using 
the right amount of force in most situations while 67 percent of African Americans disagreed. 
Furthermore, the poll revealed that about two-thirds of African Americans believed police 
officers were not held accountable for misconduct while an equal proportion of Whites believed 
they were (Morin & Stepler, 2016). The Black Lives Matter movement and numerous public 
protests reflect these findings.  
Procedural injustices, or even the perception thereof, erodes police legitimacy. Not only 
in terms of the individual who had the negative experience personally but will likely impact the 
opinions of others vicariously (Brunson, 2007). Negative perceptions of police legitimacy impact 
citizens’ willingness to obey the law, report crimes, identify as witnesses, or otherwise cooperate 
and partner with police to address crime (Tyler, 2006). The fact that public opinion of police is 
very poor among African American citizens is especially problematic as many high crime areas 
are heavily minority populated, thus police effectiveness in addressing those crime problems is 
likely hindered. Thus, minimizing use of force and officer behaviors that generate citizen 
complaints is crucial. 
Body-Worn Cameras, a Potential Solution? 
BWCs are small, self-contained, digital video recording devices that attach to an officer’s 
shirt, or are mounted on glasses, hats, or a headband and are a notable advancement from earlier 
forms of video recording technology utilized by police. In-car video systems, which have been in 





seriously limiting their utility for recording police-citizen interactions in their entirety. The small 
size of BWCs, hands-free portability, and ability to operate and store video for full tours of duty 
overcome the limitations of in-car video systems. Video recording is initiated and ended by the 
officer manually activating/deactivating the camera; however, most BWCs on the market 
continuously record on a 15 second to 2-minute loop (depending on the product) in order to 
capture and preserve events immediately preceding camera activation (Hung, Babin, & Coberly, 
2016). While BWCs allow officers to potentially record all police-citizen interactions, each 
agency sets forth its own policy regarding what types of police-citizen encounters officers are 
required to record, and conversely, what types they are prohibited from recording (The 
Leadership Conference on Civil and Human Rights & Upturn, 2017). The devices store all the 
captured video, which is typically downloaded into a server system or to a cloud-based storage 
service at the end of each shift by placing the camera in a dual-purpose cradle/port that also 
charges the BWC’s battery. BWCs and their video data storage systems generally prevent 
editing, deleting, copying, or altering recorded video before or after download, except for 
redaction of copies by authorized persons to fulfill FOIA requests (Hung et al., 2016; Miller, 
Toliver, & Police Executive Research Forum, 2014). 
While BWCs have received considerable attention in the U.S. recently, they were first 
piloted in the U.K. as early as 2005 (White, 2014). Although some pilot programs had already 
begun in the U.S., the devices first received attention in media coverage following the July 2013 
Federal District Court decision in Floyd v. City of New York. In Floyd, the court ruled that the 
New York City Police Department engaged in a discriminatory pattern or practice in their “stop 
and frisk” program disproportionately targeting African American males. As a remedy, the court 





oversight and prevent racial profiling (Goldstein, 2013). 
Several high-profile police use of force incidents have occurred since the Floyd decision, 
in turn raising awareness of BWCs. The August 9, 2014 shooting death of Michael Brown in 
Ferguson, Missouri, was particularly pivotal. Brown, an unarmed African American teenager, 
was shot and killed by white Ferguson Police Officer Darren Wilson during an enforcement 
contact in which Brown was a suspect. The Michael Brown incident was not captured on video 
as the Ferguson Police Department was not so equipped, and the accounts of Officer Wilson and 
witnesses differed markedly (Fantz, 2014; United States Department of Justice, 2015). These 
conflicting reports, combined with the lack of video, raised public suspicions. The ruling of the 
U.S. Department of Justice (2015) that Officer Wilson’s use of force was justified exacerbated 
this situation. The skepticism and suspicion surrounding the Michael Brown shooting and other 
questionable use of force incidents and perceived abuses of authority resulted in increased 
scrutiny of police by the public, civil rights advocacy organizations, and politicians. Demands for 
more transparency have prompted calls to equip police officers with BWCs (Lum, Koper, 
Merola, Scherer, & Reioux, 2015; President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing, 2015). 
Presumably, the video captured by the devices would be made available to the public in 
order to increase transparency. The availability of video for public inspection in questionable 
cases of police enforcement activity (especially questionable use of force incidents) is 
increasingly important to public perceptions of police legitimacy (Stanley, 2014). Proponents of 
BWCs argue that if every police officer were equipped with a device that, with few exceptions 
(perhaps due to legitimate mechanical failure, or intentional sabotage by an officer), any police 
enforcement encounter with a citizen could be subject to review. Questions concerning the 





primarily on official officer accounts of an incident but would be determined by the objective 
examination of the captured video; swifter investigations of complaints and more conclusive 
dispositions are anticipated as a result (Harris, 2010). BWC advocates assert that the new level of 
transparency generated by the devices would increase police accountability, which should 
elevate public perceptions of police legitimacy. However, many scholars and practitioners argue 
that the increased transparency and accountability generated by BWCs is the catalyst for a much 
more impactful benefit of the devices: improved police officer behavior consistent with the 
tenets of procedural justice, which is purportedly manifest in reduced use of force incidents and 
citizen complaints.  
A theoretical framework has been proffered to explain this anticipated impact of BWCs, 
including theories that address the dynamics of coercive actions, deterrence theory, and objective 
self-awareness theory (Ariel, Farrar, & Sutherland, 2015). Ariel and colleagues (2015) contend 
that a combination of situational, psychological, and organizational factors influence a police 
officer’s decision to use force, and potentially to abuse their authority. BWCs are anticipated to 
have an impact on all three. The devices are not only thought to deter officers from hastily using 
force or engaging in misconduct, but many claim that BWCs also serve as a stimulus to behave 
in a professional and courteous manner, which has been referred to as a “civilizing effect” 
(White, 2014), and described as procedurally just conduct (Hedberg, Katz, & Choate, 2017). 
This notion is derived from objective self-awareness theory. Ariel and colleagues (2015) assert 
that the devices produce a state of objective self-awareness that enhances the deterrent effect.  
Based on this theoretical framework, which is supported by the results of the Rialto study 
and a few other small randomized controlled trials, some BWC advocates answer the question 





However, considering there have been a limited number of studies published that examined the 
impact of BWCs on use of force and/or citizen complaints, the majority of which have been 
randomized controlled trials of relatively short duration, and that they have produced mixed 
results, there is little evidence to date for the efficacy of BWCs to positively affect officer 
behavior. In contrast, one international study found that use of force incidents increased with the 
implementation of BWCs (Ariel et al., 2016). Noticeably missing from the literature are adequate 
controls for a potential de-policing effect and potential personnel shortages, both of which would 
likely impact use of force and citizen complaint rates. These gaps in the research are a salient 
issue due to the aforementioned importance of realistic expectations concerning BWC efficacy, 
and the substantial expense of BWC programs. 
While the $75 million in grant funding that the Obama administration committed to 
equipping police officers with BWCs is a substantial investment, it is insignificant compared to 
the total expenditures required to establish and maintain BWC programs across the country. For 
example, the City of Duluth, Minnesota, equipped 110 officers with BWCs which are generating 
between 8,000 and 10,000 videos per month. They store most videos for 30 days and their 3-year 
contract for storage fees is $78,000 (Bakst & Foley, 2015). The City of Baltimore estimated 
video storage costs associated with full implementation of BWCs at the Baltimore Police 
Department of approximately $2.6 million per year (Newcombe, 2015). The five-year contract 
between Axon (a company formerly known as Taser and a major manufacturer of BWCs and 
provider of video storage and management services) and the City of San Diego alone included 
1,000 cameras with a purchase price of $267,000 and $3.6 million for maintenance and video 
storage (Bakst & Foley, 2015). Moreover, these expenses do not include the human resource 





FOIA requests, nor for the additional time required for officers to download and catalog the 
captured video (Major Cities Chiefs and Major County Sheriffs, 2015). For instance, according 
to Bakst and Foley (2015), storage fees for 150 BWCs at the Berkeley, California, Police 
Department are approximately $45,000 a year. In addition to those fees, the program will require 
assigning up to two full time employees to manage the video, and it will require officers to spend 
up to 30 minutes per shift dealing with recorded video. Bakst and Foley (2015) calculate the 
latter as the equivalent of the total hours worked by five full-time officers annually. The mixed 
empirical evidence is of concern considering the expense of BWC programs and limited police 
agency budgets. Although the initial purchase of the devices appears to be manageable, the 
associated program maintenance costs are a large recurring line item sure to draw resources away 
from other initiatives and endeavors, and these costs grow exponentially as the number of 
cameras increases. 
The Purpose and Significance of the Study 
 The Newport News, Virginia, Police Department’s (NNPD) experience with BWCs 
offers a unique opportunity to address the gap in the research identified above and granted the 
researcher unfettered access to their internal data necessary to make such a contribution to the 
literature. NNPD is a mid-size East coast police department of 440 sworn officers and 153 non-
sworn personnel serving a population of approximately 180,000. The command staff of NNPD 
began implementation of BWCs in May 2013, more than one full year prior to the Ferguson 
incident and the intense nationwide scrutiny of police that followed, because they recognized that 
the devices would be beneficial in increasing transparency, resolving citizen complaints, and 
reducing liability. More importantly, the implementation of this innovative technology was well 





officers with the devices. NNPD’s deployment of BWCs to all 284 patrol personnel occurred 
incrementally in several waves spanning 3 years beginning with a 10 BWC pilot in May 2013 
and an additional 44 of the devices by December of that year, another 30 by the end of 2014, 175 
more during 2015, and the final 25 BWCs in the first half of 2016. This staggered rollout of the 
devices was due to budget constraints, which is not uncommon for larger agencies.  
The objective of the study is to explore the impact of the devices on the frequency and 
severity of use of force incidents and the frequency and outcome of citizen complaints while 
controlling for staffing and volume of officer-initiated enforcement contacts. The current quasi-
experimental study utilizes secondary data collected from the Newport News, Virginia Police 
Department for an 86-month period: May 2010 through June 2017; 36 months prior to the 
beginning of BWC implementation and the 50 months following, which includes 12 months post 
full implementation. The data includes computer assisted dispatch data, use of force data, citizen 
complaint data, and officer payroll data. A series of t tests, autoregressive, integrated, moving 
average (ARIMA) and vector autoregression (VAR/VARX) time series analyses are employed to 
address the following research questions:  
Research Questions 
1. What were the effects of BWCs on use of force? 
1a. If the frequency of use of force incidents was reduced, was the reduction 
sustained? 
1b. If the frequency of use of force incidents was reduced, was there an incremental 
decline with waves of BWC implementation, or did any decline plateau or decay 
over the course of implementation? 





1d. Did BWCs have a significant impact on these outcomes when simultaneously 
considering staffing and volume of officer-initiated enforcement activity?        
2. What were the effects of BWCs on citizen complaints? 
2a. If the frequency of citizen complaints was reduced, was the reduction sustained? 
2b. If the frequency of citizen complaints was reduced, was there an incremental 
decline with waves of BWC implementation, or did any decline plateau or decay 
over the course of implementation? 
2c. Was there a change in the proportion of sustained complaints compared to those 
unfounded, unsubstantiated, or in which the officer was exonerated? 
2d. Did BWCs have a significant impact on these outcomes when simultaneously 
considering staffing and volume of officer-initiated enforcement activity? 
Overview of the Dissertation 
The dissertation is presented as follows. Chapter 2 begins with an overview of use of 
force, abuse of authority, and citizen complaints, followed by a review of relevant literature 
regarding the theoretical framework offered by BWC advocates as the basis for their claims. The 
chapter continues with a review of extant research that has examined the impact of BWCs on use 
of force and citizen complaints and concludes with a review of the literature regarding a potential 
de-policing effect. Chapter 3 presents the research methods, including details regarding the study 
site, data collection, conceptualization and operationalization of the dependent, independent, and 
control variables, and a description of the statistical techniques utilized for the analysis. The 
results of the analysis are presented in Chapter 4, followed by a discussion of the conclusions, 








The focus of the current study is the presumed impact of BWCs on police officer 
behavior, which in turn is believed to reduce use of force and citizen complaints. The anticipated 
impact on officer behavior and subsequent outcomes is based on a theoretical framework that 
includes social interactionist theory of coercive actions, deterrence, and objective self-awareness 
theories. While this study is not a test of theory, a review of the applicable literature regarding 
this framework is helpful to establish the basis for the claims made by BWC proponents 
concerning the benefits of the devices (Farrar & Ariel, 2013; Ariel, Farrar & Sutherland, 2015). 
Thus, this chapter begins with an overview of use of force, abuse of authority, and citizen 
complaints, followed by a review of the theoretical framework, which, BWC proponents suggest, 
supports the notion that equipping officers with the devices will deter them from escalating 
enforcement encounters and increase their professionalism and courtesy. This anticipated 
positive impact on officer behavior is presumed to manifest in reduced use of force incidents and 
citizen complaints. Presentation of the extant published studies that examined the impact of 
BWCs on use of force and citizen complaints follows, and the chapter concludes with a 
discussion of a potential confounding factor, a possible de-policing effect. 
Use of Force, Abuse of Authority, and Citizen Complaints 
While most instances of police use of force are determined to be appropriate, and officers 
are authorized to use force and expected to do so when it is justified to enforce the law and 
maintain public safety, the legal parameters for the justification of use of force are vague. Even 
legally justified uses of force can, and often are perceived by citizens as an abuse of authority 





excessive force are serious abuses of authority, there are other forms that are extremely harmful 
as well. Verbal and legal abuses can have a serious negative impact on the victim including 
psychological harm and unjust negative consequences in matters of life and liberty. 
Identifying the correlates of use of force and abuse of authority and estimating the 
frequency of these phenomena accurately has been elusive. First, researchers have substantial 
methodological difficulty studying the behavior of police officers, especially unethical and/or 
illegal behaviors (Hickman & Poore, 2016; Son & Rome, 2004). Second, no consistent method 
of data collection on use of force incidents exists across law enforcement agencies, and although 
citizen complaints are often used as a proxy measure for police abuses of authority, there is good 
reason to believe that many such abuses go unreported (Lersch, 2002). Thus, police abuse of 
authority, especially the less serious forms, likely occurs much more frequently than the volume 
of citizen complaints indicates. 
Regardless of whether a citizen subjected to a perceived unjust use of force or other 
abuse of authority files a complaint, their attitudes concerning police are negatively impacted as 
are those of others who witness and similarly perceive such an encounter and those with whom 
the encounter is communicated (Kochel, 2019; Son, Tsang, Rome, & Davis, 1997). Thus, any 
use of force incident or perceived abuse of authority, whether it generates a citizen complaint or 
not, is potentially damaging to police legitimacy. The sections that follow provide an overview 
of the relevant concepts, frequencies, and correlates of use of force, abuse of authority, and 
citizen complaints. 
Use of force. 
 There is some ambiguity regarding what constitutes police use of force and a universal 





of force as “that amount of effort required by police to compel compliance from an unwilling 
subject” (p. 1). The Police Foundation (2016) defines it as “the means of compelling compliance 
or overcoming resistance to an officer’s commands in order to protect life or property or to take a 
person into custody” (p. 1). Garner, Schade, Hepburn, and Buchanan (1995) asserted that police 
use of force should be defined as “behaviors by individuals that intentionally threaten, attempt, 
or inflict physical harm on others (Reiss & Roth, 1993, p. 2),” which is, in essence, the National 
Academy of Sciences definition of “violence” (p. 152). Whether police use of force refers to the 
application of physical force only, or includes other forms of non-physical coercion, varies 
across the literature.  
The Newport News Police Department’s (2017) use of force policy, which is utilized for 
the conceptualization of use of force in this study, defines force as follows: 
Deadly Force: Any use of force that is reasonably likely to cause death. Non-Deadly 
Force: Any use of force other than that which is considered deadly force. This includes 
any physical effort used to control or restrain another, or to overcome the resistance of 
another (p. 1). 
  
While the NNPD (2017) use of force policy defines use of force in terms of physical contact, it 
notes that verbal commands may legally constitute force: 
All officers who encounter a situation where the possibility of violence or resistance to 
lawful arrest is present should, if possible, attempt to defuse the situation through advice, 
warning, and verbal persuasion. NOTE: Verbal directions can legally qualify as use of 
force. In the event that a situation escalates beyond the effective use of verbal techniques 
to defuse the situation, officers are authorized to employ Department trained or approved 
compliance techniques…if resistance escalates, officers are authorized to respond in 
accordance with their training in reasonable force options (p. 2). 
 
However, the NNPD (2017) policy requires officers to complete a use of force report only for 
physical uses of force excluding low level control holds in which there is no complaint of injury 
and the subject did not engage in “defensive or active resistance against the officer” (p. 8). 





as physical actions despite the obvious limitation of potential underreporting (Garner et al., 
1995). This limitation, combined with the inconsistency in the conceptualization and 
measurement of use of force and issues associated with direct observation and survey methods, 
makes estimating the frequency of occurrence difficult. 
 Frequency of use of force. 
At the outset it is important to note that no reliable national data collection method for 
police use of force exists, neither for deadly nor non-lethal, and studies conducted to estimate the 
frequency of police use of force have operationalized force differently utilizing a variety of 
metrics (Garner, Hickman, Malega, & Maxwell, 2018; Nix, Campbell, Byers, & Alpert, 2017). 
Nevertheless, extant research utilizing both citizen and police administrative surveys as methods 
of estimation indicates that the threat and/or use of non-lethal physical force is a relatively rare 
occurrence in police-citizen contacts overall (Adams et al., 1999; Eith & Durose, 2011; Garner et 
al, 2018). According to a 2015 Bureau of Justice Statistics report in which data from the 2002, 
2005, 2008, and 2011 Police-Public Contact Surveys (PPCS) were examined, a little more than 
1.5 percent of citizens surveyed reported that officers threatened to use force or actually used 
force on them during an encounter with police (Hyland, Langton, & Davis, 2015). However, 
estimations of the frequency of use of force can be misleading when comparing the occurrence to 
all police-citizen contacts, considering a substantial portion are not enforcement contacts and the 
majority do not involve arrest (Eith & Durose, 2011). In addition, citizen self-report surveys such 
as the PPCS exclude those incarcerated in local jails or prisons, a population likely to contain a 
substantial number who experienced police use of force (Hickman, Piquero, & Garner, 2008). 
 Use of force rates in relation to arrests are arguably a more informative indicator of 





used in 0.8% to 58.1% of arrests, and this wide range is due to the variety of operational 
definitions of use of force in the literature. However, utilizing officer completed reports in a 
sample of 7,512 arrests at six different agencies they found that physical force (which included 
only actual application of physical force, excluded light control holds, and did not include threat 
of force – e.g., displaying/pointing a weapon) ranged from 12.7% to 22.9% of arrests (Garner, 
Maxwell, & Heraux, 2002). Hickman and colleagues (2008) utilized both PPCS data and the 
Survey of Inmates in Local Jails (SILJ) to estimate the frequency of nonlethal force used in 
arrests. According to Hickman et al. (2008), “We estimate that the police use or threaten to use 
force in 1.7% of all contacts and in 20.0% of all arrests” (p. 563). Consistent with previous 
studies, they found that the largest proportion of use of force incidents were at the lowest levels 
of severity. Hickman et al. (2008) also noted that “males, youths, and racial minorities report 
greater rates of police use of force” (p. 563). Notwithstanding the measurement issues, a 
considerable amount of literature has been published on the correlates of use of force, and these 
variables have frequently emerged as significant predictors.         
 Correlates of use of force. 
 Comprehensive reviews of the extensive empirical research literature regarding the 
correlates of use of force have been conducted by Sherman (1980), Riksheim and Chermak 
(1993), National Research Council (2004), and Klam and Tillyer (2010). Five different factor 
categories were utilized as an organizing framework in these reviews, which include 
characteristics of the community and the organization, situational variables associated with the 
encounter, and characteristics of both the individual officer and suspect. Bolger (2015) 
conducted a meta-analysis of use of force studies published from 1995 to 2013 examining the 





characteristics were significant, “those variables that tap into what occurs during an encounter 
and characteristics of the potential target of force seem to have the greatest impact on the 
likelihood of force being used” (p. 483). Significant encounter related variables included the 
seriousness of the offense, whether an arrest was made, whether the suspect resisted arrest, 
whether there was conflict between citizens, the number of officers on scene, and whether the 
encounter was officer initiated; suspect characteristics that emerged as significant included race, 
sex, demeanor, socio-economic class, and intoxication (Bolger, 2015). 
 While offense seriousness, arrest, resisting arrest, and conflict between citizens can all be 
considered legal factors and appropriate considerations in the use of force calculus under certain 
circumstances, clearly the race, sex, socio-economic class, demeanor, and intoxicated state of the 
suspect, or the mere presence of more officers absent resistance or an eminent threat of physical 
harm to themselves, other officers, or citizens, are inappropriate extralegal factors and should not 
have any impact on an officer’s decision to apply physical force. These findings add to the 
already problematic nature of determining the justification for a given use of force. 
 Justification for use of force. 
 Each use of force incident must be assessed according to its unique circumstances and 
through the lens of the objective reasonableness standard established by the U.S. Supreme Court 
in the 1989 Graham v. Connor decision, which states:  
The “reasonableness” of a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of 
a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight… The 
calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are 
often forced to make split-second judgments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, 
and rapidly evolving—about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation 
(p. 490). 
  
It is important to note that the Graham decision sets the minimum standard or threshold for 





be legally justified in accordance with the objective reasonableness standard, there is often 
disagreement about the ‘reasonableness” of a given use of force (Alpert & Smith, 1994; Pew 
Research Center, 2014; Worden, 1995). The 20/20 hindsight prohibition creates ambiguity, 
which drives much of this disagreement, and it undoubtedly masks some abuses of authority. 
 Regarding the 20/20 hindsight prohibition, Lyle and Esmail (2016) note that policing “is 
the only occupation that provides such relief from remedy for actions that does not contemplate 
or provide for analysis of decision making under a postmortem review” (p. 179). For example, 
they point out that pilots must make split-second decisions as well, and mistakes can have 
catastrophic consequences. When an aviation accident or incident occurs, a thorough 
investigation is conducted to determine the causes. Pilots are not afforded immunity for errors. 
The same can be said of medical professionals and myriad other professions. Policing is of 
course unique in that enforcement of the law involves danger of physical harm from subjects 
who are compelled to avoid apprehension, and failure to make split-second decisions to defend 
oneself can cost an officer their life. However, through poor judgment and errors an officer can 
construct circumstances that require the use of force, a phenomenon that Fyfe (2005) termed the 
split-second syndrome.           
According to Fyfe (2005), “unnecessary violence occurs when well-meaning officers 
prove incapable of dealing with the situations they encounter without needless or too hasty resort 
to force” (p. 207). He argues that when officers rush into situations and confront suspects 
without utilizing cover and concealment, they often place themselves in a situation that requires 
a rapid decision to use force with limited information. Fyfe further asserts that incompetence 
often leads to escalation rather than de-escalation of tense encounters. The 20/20 hindsight 





officer’s decisions and actions prior to the moment of the force decision, the actual necessity to 
use force in a given enforcement contact is not ascertained (Fyfe, 2005). 
 While the Graham decision requires the objective analysis of only the information 
available to the officer at the moment he or she decided to use force, there is an unavoidable 
subjective element in one’s assessment. Alpert and Smith (1994) referred to it as “subjective 
objectivity,” and it makes consensus on whether a given use of force is reasonable or 
unnecessary/excessive highly unlikely. They argue that such judgments are shaped by one’s 
experiences and attitudes. Therefore, individual police officers may view the dynamics of an 
enforcement encounter and the necessity of a given use of force differently depending on their 
previous experience and training, and likewise, citizens may judge the reasonableness of the 
same incident entirely differently than police and disagree with one another (Alpert & Smith, 
1994). This subjectivity is evident in the following example cited by Ariel and colleagues 
(2015):  
 Adams (1996: 53) cites a famous disagreement between a team of field researchers led by 
 Reiss (1968) and a panel of experts from the President’s Commission on Law 
 Enforcement and Administration of Justice (1976), which aptly describes the 
 measurement problem. The two teams could not agree on what constitutes “improper use-
 of-force”, even though they were both scrutinizing the same incidents. Though dated, the 
 problem they encountered still persists today (p. 514). 
 
 In summation, the police are empowered to use non-negotiable coercion, including 
physical force when necessary, and ultimately there will always be some circumstances in which 
force is justified in police work (Bittner, 1990; Skolnick & Fyfe, 1993). However, as Adams 
(2005) points out, “the amount of force used should be proportional to the threat and limited to 
the least amount required to accomplish legitimate police action” (p. 451). Unfortunately, that is 
not always the case. Moreover, there is widespread public perception that biases often impact 





extralegal factors. As Weisburd, Greenspan, Hamilton, Bryant, and Williams (2001) asserted, 
“the potential abuse and actual abuse of such authority remain both a central problem for police 
agencies and a central public policy concern” (p. 12). This continues to be the case nearly two 
decades after that statement was made. 
Abuse of authority. 
 The term “police brutality” has been and continues to be commonly used to describe 
officer misconduct involving inappropriate or unlawful exercise of police powers. According to 
Reiss (1968), “[w]hat citizens mean by police brutality covers the full range of police 
practices…” (p. 11). He listed behaviors ranging from the use of profanity to abuses of power 
including unlawful searches and unwarranted use of force. However, Carter (1985) argued that 
the term “brutality” is nebulous, failing to capture the different behaviors it is meant to represent, 
and that “abuse of authority” is more descriptive. Carter’s (1985) abuse of authority typology 
includes three categories of abuse: Physical abuse/excessive force, verbal/psychological abuse, 
and legal abuse/violation of civil rights. According to Carter (1985), “The underlying construct 
in the typology is that a police officer has exercised power by virtue of his/her office in a manner 
that is not consistent with law or ethical cannons” (p. 323). Carter’s typology provides a clearer 
conceptualization of the three forms of abuse, however, determining whether a police officer’s 
behavior and actions in a given encounter are a legitimate exercise of his or her authority or are 
an abuse of their powers can be difficult. While the difficulty of determining the reasonableness 
of a given use of force has been addressed, determining whether an officer’s behavior and 
actions constitute verbal/psychological abuse or legal abuse/violation of civil rights can be 
equally problematic. For example, while there is little doubt that a 2017 incident in which an 





physically resist in a profanity laced tirade constituted abuse of authority (Von Ancken, 2017), 
the 2013 arrest of a motorist by a University of Central Florida (UCF) police officer is 
questionable. In the latter case a white male UCF officer was citing an African American female 
for an inoperative brake light and she refused to roll her window down completely per the 
officer’s request. The woman asked the officer to pass the citation through the partially rolled-
down window instead. After a brief verbal exchange the officer ordered the woman to exit her 
vehicle using forceful verbal commands. Ultimately, when she failed to comply, the officer 
broke the window, forced the woman to the ground, and arrested her (Weiner, 2014). The 
woman filed a complaint against the officer alleging that the officer abused his authority and that 
she believed the incident was racially motivated. Although she was not required to sign a citation 
per Florida law, the officer was exonerated following an internal investigation. The UCF Police 
Department released the officer’s body-worn camera captured video of the incident, which 
subsequently went viral on social media and became the subject of heated public controversy. 
Brunson and Miller’s (2005) research provides further examples of verbal/psychological 
and legal/violation of civil rights abuses of authority. Their qualitative study was based on 
interviews of 40 young African American men in St. Louis, Missouri regarding their personal 
and vicarious experiences with police officers. Most of the sample reported being subjected to 
harassment, disrespect, verbal abuse, and either experiencing unwarranted searches and physical 
force or witnessing such incidents (see also, Brunson, 2007; Gau & Brunson, 2010). While 
ridiculing, harassing, using profanity toward, or searching a citizen without legal justification are 
clearly abuses of authority, as indicated in the UCF incident above, determining whether 
aggressive verbal commands, threats, exigent circumstances for warrantless searches, and 





actions are determined to be in accordance with departmental policy and legally justified by 
authorities, they are viewed as an abuse of authority by citizens, and thus might be classified as 
“lawful but awful” incidents or practices. The potential for officers to engage in biased policing, 
and perception of many citizens that it likely occurs frequently, complicates these judgments. 
Bias-based policing is a form of abuse of authority that may span all three categories of 
Carter’s typology and has been defined as “practices by individual officers, supervisors, 
managerial practices, and departmental programs, both intentional and nonintentional, that 
incorporate prejudicial judgments based on sex, race, ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, 
economic status, religious beliefs, or age that are inappropriately applied” (Ioimo, Tears, 
Meadows, Becton, & Charles, 2007, p. 271). However, this definition does not necessarily 
contain an exhaustive list. Factors such as political leanings, membership in an organization, and 
behavior or appearance that violates societal norms could be included as well (Kappeler, Sluder, 
& Alpert, 1998; National Research Council, 2004). In short, any such extralegal factors that an 
officer or agency inappropriately applies in making impactful discretionary choices, such as the 
decision to make an investigatory stop, constitutes bias-based policing. 
Correlates & frequency of abuse of authority. 
 Carter (1994) asserted that any given abuse of authority is either intentional or reactive. 
As the term suggests, intentional abuse “is that which is overtly and consciously imposed by the 
officer. Conversely, reactive abuse exists in response to stimuli or conditions without any overt, 
conscious decision to inflict the abuse” (Carter, 1994, p. 275). He described intentional abuses of 
authority as retaliation for some perceived provocation or a punishment for a specific action or 
behavior, whereas a reactive abuse of authority is unintentional although it may be precipitated 





stressors, social isolation stressors, organizational stressors, functional stressors, personal 
stressors, physiological stressors, and psychological stressors, can trigger either. One of these 
major stressors is citizen disrespect toward officers and refusal to defer to their authority.   
 An extensive body of research examining the impact of citizen demeanor on police 
officer behavior has consistently found that citizens who are disrespectful towards police are 
treated more punitively (cf., Klinger, 1994). In fact, Engel, Tillyer, Klahm, and Frank (2012) 
document 50 studies that linked citizen demeanor to police officer behavior, which they assert 
was unchallenged until Klinger’s (1994) study of police-citizen encounters in Miami-Dade, 
Florida. Klinger argued that in previous studies citizen demeanor had been operationalized in 
such a way that illegal behaviors were included (e.g., non-compliance with lawful orders, 
disorderly conduct, resisting arrest, etc.), and when such behaviors were excluded, citizen 
demeanor would not be a significant factor in officer decision making/conduct. The results of 
Klinger’s study supported his assertion. However, Engel and colleagues (2012) point out that 
citizen demeanor was a significant predictor of police officer behavior in an additional seven 
“post- Klinger” studies, which operationalized citizen demeanor per his suggestion (see Engel et 
al., 2012). In addition, recent studies have demonstrated that citizen demeanor is a factor in 
police officers’ assessments of threat (Nix, Pickett, Wolfe, & Campbell, 2017), and decisions to 
escalate to forceful verbal commands (James, James, & Vila, 2018). 
 The colloquialism “contempt of cop” refers to this type of demeanor—a display of 
disrespect, hostile attitude, and or challenge to an officer’s authority. Van Maanen (1978) 
documented that officers referred to citizens who failed to defer to their authority in this way as 
“assholes” and observed that they were often treated harshly. Natapoff (2017) argues that 





obstructing an officer, or other types of vaguely defined violations for nothing more than failing 
to adhere to the officer’s conception of proper comportment. Moreover, Holmes (2016) argues 
that these individuals are often charged with resisting arrest as well.  
In terms of improper force (unnecessary or excessive), Harris (2009) conducted a 
systematic review of the research literature and concluded that “[w]hat research there is suggests 
that situational factors have the most substantive impact on police use of improper force within 
police-citizen encounters…” (p.25). Similar to the correlates of use of force in general, studies 
have found that citizens who are intoxicated, antagonistic toward officers, and/or of lower socio-
economic class are significantly more likely to be subjected to improper force and those odds are 
increased with the presence of citizen onlookers or more officers (Friedrich, 1980; Reiss, 1968; 
Worden, 1995). Thus, the literature regarding improper use of force suggests that a suspect’s 
demeanor could indeed trigger this type of abuse of authority, especially when combined with 
one or more of the other aforementioned factors.  
These studies involving observation of police-citizen encounters all indicated that the use 
of improper force is relatively infrequent. Reiss (1968) reported the highest percentage of 
improper uses of force at 2.4% of the police-citizen encounters observed, while Friedrich (1980) 
and Worden (1995) reported 1.8% and 1.3% respectively. However, Harris (2009) points out that 
the accuracy of these results should be viewed with a fair amount of skepticism due to the rather 
low scientific rigor of these few studies. Moreover, although these studies are all dated, one 
cannot rule out the likelihood of officer reactivity to the observers, which raises questions 
concerning the validity of the results as well. 
Several theoretical perspectives have been applied in an attempt to identify the correlates 





Some of these involve the asymmetry of police-citizen interactions, which speaks to officer 
reactions to citizen demeanor and “contempt of cop,” and other situational factors that might lead 
officers to pursue a “just” outcome through unethical or unlawful means (such as unlawful 
searches), which has been referred to as “noble cause corruption” (Klockars, 1980). Bias, either 
implicit or explicit, is also commonly proposed as a correlate.  
The potential for prejudice or stereotypes and implicit bias to impact an officer’s 
decisions is rooted in their power to engage in selective enforcement, which is to choose when, 
where, and how to enforce which laws and, according to Davis (1969), “such power goes to 
selection of parties against whom the law is enforced…” (p.163). Although all of the 
aforementioned extra-legal factors that an officer might consider in his or her selection of whom 
to engage in an enforcement contact and/or how they treat the subject of an enforcement 
encounter are of concern, race is clearly inappropriate and the most problematic. According to 
Epp and colleagues (2014): 
Whether their choices are biased by race depends on how they see the social world: who 
is seen as ‘suspicious,’ ‘out of place,’ or simply ‘unusual’ determines who is stopped, 
questioned, and pressed for consent to be searched. Unfortunately, a large body of 
research demonstrates that most people in the contemporary United States, police officers 
included, cannot help but assume that racial minorities are more likely to be dangerous or 
engaged in criminality (p. 40). 
 
The stereotype described above is applied to African Americans in particular, and the practice of 
effecting investigatory traffic or pedestrian stops based on racial stereotypes is commonly 
referred to as “racial profiling.” 
Extensive research has shown that minority citizens (young African American males in 
particular) are disproportionately subjected to intrusive proactive enforcement contacts (Smith, 
Rojek, Petrocelli, & Withrow, 2017). For example, Faggan and Davies (2000) found that African 





City. A considerable number of studies have found that African Americans are also 
disproportionately subjected to investigatory traffic stops (see Smith et al., 2017; Epp et al., 2014 
for review). According to Brunson and Miller (2005), “young black men are widely viewed as 
‘symbolic assailants’ in the popular imagination (Quillian and Pager 2001), in the criminal 
justice system broadly (Bridges and Steen 1998; Kennedy 1997) and among the police 
specifically (Anderson 1990; Skolnick 1994)” (p. 615), and they argue that being 
disproportionately targeted for proactive enforcement contacts has deleterious impact on 
minority views concerning police legitimacy in general (see also Epp et al., 2014). 
Verbal/psychological abuse and legal abuse/violation of civil rights are believed to be 
more pervasive than physical abuse, however, the actual frequency is even more difficult to 
accurately estimate. For example, Brunson and Miller (2005) found that: 
Complaints of persistent harassment and disrespectful treatment were the most 
widespread in our interviews, and came from both delinquent and non-delinquent young 
men. These youths described repeated instances of being verbally abused by officers’ use 
of antagonistic language, name calling, profanity, and derogatory remarks; and also 
protested against the physically invasive nature of police stops, including public cavity 
and strip searches (p. 635). 
 
Citizen complaints are most often used as a proxy measure of all forms of abuse of authority, but 
have some serious limitations. 
Citizen complaints. 
While citizen complaints are often used as a proxy measure for inappropriate, unethical, 
or unlawful behavior (officer abuse of authority), Terrill and McCluskey (2002) point out that 
there are different perspectives regarding what they actually indicate. First, they are indicative of 
the citizen’s perceptions about what occurred and, in many cases, may not be a reliable source of 
data about the appropriateness of an officer’s behavior in a given encounter. Second, it may be a 





embellishments of the facts. Third, they may be an indicator of real or potentially problematic 
officer behavior. Lastly, citizen complaints may be an indicator of officer productivity.  
Another methodological problem with using citizen complaints as a proxy measure for 
officer abuse of authority is the likelihood of under-reporting. There are several reasons why 
officer abuse of authority may go unreported via citizen complaint: The system for filing a 
complaint employed by a given department may be cumbersome and time consuming, some 
citizens might fear reprisal (e.g., if the evidence is weak perhaps a criminal charge of filing a 
false report), and some citizens may believe that officers protect one another and filing a 
complaint would be futile (Brandl, Stroshine, & Frank, 2001). In any event, citizen complaints 
are problematic in terms of police legitimacy (Terrill & Paoline, 2015) and each deserves prompt 
and authentic investigation. 
Investigations of citizen complaints result in one of four dispositions: unfounded, 
unsubstantiated, sustained, or exonerated (Novak, Cordner, Smith, & Roberg, 2017). In the first 
case, unfounded, investigators determine that there is evidence that contradicts the allegations 
made by the citizen—that the complaint is inaccurate or fabricated. The second possible 
disposition, unsubstantiated, indicates that there is not sufficient evidence to corroborate the 
complainant’s allegations. Complaints are sustained when investigators have discovered enough 
evidence to support the complainant’s allegations. The fourth disposition, exoneration, is 
assigned when there is evidence that the allegations against the officer are true, but the officer’s 
actions were justified, within department policy, and lawful.  
 The bulk of the research literature concerning citizen complaints has focused on an 
individual unit of analysis—complaint prone officer correlates. Much less attention has been 





and colleagues (2017) summarized some relevant studies, which included Independent 
(Christopher) Commission (1991), Dugan and Breda (1991), Petterson (1991), Walker (1998), 
Wallace (1990), and Law Enforcement News (1989). The results of these studies indicate that 
while less than 1 percent of citizens actually file a complaint, between 10 and 15 percent believe 
that they have a legitimate complaint. Second, the rate of complaints and the proportion of 
complaints sustained varies widely by agency, but excessive force complaints are generally 
sustained at a lower frequency than other types. Third, a large proportion of complaints in a 
given agency are generally filed against a relatively small proportion of officers who are younger 
and have little experience (Novak et al., 2017). Research regarding individual correlates has also 
generated evidence indicating that officers who engage in more proactive (officer-initiated) and 
aggressive enforcement activities also receive more citizen complaints (Lersch, 2002; Lersch & 
Mieczkowski, 1996). A recent study of citizen complaints in eight cities conducted by Terrill and 
Ingram (2016) found that “improper force and discourtesy were the two most frequent 
complaints in six of the eight city departments” (p. 171), 20% and 22% respectively, and that 
11% of all complaints were sustained across the eight departments. They also found that male 
and minority citizens were more likely to file complaints, but that complaints filed by African 
Americans were less likely to be sustained. 
The notion that police officer behavior can influence citizen behavior and ultimately the 
outcome of an encounter is central to the potential efficacy of BWCs to reduce use of force 
incidents and citizen complaints. Citizens are much less likely to defer to police authority and 
more likely to resist when officers are disrespectful or overly aggressive at the onset of an 
encounter (Mastrofski, Reisig, & McCluskey, 2002; Terrill, 2003). For example, research has 





impact on officer credibility (Baseheart & Cox, 1993), and can increase citizen perceptions of 
excessive force (Patton, Asken, Fremouw, & Bemis, 2017). Such behavior on the part of police 
officers may provoke resistance or even an assault in an enforcement encounter. The next section 
presents the theoretical framework that predicts the outcome of police-citizen transactions and 
how BWCs may alter those transactions and outcomes by increasing professionalism and 
courtesy and reducing use of force and abuses of authority.  
Theoretical Underpinnings for BWC Impact on Officer Behavior 
The theoretical framework that follows explains the transactional nature of police-citizen 
enforcement contacts and the dynamics that can result in the undesirable outcomes detailed in the 
previous section. Then the two theories which have been proffered to explain how and why the 
utilization of BWCs is expected to result in reduced use of force and citizen complaints are 
presented. This theoretical framework consists of social interactionist theory of coercive actions, 
deterrence, and objective self-awareness theories. 
Dynamics of the police-citizen encounter. 
 The assumption that officer conduct is often a significant factor in how a citizen reacts to 
an enforcement contact is foundational for the belief that equipping officers with BWCs should 
reduce use of force and citizen complaints. Worden (1995) asserted that “officers not only 
respond to situations but also help to create them; sometimes, officers’ choices early in police-
citizen encounters can contribute to the emergence of circumstances that require the use of force” 
(p. 39), and research supports this assertion. For example, Bayley’s (1986) study of Denver 
patrol officers revealed that when officers initially listened to citizens and sought information by 
asking questions, that force was less likely than when they initiated encounters with more 





citizens treated disrespectfully by officers were significantly less likely to comply with the 
officer’s requests. In another study utilizing data obtained through systematic social observation 
of Indianapolis, Indiana and St. Petersburg, Florida patrol officers in the Project on Policing 
Neighborhoods, Terrill (2003) found that police-citizen encounters that began with a coercive 
approach increased the likelihood of suspect resistance and additional use of force. In the latter 
study Terrill employed a broad conceptualization of force that included not only physical actions, 
but verbal commands as well. Terrill (2005) argues that Tedeschi and Felson’s (1994) social 
interactionist theory of coercive actions explains the aforementioned phenomena. 
 Tedeschi and Felson’s social interactionist theory of coercive actions. 
Tedeschi and Felson (1994) define coercive actions in broad terms; they state that “a 
coercive action is an action taken with the intent of imposing harm on another person or forcing 
compliance” (p. 348). The authors assert that there are three types of coercive actions, conveying 
threats, the use of physical force, and punishment, which are intended to force another to comply 
with the demands of the coercer through threatened or the actual inflicting of harm. Harm is 
categorized into three forms, physical, social, and deprivation of resources. Physical harm refers 
to the threat or actual application of physical use of force to inflict pain, social harm refers to 
damaging one’s social identity, status, and/or self-esteem through insults, ridicule, use of 
derogatory language, or any other action to embarrass or humiliate the target person, and 
punishment includes any action taken with the intent to harm the target person in order to restore 
the coercer’s vision of justice. The authors view the motivations to engage in coercive actions 
and the goals the actor hopes to achieve through a social interactionist lens. According to 
Tedeschi and Felson (1994), “a social interactionist perspective emphasizes social conflicts, 





approach emphasizes situational factors, it includes cognitions, preferences, and emotions as 
important features of social actions” (p. 160).  
 The theory posits four basic tenets: The first, that coercive actions are intended to 
accomplish one or more of three goals: “(a) to control the behavior of others, (b) to restore 
justice, and (c) to assert and protect identities” (Tedeschi & Felson, 1994, p. 348). The second, 
one or more of the three types of coercive actions will accomplish one of these goals. Third, the 
actor weighs costs and benefits of coercive actions, and while anticipated high costs may inhibit 
such actions, their values may tilt the scales in favor of coercive action to achieve the desired 
goal. Lastly, while the means to achieve each of the aforementioned goals may differ, many 
instances involve all three desired outcomes.  
This theory provides a plausible explanation for the police-citizen encounter that 
escalates to the use of non-physical coercion, physical force, and potentially the abuse of 
authority. It offers an explanation for both the behavior of the police officer and that of the 
citizen during an interaction. First, in terms of police officer conduct, because of the 
asymmetrical power relationship, police expect deference from all citizens (Alpert & Dunham, 
2004). Moreover, as the asymmetry increases (i.e., the lower the social capital of the citizen), the 
more deference and respect is expected by an officer. Thus, the theory proposes that a hostile and 
disrespectful citizen demeanor, “contempt of cop,” would be received as an affront to not only 
the police officer’s social identity, but his or her official position and societal expectations in 
general, which would warrant a response to re-establish their authority. The theory further asserts 
that the motivation to force compliance and save face is substantially increased with the presence 
of onlookers or peer officers. According to the theory, threats, physical force, and punishments 





posits that coercion will be utilized for retribution when their social identity has been threatened. 
Consequently, a police officer engaged in an enforcement encounter with a recalcitrant and 
disrespectful citizen would be likely to engage in coercive tactics, and perhaps 
verbal/psychological and/or legal/civil rights abuse of authority. Tedeschi and Felson (1994) 
assert that noncontingent threats are often used for retribution in such cases. “A noncontingent 
threat is coercive action that is usually intended to frighten or humiliate the target person. Fear 
and humiliation are harms imposed on the target by the threatener; hence, noncontingent threats 
may be conceived as a form of punishment” (Tedeschi & Felson, 1994, p. 169). Furthermore, the 
theory predicts that “contempt of cop” situations have a high potential to escalate to use of 
physical force or even a physical abuse of authority. 
Tedeschi and Felson’s theory not only predicts the police officer’s behavior in such 
interactions, but the citizen’s as well. As indicated earlier, when officers begin encounters with 
an aggressive/coercive approach, the likelihood of suspect noncompliance and resistance 
increases (Terrill, 2003), and citizens treated disrespectfully by officers are significantly less 
likely to comply with the officer’s requests (Mastrofski et al., 1996). The theory makes clear that 
these officer behaviors are going to be particularly problematic with poor young inner-city 
minorities, among whom social identities are of great importance. Anderson’s (1994) Code of the 
Streets is highly informative in this regard. According to Anderson, central to this code of poor 
inner-city youth and young adults is respect. They value it highly and vigorously protect their 
reputation of being tough by demanding it and retaliating when they sense they have been 
disrespected. Standing up to authority figures is especially indicative of toughness. Therefore, 
the social interactionist theory of coercive actions predicts that police officers entering an 





face noncompliance, resistance, or perhaps even physical assault. Tedeschi and Felson (1994) 
assert that individuals perform somewhat of a cost benefit analysis in the decision-making 
process and that anticipated high costs (e.g., arrest, discipline, etc.) may inhibit one from 
engaging in a coercive action. However, they point out that the more the desired outcome or goal 
is valued, the more cost an individual is willing to endure and that often mental scripts will 
override any fear of costs.  
While social interactionist theory of coercive actions offers an explanation of how the 
dynamics of the police-citizen enforcement encounter can lead to the outcomes of concern (use 
of force, abuse of authority, and citizen complaints), protection of social identities is a 
particularly problematic phenomenon for police officers, and becoming more so as American 
society is increasingly scrutinizing officer behavior. Although fighting words doctrine—the legal 
concept that prohibits the use of language that would likely offend another to the point it could 
cause a breach of peace and upon which disorderly conduct statutes and ordinances were 
based—was established in the U.S. Supreme Court 1942 Chaplinsky v New Hampshire decision, 
in Lewis v. City of New Orleans (1974), disorderly conduct ordinances that prohibit foul 
language against police were ruled unconstitutional (Egan, 1999; c.f., Epps, 2019).2 The case law 
clearly states that citizens have a constitutional right to criticize and express displeasure with 
government and its representatives and police officers are required to have a “thicker skin” than 
members of the general public. Technology may be of assistance in deterring hasty use of force 
and abuse of authority by increasing tolerance, procedurally just behavior and use of de-
escalation techniques. The ability to observe police officer-citizen encounters in what has been a 
                                            
2 The 2019 U.S. Supreme Court Nieves v Bartlett decision limits First Amendment retaliation 





low-visibility environment is thought to be key. Are BWCs a solution? 
Effects of being observed. 
 Ariel and colleagues (2015) have proffered two theories to explain the anticipated 
positive impact of BWCs on officer behavior, deterrence and objective self-awareness, which 
they apply simultaneously. This theoretical framework is based upon the notion that the power to 
control the behavior of individuals lies in the ability to observe them—Foucault’s (1980) social 
theory of panopticism (based on Jeremy Bentham’s panopticon), which asserts that surveillance 
is key for that kind of power. 
Deterrence theory. 
The most basic explanation is that BWCs are a means of oversight and monitoring of 
officer behavior and performance serving as the source of surveillance power mentioned above.  
The concept of deterrence is central to classical criminological theory, and according to Akers 
and Sellers (2013): 
The basic premise in classical criminology is that actions are taken and decisions are 
made by persons in the rational exercise of free will.  All individuals choose to obey or 
violate the law by a rational calculation of the risk of pain versus potential pleasure 
derived from an act (p. 15). 
  
However, the theoretical perspective has been elaborated upon and expanded into a modern 
version known as rational choice theory, which asserts that deterrence from all kinds of deviant 
behaviors occurs as a result of more than just legal sanctions/punishments, but through myriad 
unpleasant consequences (Grasmick & Bursik, 1990; Paternoster, 2010).  Furthermore, scholars 
have recognized that punishment avoidance, and even vicarious punishment avoidance can 
influence the decision to engage in deviant behavior (Stafford & Warr, 1993).   
Ariel and colleagues (2015) contend that surveillance of officer behavior via BWC 





engaging in unprofessional conduct. BWCs are anticipated to have a deterrent effect on these 
behaviors as any use of force is generally considered an unfavorable outcome to be avoided 
whenever possible, and any abuse of authority or unprofessional conduct is grounds for 
disciplinary action. The authors assert that BWC captured video of an incident involving 
unnecessary or excessive force, other abuses of authority, or unprofessional conduct meets the 
three basic tenets of deterrence theory: (1) There is a level of certainty that misconduct captured 
on video will be discovered should a citizen complaint be filed, supervisory audit take place, or 
the video be subject of prosecutorial review for evidentiary purposes; (2) captured video 
provides the means for celerity in an investigation, disposition of a complaint, and subsequent 
disciplinary action; and (3) severity is addressed in that any disciplinary record adversely affects 
a police officer’s career, and, in cases of more serious misconduct (such as excessive force and 
other civil rights violations), not only potential termination and revocation of their peace officer 
license, but perhaps criminal prosecution. Katz and colleagues (2014, 2015) cited this likely 
deterrent effect in a randomized controlled trial of BWCs at the Phoenix, Arizona Police 
Department. However, the devices are not only thought to deter officers from engaging in 
misconduct, but some assert that BWCs also serve as a stimulus to increase professionalism and 
courtesy, which has been referred to as a “civilizing effect” (White, 2014), and procedurally just 
behavior (Hedberg et al., 2017). This notion is derived from another related but unique 
theoretical perspective, objective self-awareness theory. Ariel and colleagues (2015) assert that 
the devices produce a state of objective self-awareness that enhances the deterrent effect.  
Objective self-awareness theory. 
The central assumption of Duval and Wicklund’s (1972) objective self-awareness theory 





subsequently tend to modify their behavior to conform to social expectations. The theory is 
comprised of four concepts: (1) state of consciousness; (2) self-evaluation; (3) standards of 
correctness; and (4) conformity.  The first, state of consciousness, is dichotomous consisting of 
subjective and objective states of awareness. Duvall and Wicklund (1972) posit:  
When attention is directed inward and the individual’s consciousness is focused on 
himself, he is the object of his own consciousness—hence ‘objective’ self-awareness. 
When attention is directed away from himself he is the ‘subject’ of the consciousness that 
is directed toward external objects, thus the term ‘subjective’ self-awareness (p. 2). 
 
The second concept, self-evaluation, refers to a process that takes place in the state of objective 
self-awareness in which one examines their behavior critically in comparison with the third 
concept, standards of correctness.  According to Duvall and Wicklund (1972): 
The notion of self-evaluation is predicated on the existence of a psychological system of 
standards of correctness that is possessed by each person… A standard is defined as a 
mental representation of correct behavior, attitudes, and traits (p. 3). 
 
Examples of standards of correctness include rules of etiquette such as table manners, 
appropriate language for present company, and proper comportment at a funeral (Duvall & 
Wicklund, 1972). The final concept is conformity, which Duvall and Wicklund (1972) define as, 
“a change in the person’s attitudes, beliefs, or behaviors in the direction of the differing attitudes, 
beliefs, or behaviors of other people who are present in the same situation” (p. 57). 
Duvall and Wicklund (1972) postulate the following propositions. First, the two 
conscious states are mutually exclusive.  One cannot simultaneously focus conscious attention on 
him or herself and an external stimulus.  However, the theory posits that one may “oscillate” 
between the two conscious states.  Second, that the subjective state of awareness is the primary 
or default conscious state.  According to Duvall and Wicklund (1972): 
the environment is normally a strong enough stimulus to draw attention toward it, which 
means the self is totally excluded from attention. In order that the person become 





an object in the world” (p. 7). 
 
Third, Duvall and Wicklund (1972) assert that stimuli such as seeing oneself in a mirror can be 
sufficient to trigger objective self-awareness, but that being observed by another person is the 
strongest stimulus.  Lastly, when one enters the state of objective self-awareness one 
automatically engages in self-assessment comparing behavior to the previously mentioned 
standard of correctness.  If one discovers a discrepancy between the two, then he or she will 
either conform his or her behavior to the standard of correctness, or flee the situation causing the 
objective self-awareness state (Duvall & Wicklund, 1972). According to Duvall & Wicklund 
(1972), “awareness of the self as an object acts as a feedback system which forces the individual 
to alter aspects of himself in the direction of his conception of what a correct person should be” 
(p. ix).  
The effects of being observed (or even the perception of being observed) on compliance 
behaviors has been studied in a variety of contexts, such as productivity of industrial laborers 
(Landsberger, 1958), handwashing behaviors of public restroom users (Munger & Harris, 1989), 
employee handwashing in healthcare facilities (Bolton, Rivas, Prachar, & Jones, 2015), parent-
child interactions (Gardner, 2000), doctor-patient interactions (Redman, Dickinson, Cockburn, 
Hennrikus, & Sanson-Fisher, 1989), patient care quality in nursing homes (Schnelle, Ouslander, 
& Simmons, 2006), littering (Ernest-Jones, Nettle, & Bateson, 2011), and honor system 
collection boxes for coffee (Bateson, Nettle, & Roberts, 2006) to name a few. While objective 
self-awareness theory has historically been applied and tested in direct observation situations 
(Wicklund, 1975; Silva & Duval, 2001), the notion among law enforcement practitioners and 
many academics alike is that video monitoring of officer activity would have essentially the 





(Farrar & Ariel, 2013; Harris, 2010; Kassin, Kukucka, Lawson, & DeCarlo, 2014; Schellenberg, 
2000; White, 2014).  
As mentioned in Chapter 1, the desired behaviors that are anticipated as a result of 
objective self-awareness via BWCs define procedural justice, and the tenets of procedural justice 
and de-escalation techniques overlap. According to Todak and James (2018): 
The notion from procedural justice that citizens want to be treated by police with dignity 
and respect is echoed in the “respect” and “human” tactics which involve talking to 
citizens as people and minimizing the use of authoritative voice and “cop talk.” Dignity 
and respect for citizens and their rights can also be shown through the “compromise” 
tactic. Sometimes, a small adjustment to charges can significantly improve a person’s 
situation while still achieving justice. Demonstrating the fairness and neutrality 
components of procedural justice can be achieved using the “honesty” tactic. By 
providing a clear explanation for the decisions being made, officers demonstrate to 
citizens that they are applying the law fairly. Finally, the “listen” and “empower” tactics 
legitimize citizens’ concerns and engage them as partners in the decision-making process 
(p. 517). 
 
These are the very behaviors that the objectively self-aware police officer would arguably 
engage in which, in turn, should aid in de-escalation and result in fewer use of force incidents 
and citizen complaints. An anticipated result referred to by White (2014) as a “civilizing effect,” 
which falls in line with the paradigm shift from a “warrior” to “guardian” mindset recommended 
by The President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing (2015) to address the current police 
legitimacy crisis. 
  In summation, the preceding theoretical framework established the behaviors that 
BWCs are anticipated to deter, those behaviors they are anticipated to promote, and the means by 
which these anticipated behavioral changes are believed to be achieved. Although BWCs have 
been implemented by U.S. police agencies on a large scale just in the last few years with very 
little evidence of their effectiveness, researchers have been quick to respond. Several randomized 





devices on use of force and citizen complaints, which have produced mixed results.  
Extant BWC Research 
 A total of 14 studies examining the impact of BWCs on use of force and/or citizen 
complaints have been conducted in the United States, which include randomized controlled trials 
of the devices at the Rialto, CA Police Department, Mesa, AZ Police Department, Phoenix, AZ 
Police Department, Las Vegas, NV Police Department, Orlando, FL Police Department, Denver, 
CO Police Department, Spokane, WA Police Department, Washington, DC Police Department, 
Arlington, TX Police Department, Milwaukee, WI Police Department, Hallandale Beach, FL 
Police Department, and the Boston, MA Police Department. In addition, quasi-experimental 
evaluations of the impact of BWCs on use of force have been conducted at the Tampa, FL Police 
Department and an unnamed agency in the Northwest U.S. Eighteen publications have been 
generated from these studies, ten of which have been published in peer reviewed journals. 















     Table 2.1: Extant Research Examining the Impact of BWCs on Use of Force & Citizen 
     Complaints 
 
 
DV - Use of Force Reports Only 
 
Jennings, Fridell, Lynch, 
Jetelina, & Gonzalez (2017)1 
 
Tampa, FL • Research Design: Quasi-
experimental evaluation [3/2015 
– 2/2016] 
• Agency: Tampa Police 
Department - large agency (1000 
sworn) 
• Unit of Analysis: Individual 
officer and treatment vs. control 
groups 
• Sample: Treatment group BWC 
equipped (n = 60 officers) / 
control group (n = 60 officers) 
• Measure: Use of force reports 
• Analysis: PSM and t-test 
• Results: BWC equipped 
officers had significantly less use 
of force reports than control 
officers, both during the 
evaluation period and pre/post 
BWC implementation 
  




• Research Design: Quasi-
experimental evaluation [pre 
BWC 1/2009 – 3/2013 / post 
BWC 4/2013 – 5/2016] 
• Agency: Unnamed – midsize or 
small agency (< 100 sworn) 
• Unit of Analysis: Aggregated 
monthly use of force reports  
• Measure: Monthly rate of use 
of force reports per 1,000 calls for 
service 
• Analysis: Interrupted time 
series  
• Results: Statistically significant 
increase in use of force reports in 








DV - Citizen Complaints Only 
 




Arlington, TX • Research Design: 6-month 
randomized controlled trial 
[10/2015 – 3/2016] 
• Agency: Arlington Police 
Department - large agency (635 
sworn) 
• Unit of Analysis: Shift (12-
hour) – all officers on shift BWC 
equipped 
• Sample: 9,730 shifts randomly 
assigned to treatment condition 
(4,893 treatment / 4,837 control) 
• Measure: Citizen complaints 
filed (rate per shift) 
• Analysis: Descriptive only 
• Results: BWC equipped 
officers had a 38% drop in citizen 
complaints compared to the same 
six months prior to BWC 
implementation 
 
Hedberg, Katz, & Choate 
(2017)1; 








• Research Design: 15 month 
randomized controlled trial 
[4/2013 – 7/2014] 
• Agency: Phoenix Police 
Department - large agency (3000 
sworn) 
• Unit of Analysis: Incident 
• Sample: Patrol areas (1 
experimental / 1 control) within 1 
precinct 
• Measure: Citizen complaints 
filed (rate per incident) 
• Analysis: GLM regression 
• Results: BWC equipped 
officers significantly less likely to 














• Research Design: 12-month 
quasi-randomized controlled trial 
[10/2012 – 9/2013] 
• Agency: Mesa Police 
Department - large agency (800 
sworn) 
• Unit of Analysis: Treatment 
and control groups (aggregated 
citizen complaints filed) 
• Sample: Treatment group BWC 
equipped (n = 50 officers) / 
control group (n = 50 officers) 
• Measure: Citizen complaints 
filed 
• Analysis: Descriptive only 
• Results: BWC equipped 
officers had 48% reduction in 
citizen complaints of misconduct 
and 75% reduction in use of force 
complaints filed against them 
 
 




Denver, CO • Research Design: 6-month 
randomized controlled trial 
[7/2014 – 12/2014] 
• Agency: Denver Police 
Department - large agency (1500 
sworn) 
• Unit of Analysis: Patrol district 
• Sample: 1 treatment district (n 
= 119 officers) / 5 control 
districts (n = 513 officers) 
• Measures: Aggregated Use of 
force reports and citizen 
complaints filed 
• Analysis: Adjusted odds ratios  
• Results: Statistically significant 
lower odds of citizen complaints, 






Ariel, Farrar, & Sutherland 
(2015)1; 
Farrar & Ariel (2013); 
Sutherland, Ariel, Farrar, & 
De Anda (2017)1 
  
Rialto, CA • Research Design: 12-month 
randomized controlled trial 
[2/2012 – 1/2013] 
• Agency: Rialto Police 
Department - midsize agency 
(115 sworn) 
• Unit of Analysis: Shift (12-
hour) – all officers on shift BWC 
equipped 
• Sample: 54 officers / 988 shifts 
randomly assigned to treatment 
condition (489 treatment /499 
control) 
• Measures: Use of force reports 
and citizen complaints filed (rate 
per shift) 
• Analysis: Poisson and 
interrupted time series 
• Results: Statistically significant 
reductions in use of force and 
citizen complaints 
 
Braga, Barao, McDevitt, & 
Zimmerman (2018) 
 
Boston, MA • Research Design: 12-month 
randomized controlled trial 
[9/2016 – 8/2017] 
• Agency: Boston Police 
Department - large agency (2000 
sworn) 
• Unit of Analysis: Treatment 
and control groups (aggregated 
use of force reports and citizen 
complaints filed)  
• Sample: Treatment group BWC 
equipped (n = 140 officers) / 
control group (n = 141 officers) 
of gang unit 
• Measures: Aggregated use of 
force reports and citizen 
complaints filed 
• Analysis: Independent samples 






  • Results: No significant 
difference between BWC 
equipped/non-equipped officers 
in either use of force reports or 
citizen complaints 
Braga, Sousa, Coldren, & 
Rodriguez (2018)1  
 
Las Vegas, NV • Research Design: 19-month 
randomized controlled trial 
[3/2014 – 9/2015] 
 
• Agency: Las Vegas Police 
Department - large agency (2600 
sworn) 
• Unit of Analysis: Individual 
officers  
• Sample: Treatment group BWC 
equipped (n = 218 officers) / 
control group (n = 198 officers) 
• Measures: use of force reports 
and citizen complaints filed 
(binary 0 = no use of force/citizen 
complaint or 1 = 1 or more) 
• Analysis: z-test  
• Results: BWC equipped 
officers significantly less use of 
force reports and citizen 
complaints 
 





• Research Design:12-month 
quasi-randomized controlled trial 
[1/2016 – 12/2016] 
• Agency: Hallandale Beach 
Police Department - midsize 
agency (60 sworn) 
• Unit of Analysis: Treatment 
and control groups (aggregated 
use of force reports and citizen 
complaints filed) 
• Sample: Treatment group BWC 
equipped (n = 26 officers) / 
control group (n = 25 officers) 
• Measures: use of force reports 







  • Analysis: Independent samples 
t-test 
• Results: No significant 
difference between BWC 
equipped/non-equipped officers 
in either use of force reports or 
citizen complaints / no significant 
reductions in either measure 
pre/post BWC deployment 




• Research Design: 12-month 
randomized controlled trial 
[3/2014 – 2/2015] 
• Agency: Orlando Police 
Department - large agency (700 
sworn) 
• Unit of Analysis: Treatment 
and control groups (aggregated 
use of force reports and citizen 
complaints filed) 
• Sample: Treatment group BWC 
equipped (n = 46 officers) / 
control group (n = 43 officers) 
• Measures: use of force reports 
and citizen complaints filed 
• Analysis: Independent samples 
t-test 
• Results: BWC equipped 
officers significantly less use of 
force reports and citizen 
complaints than control officer 
group and significant difference 
pre/post BWC implementation 
  
Peterson, Yu, La Vigne, & 
Lawrence (2018) 
 
Milwaukee, WI • Research Design: 15-month 
randomized controlled trial 
[10/2015 – 12/2016] 
• Agency: Milwaukee Police 
Department - large agency (1800 
sworn) 
• Unit of Analysis: Treatment 
and control groups (aggregated 







  • Sample: Treatment group BWC 
equipped (n = 252 officers) / 
control group (n = 252 officers) 
• Measures: Use of force reports 
and citizen complaints filed 
• Analysis: Poisson and logistic 
regression 
• Results: No significant 
reduction in use of force reports 
and citizen complaints pre/post 
BWC implementation / no 
significant difference between 
treatment and control officer 
groups 
White, Gaub, & Todak (2017)1 Spokane, WA 
 
• Research Design: 6-month 
randomized controlled trial 
[5/2015 – 10/2015] 
• Agency: Spokane Police 
Department - large agency (300 
sworn) 
• Unit of Analysis: Treatment 
and control groups rate of use of 
force reports and citizen 
complaints filed per 1,000 calls 
for service per month 
• Sample: Treatment group BWC 
equipped (n = 82 officers) / 
control group (n = 67 officers) 
• Measures: Use of force reports 
and citizen complaints filed 
converted to monthly rate per 
1,000 calls for service 
• Analysis: Independent and 
paired samples t-test 
• Results: No significant 
reduction in use of force reports 
and citizen complaints pre/post 
BWC implementation / no 
significant difference between 












• Research Design: 6-month 
randomized controlled trial 
[5/2015 – 10/2015] 
• Agency: District of Columbia 
Police Department - large agency 
(3800 sworn) 
• Unit of analysis: Individual 
officer  
• Sample: Treatment group BWC 
equipped (n = 1,189 officers) / 
control group (n = 1,035 officers) 
• Measures: Use of force reports 
and citizen complaints filed 
• Analysis: WLS regression 
• Results: Null, no significant 
treatment effect on use of force 
reports or citizen complaints filed 
•  
      Notes: 1Published in peer reviewed journal 
Impact of BWCs on use of force. 
 The impact of BWCs on use of force has been examined in 11 of the 14 U.S. studies, 
showing mixed results. These include nine randomized controlled trials (Denver, CO – Ariel, 
2017; Rialto, CA – Ariel et al., 2015, Farrar & Ariel, 2013, Sutherland et al., 2017; Boston, MA - 
Braga, Barao, et al., 2018; Las Vegas, NV - Braga, Sousa, et al., 2018; Hallandale Beach, FL -  
Headley et al., 2017; Orlando, FL – Jennings et al., 2015; Milwaukee, WI – Peterson et al., 2018; 
Spokane, WA – White et al., 2017; Washington, DC – Yokum et al., 2017) and two quasi-
experimental evaluations (Tampa, FL - Jennings, et al., 2017; unnamed agency in Northwest, 
U.S. – Koslicki et al., 2019), all of which utilized officer completed use of force reports (official 
agency data) in the operationalization of the dependent variable. The first of these studies was 
conducted in Rialto, CA by Farrar and Ariel (2013) between February 2012 and January 2013. 
The statistically significant findings of this small RCT (reduced use of force incidents by more 





Since this first study, three others have found statistically significant reductions in use of 
force (Las Vegas, NV - Braga, Sousa, et al., 2018; Orlando, FL – Jennings et al., 2015; Tampa, 
FL - Jennings, et al., 2017). However, twice as many (six) have found no significant differences 
between BWC equipped officers and those in the control group and/or pre/post device 
implementation in terms of use of force (Denver, CO – Ariel, 2017; Boston, MA - Braga, Barao, 
et al., 2018; Hallandale Beach, FL - Headley et al., 2017; Milwaukee, WI – Peterson et al., 2018; 
Spokane, WA – White et al., 2017; Washington, DC – Yokum et al., 2017). Moreover, one study 
(Koslicki et al., 2019), the longest quasi-experimental evaluation to date (four years pre- and 
three years post-BWC deployment at an unnamed Northwest U.S. agency), found a statistically 
significant increase in use of force reports over the three years post BWC implementation. 
 Although the generalizability to U.S. policing is questionable, several international 
studies have examined the impact of BWCs on use of force as well. These include two conducted 
in Canada (Edmonton, AB - Edmonton Police Service, 2015; Toronto, ON - Toronto Police 
Service, 2016), one in the United Kingdom (Birmingham, UK - Henstock & Ariel, 2017) and one 
global/multi-site study (Ariel, Sutherland, Henstock, Young, Drover, Sykes, Megicks, & 
Henderson, 2016). Of these four studies, one reported statistically significant reductions in use of 
force (Henstock & Ariel, 2017) and two reported null results (Edmonton Police Service, 2015; 
Toronto Police Service, 2016). Ariel and colleagues (2016), however, reported a significant 
increase in use of force in their global/multi-site study, and found that this increase may be due 
to officer discretion in camera activation. Collectively, the U.S. and international studies fail to 
provide a definitive answer, thus the impact of BWCs on use of force remains unclear. 
Impact of BWCs on citizen complaints. 





studies, which, like the research examining the impact of BWCs on use of force, have also 
produced mixed results. These include 10 randomized controlled trials (Arlington, TX – 
Goodison & Wilson, 2017; Phoenix, AZ – Hedberg et al., 2017, Katz, et al., 2014; Denver, CO – 
Ariel, 2017; Rialto, CA – Ariel et al., 2015, Farrar & Ariel, 2013, Sutherland et al., 2017; 
Boston, MA - Braga, Barao, et al., 2018; Las Vegas, NV - Braga, Sousa, et al., 2018; Orlando, 
FL – Jennings et al., 2015; Milwaukee, WI – Peterson et al., 2018; Spokane, WA – White et al., 
2017; Washington, DC – Yokum et al., 2017) and two quasi-experimental evaluations (Mesa, 
AZ – Mesa Police Department, 2013; Hallandale Beach, FL – Headley et al., 2017), all of which 
utilized official agency data (citizen complaints filed) in the operationalization of the variable. 
Farrar and Ariel’s (2013) Rialto study was again the first of these studies chronologically and 
found that BWC equipped officers experienced a 90% reduction in citizen complaints.  
Since the Rialto study, six others have found statistically significant reductions in citizen 
complaints (Arlington, TX – Goodison & Wilson, 2017; Phoenix, AZ – Hedberg et al., 2017, 
Katz et al., 2014; Mesa, AZ – Mesa Police Department, 2013; Denver, CO – Ariel, 2017; Las 
Vegas, NV - Braga, Sousa, et al., 2018; Orlando, FL – Jennings et al., 2015). However, five 
studies found no significant differences in citizen complaint filings between BWC equipped 
officers and those in the control group and/or pre/post device implementation (Boston, MA - 
Braga, Barao, et al., 2018; Hallandale Beach, FL - Headley et al., 2017; Milwaukee, WI – 
Peterson et al., 2018; Spokane, WA – White et al., 2017; Washington, DC – Yokum et al., 2017). 
The impact of BWCs on citizen complaints has been the subject of several international 
studies as well, two in Canada (Edmonton, AB – Edmonton Police Service, 2015; Toronto, ON – 
Toronto Police Service, 2016), three in the United Kingdom (Portsmouth, UK – Ellis, Jenkins, & 





Davies, & Baika, 2015), one in Uruguay (Mitchell, Ariel, Firpo, Fraiman, Castillio, Hyatt, 
Weinborn, & Sabo, 2018), and one global/multisite study (Ariel, Sutherland, Henstock, Young, 
Drover, Sykes, Megicks, & Henderson, 2017). Of these seven studies, all but two (Edmonton 
Police Service, 2015; Toronto Police Service, 2016) reported statistically significant reductions 
in citizen complaints. Notwithstanding the earlier caveat concerning the generalizability of the 
international studies to U.S. policing, although the results are a little more consistent than those 
of the use of force research, the impact of BWCs on citizen complaints is also inconclusive. 
Methodological issues and gaps in the extant BWC research. 
 As indicated in the two preceding sections, the data sources for the measures of use of 
force and citizen complaints have been consistent across the extant research (official agency 
data), however, a number of different metrics have been utilized. Use of force and citizen 
complaints have been examined as simple count variables in aggregate by month, by year, or the 
length of the study for individual officers in a few instances, and for treatment and control 
groups in most. Rates have been calculated and used in some studies, which include rate of use 
of force reports and/or citizen complaints per shift (Ariel, et al., 2015; Goodison & Wilson, 
2017; Headley et al., 2017; Hedberg et al., 2017), and per 1,000 calls for service (Koslicki et al., 
2019; White et al., 2017). One study coded use of force reports and citizen complaints as binary 
variables (0 = no use of force reports/citizen complaints and 1 = 1 or more) (Braga, Sousa, et al., 
2018). However, while the rates that have been utilized standardize the measure, and in one case 
controls for call volume, they do not control for staffing. Calculating a rate per patrol hours 
worked for the dependent variables would arguably control for staffing, while including both 
rates of externally generated calls for service and officer-initiated activity per patrol hours 





or named in a citizen complaint.  
   Second, while the extant studies have examined the frequency of use of force incidents, 
the potential impact of BWCs on the level or severity of force utilized and frequency of citizen 
injuries has not been explored. Likewise, little attention has been given to potential changes in 
complaint dispositions. The only known study that has addressed the latter in any form is Braga 
and colleagues (2018) who found that BWC equipped officers were less likely than no-equipped 
officers to have complaints sustained, but the finding was not statistically significant. Lastly, the 
majority of the analyses have been descriptive and/or independent sample t-test comparisons of 
treatment and control groups. Only two of the U.S. studies employed time series analysis to 
examine a substantial period of time pre- and post-BWC deployment (Rialto, CA – Sutherland et 
al., 2017; Unnamed Northwest U.S. agency – Koslicki et al., 2019). Sutherland and colleagues 
(2017) examined four years post-BWC implementation at the Rialto, CA Police Department and 
found that the initial reductions in use of force and citizen complaints had been sustained. 
However, Koslicki and colleagues’ (2019) analysis of four years pre and three years post BWC 
implementation data from an agency in the Northwest U.S. indicated a significant increase in use 
of force reports over the three years following device deployment. These are the only two known 
studies that have examined long-term impact of the devices and have conflicting results. A 
potential unintended consequence of equipping police officers with BWCs that is also scantly 
addressed in the research literature is the possibility of a de-policing effect. 
Potential De-policing 
 While several of the extant studies have demonstrated the potential positive effect of 
BWCs on officer behavior, concerns have been raised that the devices may negatively impact 





enforcement contacts, such as stop and frisks of suspicious persons and traffic stops (particularly 
investigative traffic stops), a potential phenomenon that has been described as “camera-induced 
passivity” (Wallace, White, Gaub, & Todak, 2018, p. 481). However, concerns of de-policing 
first emerged post-Ferguson due to the increased scrutiny of police by the general public, 
government officials, and advocacy groups, a potential phenomenon commonly referred to as the 
“Ferguson effect.” 
A report published by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (2017) asserts that, as a result 
of the high-profile questionable deadly force incidents in recent years, law enforcement has felt a 
“chill wind” (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2017). The report proposes that law enforcement 
officers have not only perceived that “national politicians stood against them, but also that the 
politicians’ words and actions signified that disrespect was acceptable in the aftermath of the 
Brown shooting” (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2017, p. 3). Furthermore, it asserts that the 
intense media coverage implying epidemic police misconduct and wrongdoing has led to a social 
movement to challenge and discredit law enforcement actions. The study asserts that police 
officers are demoralized and less proactive as a result—the de-policing phenomenon referred to 
as the Ferguson effect. De-policing, in terms of a Ferguson effect, in particular, has been 
identified as a form of dissent shirking. A concept found in the broader organizational behavior 
literature, it refers to a process in which reducing one’s work activity serves as an emotionally-
led form of silent protest (Chanin & Sheats, 2017). This concept is specifically applicable to 
policing due to the highly discretionary nature of policing (i.e., engagement in self-initiated 
enforcement activities). 
A post-Ferguson de-policing phenomenon remains largely a matter of speculation, as 





police officers in a Pew Research Center (2017) study indicated that the recent high-profile 
police shootings of African American citizens has been problematic for policing, and 72 percent 
reported being more reluctant to stop and question suspicious subjects (Morin, Parker, Stepler, & 
Mercer, 2017). However, results of one empirical study that examined the issue has been 
published in a peer reviewed journal. Shjarback, Pyrooz, Wolfe, and Decker (2017) analyzed 
data from 118 Missouri law enforcement agencies (epicenter of the 2014 Ferguson incident) that 
policed jurisdictions of 5,000 citizens or more using paired t-tests. According to Shjarback and 
colleagues (2017): 
We found consistent evidence of a racialized de-policing effect. Departments made fewer 
vehicle/traffic stops, searches, and arrests in 2015 relative to 2014 in jurisdictions with 
larger African –American populations. Thus, a major finding of this study is that 
context—especially the racial compositions of cities—shapes de-policing behavior (p. 
50). 
 
There is widespread speculation that de-policing is responsible for recent increases in 
violent crime (Mac-Donald, 2016). While the delay in the availability of data made it difficult to 
address this question immediately, scholars have published some study results. Rosenfeld (2016) 
conducted an analysis of de-policing effects and increased violent crime in a sample of large US 
cities in a National Institute of Justice-sponsored study finding no connections between the two. 
Similarly, Shjarback and colleagues (2017) found no significant impact on crime rates in their 
study of Missouri agencies. However, due to the limited research this remains an open question 
as well. 
As mentioned, some have expressed concerns that BWCs could exacerbate de-policing 
stemming from a Ferguson effect, or simply deter officers from engaging in self-initiated 
enforcement encounters for fear of scrutiny. In either case, or both combined, Wallace and 





both internal and external scrutiny of their actions resulting from the BWC captured video. They 
further suggest that an officer’s ability to limit his or her exposure to scrutiny is primarily limited 
to discretionary activities, such as suspicious person (pedestrian) and traffic stops. As indicated 
in a previous section of this chapter, enforcement contacts initiated by the officer is a correlate of 
both use of force and citizen complaints. Thus, officers might become less proactive to protect 
themselves. Although a handful of studies have examined the impact of BWCs on officer activity 
in some form, only Wallace and colleagues (2018) have empirically examined de-policing and 
BWCs specifically. Summaries of these studies and the associated publications are listed in 
Table 2.2. 
































    Table 2.2: Extant Research Examining the Impact of BWCs on Officer Proactivity 
 
 
DV – Self Initiated Activity 
 







• Research Design: 12-month 
quasi-randomized controlled trial 
[1/2016 – 12/2016] 
• Agency: Hallandale Beach 
Police Department - midsize 
agency (60 sworn) 
• Unit of Analysis: Treatment 
and control groups (aggregated 
arrests, field contacts, and traffic 
citations.  
• Sample: Treatment group BWC 
equipped (n = 26 officers) / 
control group (n = 25 officers) 
• Measures: aggregated arrests, 
field contacts, and traffic citations 
(percent change for treatment and 
control groups pre and post BWC 
implementation) 
• Analysis: Independent samples 
t-tests 
• Results: Statistically significant 
reduction in arrests but increase 
in field contacts for BWC 
equipped officers compared to 
control group / no significant 
reductions/difference in traffic 
citations pre/post BWC 
deployment for either group 
 
Peterson, Yu, La Vigne, & 
Lawrence (2018) 
 
Milwaukee, WI • Research Design: 15-month 
randomized controlled trial 
[10/2015 – 12/2016] 
• Agency: Milwaukee Police 
Department - large agency (1800 
sworn) 
• Unit of Analysis: Treatment 
and control groups (aggregated 






• Sample: Treatment group BWC 
equipped (n = 252 officers) / 
control group (n = 252 officers) 
• Measures: Aggregated arrests, 
traffic stops, and subject stops for 
the nine months prior to BWC 
implementation and 9 months 
post implementation for treatment 
and control groups  
• Analysis: Poisson and logistic 
regression 
• Results: BWC equipped 
officers made 8% fewer subject 
stops than control group officers 
(statistically significant); no 
significant differences in number 
of arrests or traffic stops 
  
Ready & Young (2015)1 
 
Mesa, AZ • Research Design: 12-month 
quasi-randomized controlled trial 
[10/2012 – 9/2013] 
• Agency: Mesa Police 
Department - large agency (800 
sworn) 
• Unit of Analysis: Individual 
officer  
• Sample: Treatment group BWC 
equipped (n = 50 officers) / 
control group (n = 50 officers) 
• Measure: Officer completed 
field contact reports (binary 0/1: 
self-initiated; stop & frisk; 
warning; citation; arrest)   
• Analysis: HGLM logistic 
regression 
• Results: BWC equipped 
officers were significantly more 
likely to initiate encounters and 
issue citations, but significantly 
less likely to conduct stop & 
frisks than control group officers 





• Research Design: 6-month 
randomized controlled trial 





• Agency: Spokane Police 
Department - large agency (300 
sworn) 
• Unit of Analysis: Individual 
officer 
• Sample: Treatment group BWC 
equipped (n = 82 officers) / 
control group (n = 67 officers) 
• Measures: Computer assisted 
dispatch recorded self-initiated 
calls and arrests 
• Analysis: HLM 
• Results: No evidence of 
statistically significant camera-
induced passivity. Results showed 
an increase of proactivity for 
BWC equipped officers 
 
White, Todak, & Gaub  
(2018)1 
 
Tempe, AZ • Research Design: 13-month 
randomized controlled trial 
[11/2015 – 12/2016] 
• Agency: Tempe Police 
Department - large agency (342 
sworn) 
• Unit of Analysis: Treatment 
and control groups aggregated 
self-initiated calls 
 
• Sample: Treatment group BWC 
equipped (n = 101 officers) / 
control group (n = 99 officers) 
• Measures: Computer assisted 
dispatch recorded self-initiated 
calls converted to monthly rate 
per 1,000 self-initiated calls for 
treatment and control groups 
• Analysis: Independent a nd 
paired samples t-test 
• Results: No significant 
reduction in self-initiated calls / 
no significant difference between 
treatment and control officer 
groups 





 As documented in Table 2.2 above, results are mixed. Of the five studies, all of which 
were randomized controlled trials, three found a statistically significant reduction in at least one 
officer activity measure, two found a statistically significant increase in at least one activity 
measure, and two had null findings. While Peterson et al. (2018) found a statistically significant 
reduction in pedestrian stops among BWC equipped officers and Ready and Young (2015) found 
that BWC equipped officers were significantly less likely to conduct stop and frisks, Headley et 
al. (2017) found an increase in field contacts for BWC equipped officers compared to the control 
group. Similarly, Headley et al. (2017) found a statistically significant reduction in arrests for 
BWC equipped officers, while Peterson et al. (2018) found no significant reduction or difference 
in arrests between that BWC equipped officers and those in the control group. Headley et al. 
(2017) found no significant reductions or difference between treatment and control groups in the 
issuance of citations pre/post BWC implementation and Peterson et al. (2018) found no 
significant differences in terms of traffic stops, but Ready and Young (2015) found that BWC 
equipped officers were significantly more likely to initiate encounters and issue citations. 
Finally, Wallace et al. (2018) and White et al. (2018) found no evidence of camera-induced 
passivity in Spokane, WA and no significant reduction in self-initiated activity in Tempe, AZ 
respectively. 
          Of these few studies, arguably the Spokane, WA research conducted by Wallace and 
colleagues (2018), which generated null findings, is the most comprehensive and focused on the 
potential link between BWCs and de-policing. However, considering the racialized de-policing 
effect found by Shjarback et al. (2017), it seems likely that Spokane’s relative lack of diversity 
makes generalizability of these findings questionable. According to the U.S. Census Bureau 





86.7 percent white, 2.3 percent African American, and 5 percent Hispanic. The second 
methodological concern is the potential Hawthorne effect associated with a randomized 
controlled trial, which is problematic in all five of these studies. While randomized controlled 
trials are considered the “gold standard,” Koslicki and colleagues (2019) call attention to this 
issue that seems highly likely to occur in the unique context of policing. Regarding the mixed 
results of the extant BWC literature and the possibility of a Hawthorne effect, Koslicki et al. 
(2019) state: 
One explanation for these divergent results may relate to one of the greatest challenges 
presented to experimental researchers, which is to say ‘that which we study, we 
influence. In the context of RCTs, this Hawthorne effect occurs through research 
subjects’ awareness of being observed by the researcher (Merrett 2007), and – though 
there is some uncertainty as to the mechanisms and complexities behind the effect – 
remains a well-documented phenomenon across scientific fields (McCambridge et al. 
2014, Chen et al. 2015). With many of the aforementioned findings on the efficacy of 
BWCs in changing police officer behaviour coming from RCTs, there is a likelihood that 
researcher presence on BWC research sites may affect the influence of BWCs through 
the duration of the trial (p. 5). 
 
Although officers are being observed via the BWC video recordings, and, as set forth in the 
theoretical framework, the devices are believed to alter officer behavior because of this 
observation, Koslicki and colleagues argue the presence of researchers may introduce a 
secondary Hawthorne effect due to the certainty that their activity is being monitored. They 
argue that this potential problem could be avoided with a quasi-experimental research design. 
De-policing, whether stemming from Ferguson effect dissent shirking, camera-induced 
passivity for fear of public scrutiny, or a combination of the two, has generally been viewed in 
negative terms. Accordingly, Wallace and colleagues (2018) state, “[t]he potential for BWCs to 
alter police activity negatively is a serious concern that could short-circuit the primary benefits of 
the technology” (p. 483). This negative connotation notwithstanding, some scholars suggest that 





2007; Brunson & Miller, 2005; Epp et al., 2014). Therefore, reductions in these types of contacts 
might serve to improve police-community relations (Sharback et al., 2017). Regardless of one’s 
position on the issue, the extremely limited research examining the impact of BWCs on proactive 
enforcement contacts is insufficient to provide a conclusive answer. 
Chapter Summary 
 This chapter began with an overview of use of force, abuse of authority and citizen 
complaints to further enlighten the problems on which BWCs are anticipated to have a positive 
impact. The theoretical underpinnings of the presumed positive impact of the devices followed. 
Tedeschi and Felson’s social interactionist theory of coercive actions makes the transactional 
nature of the police officer-citizen enforcement encounter clear and explains how both the 
officer’s and citizen’s conduct from the onset of the contact can be problematic and lead to an 
undesirable outcome. Tedeschi and Felson’s theory concerning the dynamics of the police-
citizen enforcement encounter was followed by the theoretical framework on which the 
anticipated positive impact of BWCs on officer behavior is based. Deterrence and objective self-
awareness theories were reviewed as they are the basis for BWC proponent claims that officers 
will be less likely to abuse their authority to protect their social identity and engage in 
procedurally just behaviors, including employing de-escalation techniques as a result of being 
observed via BWC captured video. Then, the extant research that has examined the impact of 
BWCs on officer behavior (use of force and citizen complaints specifically) was reviewed. 
The extant research literature examining the impact of BWCs on use of force and citizen 
complains has produced mixed results. While a few early randomized controlled trials indicated 
that equipping officers with BWCs substantially reduced use of force incidents and citizen 





extant studies that have examined the impact of BWCs on use of force, five have found that 
BWCs significantly reduced use of force incidents (Braga, Sousa, et al., 2018; Farrar & Ariel, 
2013; Henstock & Ariel, 2017; Jennings et al., 2015; Jennings et al., 2017). However, eight of 
the studies produced null findings (Ariel, 2017; Braga, Barao, et al., 2018; Edmonton Police 
Service, 2015; Headley et al., 2017; Peterson, et al., 2018; Toronto Police Service, 2016; White 
et al., 2017; Yokum et al, 2017), and two studies indicated significant increases in use of force 
post BWC deployment (Ariel et al., 2016; Koslicki et al., 2019). Likewise, the studies examining 
the impact of BWCs on citizen complaints have produced mixed results. Of the 19 extant studies, 
12 found that BWC equipped officers had significant reductions in citizen complaints filed 
against them (Ariel, 2017; Ariel et al., 2017; Braga, Sousa, et al., 2018; Ellis et al., 2015; Farrar 
& Ariel, 2013; Goodall, 2007; Goodison & Wilson, 2017; Grossmith et al., 2015; Hedberg et al., 
2017; Jennings et al., 2015; Mesa Police Department, 2013; Mitchell et al., 2018).  However, 
seven of the studies produced null findings (Braga, Barao, et al., 2018; Edmonton Police Service, 
2015; Headley et al., 2017; Peterson et al., 2018; Toronto Police Service, 2016; White et al., 
2017; Yokum et al., 2017). 
The review of the extant research literature regarding the impact of BWCs on use of force 
and citizen complaints revealed that while official agency records were consistently used as the 
data source across studies, a variety of metrics were utilized in analyses. Six specific 
methodological issues/gaps in the research were identified. First, the rates computed and utilized 
in prior studies do not account for staffing levels, and this potential confounding variable has not 
been otherwise controlled for. Second, although the theoretical framework suggests that officers 
might employ lower level force options more frequently when BWC equipped, potential changes 





examined changes in the frequency of complaint dispositions (Braga, Sousa, et al., 2018), which 
was during a 19-month randomized controlled trial. The long-term impact remains unknown. 
Fourth, only two studies have examined the impact of BWCs on use of force and citizen 
complaints for a period longer than the 12 to 19 month randomized controlled trials, and these 
two studies, which utilized time series analysis, generated conflicting results (Sutherland et al., 
2017; Koslicki et al., 2019). Thus, reduction of use of force and citizen complaints, and the 
sustainability of any reductions in these outcomes post BWC implementation, remains 
undetermined. Fifth, although randomized controlled trials are considered the gold standard of 
research, Koslicki et al. (2019) aptly argues that there is an especially high potential for a 
Hawthorne effect among police officers due to the nature of the work, and this effect is likely 
exacerbated by the testing of a technology developed for the surveillance of officer behavior. All 
but one of the 14 studies conducted in the U.S. have been randomized controlled trials and 
arguably susceptible to a Hawthorne effect. As Koslicki et al. (2019) point out, this potential 
problem could be avoided with a quasi-experimental design. Lastly, the possibility that BWCs 
could contribute to de-policing has received scant attention from researchers. 
Although the potential for BWCs to negatively impact officer proactivity is a commonly-
cited concern, only five studies have examined officer activity in some form. Furthermore, only 
one of those examined the possible phenomenon referred to as camera induced passivity 
specifically (Wallace et al., 2018). Of these five studies (all of which were randomized 
controlled trials), three found a statistically significant reduction in at least one officer activity 
measure among the BWC equipped officers, which include: Pedestrian stops (Peterson et al., 
2018); stop and frisk (Ready & Young, 2015); and arrests (Headley et al., 2017). However, two 





equipped officers, these include: Field contacts (Headley et al., 2017); and citations (Ready & 
Young, 2015). Two of the five studies generated null findings (Wallace et al., 2018; White et al., 
2018). Thus, the results are inconclusive. Since all five of these studies were randomized 
controlled trials, the possibility of a Hawthorne effect cannot be ignored, especially in terms of 
officer activity. 
 BWC advocates lauded the findings of Farrar and Ariel’s (2013) Rialto, California study 
and Mesa, Arizona Police Department’s (2013) study, and the significant reductions in use of 
force incidents (Rialto) and citizen complaints (Rialto & Mesa) are frequently cited in support of 
claims that the devices improve police officer behavior. However, as the review of the extant 
literature revealed, subsequent research has produced mixed findings, which is problematic 
considering the potential negative impact of unrealistic expectations and the expense of BWC 
program maintenance outlined in Chapter 1. The dissertation seeks to advance the current body 
of research literature by addressing the six methodological issues and gaps listed above. Chapter 















Utilizing 86 months of data (May 2010 through June 2017) the dissertation examines the 
impact of BWCs on use of force and citizen complaints at the Newport News, Virginia Police 
Department. This period includes 36 months pre-BWC implementation, 38 months of staggered 
BWC device deployment to all 284 patrol personnel, and 12 months post full BWC deployment 
to all patrol officers. As mentioned previously, NNPD deployed BWCs to patrol officers in 
waves due to budget constraints. The staggered deployment began with a 10-device pilot in May 
2013, and the deployment of an additional 44 BWCs by December of that year. The staggered 
rollout continued with equipping another 30 patrol officers with BWCs by the end of 2014, and 
175 more during 2015. The final 25 officers were BWC equipped in the first half of 2016 for a 
total of 284. The incremental deployment of BWCs among all 284 patrol personnel, combined 
with the fact that NNPD began implementation of BWCs more than one year prior to the 
Ferguson incident, the increased scrutiny of law enforcement, and the rush to equip officers with 
the devices that has followed, permits a unique examination of the impact of the devices.  
The methodological design addresses the following research questions: (1a) Was the 
frequency of use of force incidents reduced post BWC implementation and, if so, was the 
reduction sustained? (1b) If the frequency of use of force incidents was reduced, was there an 
incremental decline with waves of BWC implementation, or did any decline plateau or decay 
over the course of implementation? (1c) Was there a change in the severity of force used 
(frequency of suspect injury)? (1d) Did BWCs have a significant impact on these outcomes when 
simultaneously considering staffing and volume of officer-initiated enforcement activity? (2a) 





reduction sustained? (2b) If the frequency of citizen complaints was reduced, was there an 
incremental decline with waves of BWC implementation, or did any decline plateau or decay 
over the course of implementation? (2c) Was there a change in the proportion of sustained 
complaints compared to those unfounded, unsubstantiated, or in which the officer was 
exonerated? And (2d) did BWCs have a significant impact on these outcomes when 
simultaneously considering staffing levels and volume of officer-initiated enforcement activity.    
Sample & Data 
Sample selection. 
The current study utilizes a nonprobability purposive sample (Newport News, Virginia 
Police Department) because of a confluence of three factors that allows for an important 
contribution to the current body of knowledge concerning the efficacy of BWCs. First, BWC 
implementation began at NNPD 15 months prior to the police legitimacy crisis that followed the 
Ferguson incident and the subsequent rush to equip officers with BWCs. Second, implementation 
of BWCs at NNPD occurred in several waves over the course of three years. Third, NNPD 
granted the researcher unfettered access to the agency’s internal data necessary to address the 
current gaps in the extant research. While a nonprobability purposive sample of a single mid-
Atlantic agency imposes limitations in terms of generalizability, the Newport News Police 
Department is representative of national averages in terms of diversity of sworn personnel.3 The 
2013 Law Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics (LEMAS) Survey indicates 
that 12.5% of sworn officers employed by local police departments are female, and 
                                            
3 Although the proportion of NNPD officers who are racial minorities is larger than the national 
average, African Americans are substantially under-represented in NNPD compared to the 





approximately 27% are racial minorities (Reaves, 2015). Descriptive data of NNPD and its 440 
sworn personnel for the period of the study are contained in Table 3.1.  
 Table 3.1: NNPD Descriptive Data (2010-2017) 
 
Descriptive        M / %         S.D.         Range 
   2010-11 / 
2016-17 
Annual budget1 44.43 2.80 40.43 – 47.41 43.09 / 44.08 
Authorized number of sworn 
personnel 
 
430.00 8.66 420 - 440 420 / 440 
Number of officers assigned to 
patrol 
 
269.86 6.08 258 - 278 273 / 270 
Proportion of sworn personnel 
female2 
 
15.67% - - - 
Proportion of sworn personnel 
African American2 
 
15.67% - - - 
Proportion of sworn personnel 
other racial minority2 
 
13.33% - - - 
Citizen generated calls for 
service 
 
152,661.86 9,218.70 145,020 - 
163,226 
163,226 /  
142,826 
Officer generated calls for 
service 
 
63,300.17 15,160.82 41,791 -  
85,241 
85,241 /  
41,791 
Use of force incidents 117.71 32.71 67 - 155 155 / 67 
Citizen complaints 181.29 52.85 123 - 256 212 / 111 
 Notes: 1Millions of dollars; 2 Proportion of all sworn officers employed 2010 – 2017. 
 
NNPD provides general law enforcement services to a diverse community of 
approximately 180,000. The citizens of Newport News, Virginia are 49.0% white, 40.7% African 
American, and 10.3% other races (U.S. Census Bureau, 2017). Additional descriptive data for 






         Table 3.2: Newport News, Virginia, Descriptive Data (2010 – 2017) 
 
Descriptive        M / %         S.D.              2010 / 2017 
Population1 180,935.86 416.02           180,719 / 180,775 
Proportion of population 
white1 
 
50.38% 0.66 49.00% / 49.00% 
Proportion of population 
African American1 
 
40.40% 0.18 40.70% / 40.70% 
Proportion of population with a 
bachelor’s degree or higher1 
 
23.89% 0.61 22.80% / 24.90% 
Proportion of population 
unemployed1 
 
5.61% 0.55 4.70% / 6.30% 
Proportion of population below 
poverty level1 
 
15.13% 0.90 13.50% / 16.40% 
Median household income1 50,565.38 537.92 49,562.00 / 51,082.00 
Violent crime rate2 
 
454.13 27.81 488.15 / 499.07 
Property crime rate2 3,136.88 118.02 3,359.20 / 3,041.74 
         Notes: 1U.S. Census Bureau (2019): American Fact Finder; 2Federal Bureau of 
         Investigation (2019) – UCR Publications: Crime in the United States. 
    
The descriptive data provided in Table 3.1 (NNPD) shows that while the annual budget, 
authorized number of sworn personnel, and number of officers assigned to patrol all remained 
relatively stable, substantial changes in the volume of citizen- and officer-generated calls for 
service, use of force incidents, and citizen complaints occurred. Between 2010 and 2017 citizen 
generated calls for service decreased modestly (12.50 percent), but officer-generated calls for 
service decreased by more than half (50.97 percent). During the same period NNPD experienced 
major reductions in use of force incidents and citizen complaints, 56.77 and 47.64 percent 
respectively. Regarding the City of Newport News, Table 3.2 shows that the population, 





crime rate all remained relatively stable, but changes occurred in education level, unemployment, 
proportion of the population below poverty level, and the property crime rate between 2010 and 
2017. While the proportion of the population that held a bachelor’s degree or higher increased by 
9.21 percent, the proportion of Newport News residents unemployed and below the poverty level 
increased by 34.04 and 21.48 percent respectively. However, the property crime rate decreased 
by 9.45 percent during the same period. 
Data collection.        
The researcher collected internal NNPD data from four sources for the period of May 1, 
2010 through June 30, 2017, 86 months total: 36 months pre-BWC implementation (May 2010 – 
April 2013), 38 months of staggered BWC device deployment to all 284 patrol personnel (May 
2013 – June 2016), and 12 months post full BWC deployment (July 2016 – June 2017). These 
data include: (1) NNPD computer assisted dispatch (CAD) data; (2) internal affairs data; (3); 
City of Newport News Human Resources Department payroll and personnel data; and (4) NNPD 
Training Division records of BWC assignments. 
The CAD data is a log of all calls for service and self-initiated activity, which contains 
the date, day of week, time, officer identification, how the activity was generated (officer 
initiated or dispatched), description of the call/activity, location (street address, beat, and 
precinct), and disposition of every call and reported activity/contact. The CAD data was 
provided to the researcher by the NNPD Information Technology Department. NNPD utilizes IA 
Pro software to record use of force incidents and formal citizen complaints. The following 
information is extracted from officer completed and filed use of force reports and recorded in IA 
Pro: Officer IDs; the types of force used; citizen resistance and assaults on officers; arrests 





incidents; the reason for the use of force; and the type of service being rendered at the time force 
was used.  
IA Pro is also utilized for recording and tracking formal citizen complaints. Formal 
complaints are classified as those that could result in punitive disciplinary action should they be 
sustained. These complaints receive a full investigation. Conversely, informal complaints are of 
a less serious nature that are handled at the precinct level but are documented in a log maintained 
by the NNPD Internal Affairs Section of the Professional Standards Division. The citizen 
complaint information contained in both the IA Pro database of formal complaints and the 
informal complaint log includes: The date the incident occurred; the date the complaint was 
received; the complainant; the officer against whom the complaint is filed; the offense type; the 
IA investigator; the disposition; and conclusion date. The IA Pro database is also maintained by 
the NNPD Internal Affairs Section of the Professional Standards Division, which provided the 
researcher with reports containing use of force information and formal citizen complaint 
information aggregated by month for the 86-month period being studied. The researcher was also 
provided with a copy of the informal complaint log for the same period. 
The City of Newport News Human Resources Department provided the researcher with 
payroll and personnel records, which included detailed reports of hours worked by patrol officers 
aggregated by month and a commissioned personnel record containing hire date, current 
assignment, current rank, promotion date, date of termination/resignation/retirement (if 
applicable), and demographic information (race and sex) for all officers employed during the 86 
month period of interest. Lastly, the NNPD Training Division is responsible for maintaining the 
NNPD BWC program including training officers in the use of the devices and detailed record 





beginning with the ten-device pilot in May 2013 through the achievement of full deployment to 
all 284 commissioned officers assigned to the patrol division in June 2016. 
Measures 
Basis for calculated rates. 
 The use of force and citizen complaint frequency dependent variables and the officer self-
initiated enforcement activity and call for service control variables are calculated as rates per 
regular patrol hours worked in each month. In addition to standardizing the measurements, 
regular patrol hours worked reflects the staffing level and controls for personnel shortages. 
Staffing levels are of importance because personnel shortages are likely to impact officer ability 
to engage in self-initiated enforcement contacts, which, as indicated in Chapter 2, increase the 
likelihood of use of force and citizen complaints. Conversely, staffing shortages may also limit 
the amount of time an officer may dedicate to a call for service and also produce citizen 
complaints. The mean number of regular patrol hours worked in a month during the period under 
examination is 35,764.78 (sd = 1,702.85). Thus, rates are calculated per 1,000 regular patrol 
hours worked. 
Dependent variables.  
Use of force.  
The current study utilizes data extracted from internal NNPD use of force reports filed by 
officers. Use of force is conceptualized according to the definition of reportable use of force 
found in the Newport News Police Department Operational Manual. According to NNPD (2017) 
policy OPS-110 – Use of Force: 
A Use of Force Report (NNPD Form #83) will be prepared by the primary officer 
employing the force while on-duty, acting in an official capacity or in the event that a 





a. Whenever an officer discharges a firearm or less-lethal munitions… 
(Exceptions to this procedure are discharging a firearm at, or as part of the 
following: organized shooting matches; authorized range training; legal, 
personal practice and hunting). 
b. When the use of force results in a visible injury or death of any person, 
including officers. 
c. When a subject complains that an injury has been inflicted as the result of an 
application of force by an officer. 
d. Whenever O.C. [oleoresin capsicum – commonly referred to as “pepper spray” 
or popular brand name “Mace”] or CS/CN gas [commonly referred to as “tear 
gas”] is employed. 
e. In those situations where defensive or active resistance is employed against an 
officer. 
f. Whenever an impact weapon is employed in an offensive manner. 
g. Whenever an ECD [electronic control device, commonly referred to by popular 
brand name “Taser”] is employed in a police encounter with a suspect. (p. 8). 
 
NNPD departmental policy requires the primary officer in a use of force incident to file 
the use of force report and list only those other officers directly involved in the application of 
force. In the current study use of force is operationalized by counting the number of use of force 
reports filed in a given month (from the IA Pro database), regardless of the number of officers 
involved in each incident. A separate use of force report is required for each subject when force 
is used on more than one subject in the same incident. Therefore, the frequency of use of force 
variable reflects the number of subjects upon whom force was used. The use of force frequency 
variable is calculated as a rate per 1,000 regular patrol hours worked by month as follows: 
 
Number of Use of Force Incidents Month x
Total Number of Patrol Hours Worked Month x
 (1,000) 
Severity of force.  
The severity of force variable is represented by the number of use of force incidents 
resulting in injuries to the citizen requiring medical attention (transported to a hospital for 
treatment). Severity of force is extracted from the IA Pro reports and calculated as a proportion 





Severity of Force =  
Number of Citizens Injured (Requiring Medical Attention)Month x
Total Number of Use of Force Incidents Month x
 
 
Citizen complaints.   
The current study utilizes Farrar and Ariel’s (2013) definition of citizen complaints, 
“incidents where the reporting party has filed a grievance… against [an officer for] alleged 
misconduct or what they perceive as poor performance” (p. 7), which is consistent with NNPD’s 
classification. NNPD receives citizen complaints via request for a supervisor on scene, walk-ins 
to a precinct or headquarters, by telephone, email, website portal, or by U.S. mail. While clerks 
at any of the precinct stations or headquarters building may take complaints from walk-ins via a 
citizen complaint form or letter, and any officer, supervisor, or command staff member may 
receive a complaint in person (which are then forwarded to the Internal Affairs Unit of the 
Professional Standards Section), the latter means of filing are received directly by the Internal 
Affairs Unit. Each complaint is entered in a log and after a preliminary investigation and 
evaluation is recorded as either an informal or formal complaint. Informal complaints consist of 
minor policy violations while formal complaints are more serious in nature and receive full 
investigations. The latter are then entered into a database and tracked utilizing IA Pro software.  
Both formal and informal citizen complaints are included in the current study’s 
operationalization of the variable. However, citizen complaints often contain more than one 
allegation against one or more officers. Such cases are counted as a single complaint when the 
allegations are the same for each officer listed. Different allegations made against different 
officers contained in the same complaint are counted as an individual complaint. The citizen 






Number of Citizen Complaints Month x
Total Number of Patrol Hours Worked Month x
 (1,000) 
 
Citizen complaint dispositions. 
NNPD records the disposition of citizen complaints in one of 5 categories as follows: 
substantiated, not substantiated, unfounded, exonerated, or complainant refused to 
cooperate/complaint withdrawn. However, citizen complaints may, and often do, contain more 
than one allegation. Furthermore, as indicated in the previous chapters, BWC captured video is 
expected to provide evidence for swifter and more accurate investigations of citizen complaints. 
Thus, one would anticipate that there would be an increase in more conclusive dispositions (i.e., 
exonerated and substantiated). The frequencies of substantiated, not substantiated, unfounded, 
and exonerated proportions during the pre-BWC period compared to the deployment and post 
full implementation periods are examined. 
Intervention/independent variable. 
 BWCs.   
As previously mentioned, following the initial ten device pilot, NNPD deployed BWCs 
incrementally over a 38-month period (May 2013 – June 2016) to achieve 100% implementation 
(all 284 patrol officers equipped with the devices). Therefore, the BWC variable is computed 
both as a binary (0 = pre-BWC implementation, May 2010 – April 2013; 1 = post-BWCs, May 
2013 – June 2017) for ARIMA analysis, as well as a proportion of the 284 total for a given 
month for VAR analysis as follows: 
BWC Deployment =  
Number of Officers BWC Equipped










 Officer Self-initiated enforcement activity.  
Concerns have been raised that BWCs may have a de-policing effect through camera 
induced passivity, and that reduced proactive enforcement activity might mediate a relationship 
between BWCs and reduced use of force incidents and citizen complaints. Like Wallace and 
colleagues (2018), the current study includes traffic stops, suspicious vehicle checks, and 
suspicious person (pedestrian) stops/field interviews in the discretionary pro-active 
investigative/enforcement activity measure. The CAD data was filtered to extract only the 
aforementioned officer-initiated activities and officer assists are excluded. The self-initiated 
enforcement activity variable is calculated as a rate per 1,000 patrol hours worked by month as 
follows: 
Number of Self − Initiated Enforcement Contacts Month x
Total Number of Patrol Hours Worked Month x
 (1,000) 
 
Calls for service.  
Call for service volume (those calls dispatched to officers, not self-initiated) can have an 
impact on the dependent variables through increased exposure to risk and impacts officer ability 
to engage in self-initiated enforcement contacts. Thus, calls for service should be controlled for. 
Calls for service in the current study are generated by any means other than officer initiated. 
Only the original call was extracted from the CAD data. Duplicate dispatch assigned call 
numbers are eliminated, as are calls cancelled by communications before an officer logs arrival. 
Call for service volume is calculated as a rate per 1,000 patrol hours worked by month as 
follows: 
Number of Calls for Service (Dispatched)Month x







Ferguson incident.  
As related in Chapter 2, there is wide-spread speculation that the increased public 
scrutiny of police following the August 2014 shooting of Michael Brown by a Ferguson, 
Missouri police officer deterred officers across the U.S. from engaging in proactive enforcement 
activities, a de-policing phenomenon dubbed the “Ferguson effect.” As time series analysis is 
sensitive to historical events, the Ferguson incident is controlled for with the variable coded as 
follows: Pre-Ferguson (prior to August 2014) = 0; post Ferguson (August 2014 and after) = 1.  
Seasonality.  
As crime, calls for service, and proactive activities are subject to seasonal increases 
(generally higher in volume during the warmest months), seasonality will be controlled for 
utilizing monthly average temperatures for the period under examination4, or the use of a 
seasonal statistical model as described in the analytic strategy section below.  
Analytic Strategy 
The impact of BWCs on each of the dependent variables is assessed with a series of t 
tests and two different time series techniques, autoregressive integrated moving average time 
series analysis (ARIMA, SARIMA if the data fits a seasonal model) and vector autoregression 
analysis (VAR) using STATA/IC 16.0. Time series analysis is the appropriate statistical 
technique to test the impact of an intervention and additional explanatory variables over time as 
the modeling produces a valid and reliable result by distinguishing the impact of the intervention 
from other factors on the dependent variable (McDowall, McCleary, Meidinger, & Hay, 1980). 
                                            
4 Average monthly temperatures for the 86-months examined were obtained from historical 
weather records collected by the Newport News/Williamsburg International Airport Weather 
Station made available on the Weather Underground website:  





This is of importance because time series data is “serially dependent,” meaning that each time 
point measurement is impacted by those that came before (McDowall et al., 1980; Ostrom, 
1978). As McDowall and colleagues (1980) point out, ordinary least square regression assumes 
that “adjacent error terms are uncorrelated… this assumption is seldom satisfied by time series 
data, however, and when error terms are correlated, the standard errors of ordinary least squares 
parameter estimates are biased” (p. 12). In short, the authors warn that erroneous statistically 
significant results are common when time series data is analyzed using OLS regression. 
ARIMA time series analysis has been utilized to assess the impact of several 
interventions in the criminology and criminal justice field. For example, it has been used to 
assess the impact of reducing the legal blood alcohol concentration (BAC) to .08 on traffic 
fatalities in New Jersey (Chamlin, 2016), to evaluate the effects of the New York Juvenile 
offender law that certifies violent offenders to be tried in criminal court (Singer & McDowall, 
1988), and to assess the impact of New York’s sex offender registration law (Sandler, Freeman, 
& Socia, 2008). In terms of BWC research, it has been utilized in the Rialto, California study 
(Sutherland et al., 2017) and in a study of an unnamed Northwest U.S. agency (Koslicki et al., 
2019), the former evaluating the impact of the devices on use of force and citizen complaints, the 
latter on use of force only. VAR, a multivariate time series technique that allows for examination 
of how several endogenous variables impact one another over time, has been utilized extensively 
in financial policy analysis, but less so in other fields. Corman, Joyce, and Lovitch’s (1987) 
examination of crime, deterrence, and unemployment, Enders and Sandler’s (1993) study of the 
effectiveness of antiterrorism policies, and Witt and Witte’s (2000) research on crime, 
incarceration, and the labor supply are three examples of the utilization of VAR analysis in 





ARIMA requires a series of diagnostic tests prior to the actual analysis to assess the 
fitness of the data and make necessary adjustments to address any pre-intervention trends, 
autocorrelation, moving average, and/or seasonality. The assumption is that the pre-intervention 
time series reflects only ‘white noise’ (no pattern or ‘signal’), and the goal of the aforementioned 
diagnostics is to identify and correct for violations of that assumption before proceeding with the 
analysis (Andrews, Dean, Swain, & Cole, 2013). 
The process of specifying the model is comprised of the series of the following diagnostic 
tests. First, a plot of the time series must be examined to reveal any trends in the dependent 
variables pre-intervention. Then a correlogram is generated and examined for a slow decay to 
zero, which also indicates a trend. However, an augmented Dickey-Fuller test is utilized to 
confirm whether or not a trend exists. The null hypothesis of the Dickey-Fuller test is that a 
trend, or unit root, exists. Therefore, a significant result indicates no trend. If the test result is not 
significant, indicating the existence of a trend, the data is differenced (d) = 1, and a subsequent 
Dickey-Fuller test of the differenced variable is performed to ensure the trend is resolved.  
Assessment of the pre-intervention series for auto regression, AR (p), and moving 
average, MA (q) follows. To diagnose AR, a partial autocorrelation (PAC) graph is generated 
and inspected for spikes outside of the 95% confidence level in early lags. A lack of such spikes 
indicates an AR of 0, however, if such spikes exist, an issue with auto regression is indicated, 
which requires specification, AR (p) = 1, 2, etc. To diagnose MA, an autocorrelation (AC) plot is 
generated and examined for spikes outside of the 95% confidence level in early lags and a 
correlogram is generated to reveal any significant q statistics. If neither are detected, an MA of 0 





model, MA (q) = 1, 2, etc. Lastly, the series are examined for seasonality.5 The current study’s 
monthly observations require examination for 12-month seasonality, which would manifest in 
spikes at lags 12, 24, 36, etc. in the series.  ARIMA models with an annual seasonal pattern (12-
month) are specified (p, d, q) (P, D, Q)12, where “P” symbolizes auto regression (AR) of the 
seasonal component, “D” symbolizes differencing of the seasonal component, “Q” symbolizes 
moving average (MA) of the seasonal component, and “12” indicates the number of lags for 
seasonal differencing.  
Following diagnosis and specification, an ARIMA (or SARIMA if indicated) model of 
each dependent variable and BWCs coded simply as 0 for pre-implementation (May 2010 – 
April 2013), and 1 for all months after the beginning of BWC implementation (May 2013 – June 
2017) is analyzed. 
The second analytic technique, VAR, is the ideal multivariate time series analysis when 
data contains variables that are expected to impact one another in a “system” (Sims, 1980). 
Essentially, these variables are all treated as endogenous in the system, which reflects a vector of 
two or more, it is autoregressive in that it contains lagged values of the variables, and the 
stochastic error terms are referred to as impulses or shocks (Lutkepohl, 2007; Sims, 1980). The 
basic premise of VAR modeling is that “the dependent variable is a function of its lagged values 
and the lagged values of the other variables in the model” (Adeleye, 2018). VAR is particularly 
ideal for the current study as it also allows for the inclusion of independent exogenous variables 
in what is referred to as VARX modeling. This allows for the examination of the impact of the 
staggered deployment of BWCs on the focal variables. The VAR/VARX analyses consist of two 
                                            
5 Diagnoses of seasonality were confirmed utilizing the auto-ARIMA function in R 3.6.1 





models. First, the five focal dependent variables (use of force rate, severity of force, citizen 
complaint rate, substantiated complaint dispositions, and exonerated complaint dispositions) and 
the two other system variables (calls for service rate, and self-initiated enforcement activity rate) 
are examined as an endogenous system in a VAR (model 1). Second, the exogenous variables 
(BWC proportion, Ferguson incident, and monthly average temperature) are added in a full 
VARX model (model 2).    
Utilization of VAR is contingent upon certain requirements. First, the variables contained 
in the endogenous system must be cointegrated and stationary by the first difference. Second, all 
the variables included in the model must have equivalent lags. Third, it is crucial that the optimal 
lag length is examined. Lastly, the ordering of the endogenous system is important. Ensuring that 
these requirements are met is crucial because, first, if the variables in the endogenous system are 
nonstationary, the regression estimates may be spurious (c.f. Fanchon & Wendel, 1992; Sims, 
1980). Second, inclusion of variables with different numbers of lags, and/or specifying too few 
or too many lags may also produce erroneous regression estimates. Too many lags results in a 
loss of degrees of freedom and multicollinearity, while too few lags may produce specification 
errors (Adeleye, 2018). Third, the proper ordering of the endogenous variables in the system is 
important as different ordering likely generates different results. Thus, like ARIMA modeling, 
VAR requires a series of diagnostic tests and ordering determination per the prescribed schema. 
 First, testing for cointegration and stationarity of the variables to be included in the 
endogenous “system” is required. In the current study cointegration of the endogenous system 
variables is determined utilizing the Stata/IC 16.0 Johansen test for cointegration and the 
augmented Dickey-Fuller test is utilized to confirm stationarity. Second, a vector autoregression 





by choosing the lowest appropriate information criterion value. The Stata/IC 16.0 vector 
autoregression specification optimization test (varsoc) generates four information criterion 
values, final prediction error (FPE), Akaike’s information criterion (AIC), Hannan-Quinn 
information criterion (HQIC), and Schwartz-Bayesian information criterion (SBIC). According 
to a study conducted by Hacker and Abdulnasser (2008), the most reliable information criterion 
for optimal lag-length selection for VAR analyses is the Schwartz-Bayesian information criterion 
(SBIC). Thus, the SBIC values are used in the current study. Third, the correct ordering of the 
variables to be included in the endogenous system must be determined utilizing the Cholesky 
ordering method. 
The Cholesky ordering method requires the analyst to identify the first and last variables 
listed in the system as follows. The first variable is the contemporaneous exogenous variable. It 
does not respond contemporaneously to impulses or shocks in any of the other variables, 
however, changes in the contemporaneous exogenous variable impacts every other variable in 
the system contemporaneously. The variable ordered last, referred to as the contemporaneous 
endogenous variable, reacts to all the other variables at time t, but the impact of changes in the 
contemporaneous endogenous variable is not manifest in the other system variables until t1.  
The current study includes the following five dependent variables: Use of force rate; 
severity of force (use of force incidents resulting in citizen injury); citizen complaint rate; 
substantiated complaint proportion; and exonerated complaint proportion, each of which are 
included in a VAR endogenous system along with calls for service rate and self-initiated 
enforcement activity rate. Calls for service rate is the obvious contemporaneous exogenous 
variable. It does not likely respond contemporaneously to impulses or shocks in the self-initiated 





other end of the spectrum, each of the dependent variables are the obvious contemporaneous 
endogenous variable. Use of force rate, severity of force, citizen complaint rate, substantiated 
complaint proportion, and exonerated complaint proportion are all likely to be impacted by the 
endogenous system variables at time t, but the impact of changes in these dependent variables are 
not likely to impact the other system variables until t1. Thus, the Cholesky ordering of the 
endogenous system in both the model 1 VAR and model 2 VARX analyses is as follows: First, 
calls for service rate, second, self-initiated enforcement activity rate, and third, dependent 
variable y1,2,3,4,5. The exogenous regressor variables to be examined in the VARX analyses 
include BWC proportion, the Ferguson incident, and the average monthly temperature.  
Three post estimation tests are recommended for VAR analysis (Adeleye, 2018). First, a 
Breusch–Godfrey serial correlation LM test should be conducted to ensure there is no 
autocorrelation in the residual errors. Second, a Jarque-Bera test should be conducted to ensure 
the errors are normally distributed, and lastly, a check of the stability of the VAR estimates 
should be conducted ensuring the modulus of each eigenvalue is less than one. 
In addition, the statistically significant b coefficients generated by the VAR/VARX 
analyses are converted to Cohen’ d to determine effect size utilizing Apel and Hsu’s (2017) 
formula as follows: 
𝑑 = 𝛽 ×
1
√
(𝑇𝑃𝑟𝑒 − 1)  ∙  𝑆𝑌𝑃𝑟𝑒
2  +  (𝑇𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 − 1)  ∙  𝑆𝑌𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡
2
𝑇𝑃𝑟𝑒 +  𝑇𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 −  2
 
In summary, the analysis is comprised of the examination of the descriptive statistics, the 
diagnosis, specification, and estimation  of the ARIMA models, and the specification, estimation, 
and interpretation of the VAR/VARX models for each of the following dependent variables: use 


































Basis for calculated rates—regular patrol hours worked. 
The regular patrol hours worked in a month ranged from 32,584.16 to 39,690.28 (m = 
35,764.78, sd = 1,712.83) and decreased 7.30% from the pre-BWC period to the post-BWC 
period. The descriptive statistics for the pre-BWC, BWC deployment, and post full BWC 
deployment periods of the study are contained in Table 4.1, and the time series is graphed in 
Figure 4.1. The time series graph shows the beginning of the downward trend coinciding with 
the beginning of BWC implementation.  
   Table 4.1: NNPD Monthly Regular Patrol Hours Descriptive Statistics (May 2010 – June 
   2017) 
 
Period M SD Range 
Pre-BWC   
(May 2010 – April 2013) 
 
36,741.14 1,003.77 34,750.66 – 
38,737.02 
BWC Deployment    
(May 2013 – June 2016) 
 
35,378.04 1,803.41 32,584.16 – 
39,690.28 
Post-BWC   
(July 2016 – June 2017) 
34,060.40 1,105.06 33,104.12 – 
36,310.54 
   Notes: n = 86 months; M = mean number of regular patrol hours worked in a month during 
   corresponding period.    

















           Figure 4.1: NNPD Monthly Regular Patrol Hours Worked (May 2010 – June 
           2017) 
 
 Dependent variable—use of force rate. 
 The monthly use of force rate ranged between 0.030 and 0.589 per 1,000 regular patrol 
hours worked (m = 0.266, sd = 0.118) and the pre-BWC and post-BWC period means reflect a 
decrease of 58.01%. The descriptive statistics for the pre-BWC, BWC deployment, and post full 
BWC deployment periods of the study are contained in Table 4.2, and the time series is graphed 
in Figure 4.2. The time series graph indicates an overall downward trend during the 86-month 
period under examination, however, a clear decline is observed in the BWC implementation and 









                     Table 4.2: NNPD Monthly Use of Force Rate per 1,000 Regular Patrol 
                     Hours Worked Descriptive Statistics (May 2010 – June 2017) 
 
Period #UOF M SD Range 
Pre-BWC     
(May 2010 – April 2013) 
 
437 0.331 0.090 0.159 – 0.518 
BWC Deployment    
(May 2013 – June 2016) 
 
330 0.243 0.115 0.030 – 0.589 
Post BWC    
(July 2016 – June 2017) 
 57 0.139 0.048 0.059 – 0.211 
                    Notes: n = 86 months; #UOF is the number of use of force incidents that 
                    occurred during the corresponding period; M, SD, and Range = rate per 
                    1,000 regular patrol hours worked in a month during the corresponding 
                    period.  
 
              
 
            Figure 4.2: NNPD Monthly Use of Force Rate per 1,000 Regular Patrol Hours 










Dependent variable—severity of force (citizen injuries). 
 
 The monthly severity of force measure (monthly proportion of use of force incidents 
resulting in citizen injury requiring medical attention) ranged from 0.000 to 1.000 (m =0.473, sd 
= 0.194) and the data indicates a nominal decrease of 0.62% between the pre-BWC and post-
BWC periods. The descriptive statistics for the pre-BWC, BWC deployment, and post full BWC 
deployment periods of the study are contained in Table 4.3, and the time series is graphed in 
Figure 4.3. The overall trend line shows the proportion of use of force incidents resulting in 
citizen injury remained relatively stable; however, a downward trend is observed in the pre-BWC 
period, and conversely, an upward trend beginning with BWC implementation.   
    Table 4.3: NNPD Monthly Proportion of Use of Force Incidents Resulting in Citizen 
    Injury Descriptive Statistics (May 2010 – June 2017) 
                                  
Period #UOF #Injured M SD Range 
Pre-BWC     
(May 2010 – April 2013) 
 
437 207 0.482 0.160 0.154 – 0.857 
BWC Deployment     
(May 2013 – June 2016) 
 
330 156 0.463 0.216 0.000 – 1.000 
Post-BWC  
(July 2016 – June 2017) 
57   25 0.479 0.209 0.250 – 1.000 
    Notes: n = 86 months; #UOF is the number of use of force incidents that occurred during the 
    corresponding period; #Injured is the number of citizens injured as a result of use of force 
    incidents during the corresponding period. M, SD, and Range = proportion of use of force 
    incidents resulting in citizen injuries that required medical attention during the corresponding 






           Figure 4.3: NNPD Monthly Proportion of Use of Force Incidents Resulting in 
           Citizen Injury (May 2010 – June 2017) 
 
Dependent variable—citizen complaint rate. 
 The monthly citizen complaint rate ranged between 0.000 and 0.944 per 1,000 regular 
patrol hours worked (m = 0.408, sd = 0.198) and the pre-BWC and post-BWC period means 
reflect a decrease of 47.39%. The descriptive statistics for the pre-BWC, BWC deployment, and 
post full BWC deployment periods of the study are contained in Table 4.4, and the time series is 
graphed in Figure 4.4. While the graph indicates an overall downward trend, a stark contrast is 
observed between the pre-BWC period and after BWC implementation began. The graph 
indicates a marked trend of increasing citizen complaints during the pre-BWC period, followed 
by a notable decreasing trend during the BWC implantation and post-BWC periods.  
 
 





      Table 4.4: NNPD Monthly Citizen Complaint Rate per 1,000 Regular Patrol Hours 







M SD Range 
Pre-BWC     
(May 2010 – April 2013) 
 
660 821 0.498 0.172 0.109 – 0.944 
BWC Deployment     
(May 2013 – June 2016) 
 
502 588 0.368 0.203 0.000 – 0.907 
Post-BWC  
(July 2016 – June 2017) 
107 167 0.262 0.088 0.120 – 0.361  
       Notes: n = 86 months; # of Complaints is the number of citizen complaints that were filed 
       against officers during the corresponding period; # of Allegations is the number of 
       allegations contained in the filed complaints during the corresponding period; M, SD, and 
       Range = rate per 1,000 regular patrol hours worked in a month during the corresponding 
       period. 
 
 
            Figure 4.4: NNPD Monthly Citizen Complaint Rate per 1,000 Regular Patrol 








Dependent variable—citizen complaint disposition proportions. 
 The monthly proportion ranges, means, and standard deviations for each of the four 
citizen complaint dispositions for the 86-month period under examination are as follows: 
Unfounded allegations ranged between 0.000 and 1.000 (m =0.504, sd = 0.233), decreasing by 
19.20% between the pre-BWC and post-BWC periods; not substantiated allegations ranged 
between 0.000 and 0.692  (m =0.162, sd = 0.156), decreasing by 40.00% between the pre-BWC 
and post-BWC periods; substantiated allegations ranged between 0.000 and 0.700  (m =0.122, sd 
= 0.142), increasing by 40.35% between the pre-BWC and post-BWC periods; and exonerated 
allegations ranged between 0.000 and 0.500  (m =0.101, sd = 0.111), increasing by 115.38% 
between the pre-BWC and post-BWC periods. The descriptive statistics for the pre-BWC, BWC 
deployment, and post full BWC deployment periods of the study are contained in Table 4.5, and 
the time series are graphed in Figures 4.5, 4.6, 4.7, and 4.8 respectively. The graphs show an 
overall downward trend in unfounded dispositions, not substantiated dispositions remained 
relatively stable, and increasing trends in substantiated and exonerated dispositions. 
   Table 4.5: NNPD Monthly Citizen Complaint Disposition Proportion Descriptive 






Pre-BWC     
(May 2010 – April 2013) 
 
0.526 0.150 0.171 0.078 
BWC Deployment 
(May 2013 – June 2016) 
 
0.504 0.109 0.156 0.106 
Post-BWC 
(July 2016 – June 2017) 
0.425 0.090 0.240 0.168 
   Notes: n = 86 months; Unfounded, Not Substantiated, Substantiated, and Exonerated are the 
   proportions of citizen complaint allegations that received the respective disposition during the 
   corresponding period; Rows may not total 1.000 due to citizen complaints withdrawn or 
   dismissed due to a complainant’s failure to cooperate.  






                    Figure 4.5: NNPD Monthly Proportion of Unfounded Citizen  
                    Complaints (May 2010 – June 2017) 
 
              
 
                    Figure 4.6: NNPD Monthly Proportion of Not Substantiated Citizen 





              
                     Figure 4.7: NNPD Monthly Proportion of Substantiated Citizen  
                     Complaints (May 2010 – June 2017) 
 
 
                     Figure 4.8: NNPD Monthly Proportion of Exonerated Citizen  










 Independent variable—BWCs.  
The descriptive statistics of NNPD’s 38-month staggered deployment of 284 BWCs 
(May 2013 – Jun 2016) to all patrol personnel are contained in Table 4.6. 
        Table 4.6: NNPD BWC Deployment Descriptive Statistics (May 2010 – June 2017) 
 





Proportion of Full 
Deployment (284) 
May 2010 – Apr 2013   0             0 0.000 
May 2013 10           10 0.035 
Jun 2013   5           15 0.053 
Jul 2013 15           20 0.070 
Aug 2013   1           21 0.074 
Sep 2013   6           27 0.095 
Oct 2013 26 
 
          53 0.187 
Nov 2013   1           54 0.190 
Dec 2013   0           54 0.190 
Jan 2014   2           56 0.197 
Feb 2014   2           58 0.204 
Mar 2014   3           61 0.215 
May 2014 19           80 0.282 
Aug 2014   2           82 0.289 
Sep 2014   0          82 0.289 
Oct 2014   0          82 0.289 










Proportion of Full 
Deployment (284) 
Dec 2014   1          84 0.296 
Jan 2015   0          84 0.296 
Feb 2015   1          85 0.299 
Mar 2015 38 123 0.433 
Apr 2015   0 123 0.433 
May 2015   4 127 0.447 
Jun 2015   1 128 0.451 
Jul 2015   0 128 0.451 
Aug 2015   0 128 0.451 
Sep 2015   0 128 0.451 
Oct 2015 30 158 0.556 
Nov 2015 91 249 0.877 
Dec 2015 10 259 0.912 
Jan 2016   1 260 0.915 
Feb 2016   2 262 0.923 
Mar 2016   8 270 0.951 
Apr 2016   0 270 0.951 
May 2016 11 281 0.989 
Jun 16   3 284 1.000 
Jul 2016 – Jun 2017   0 284 1.000 
Notes: n = 86 months: 36-months pre-BWC (May 2010 – April 2013); 38-month 
incremental BWC deployment period (May 2013 – June 2016); 12-month post-BWC 
period (July 2016 - June 2017).  





Control variable—self-initiated enforcement activity rate. 
The monthly self-initiated enforcement activity rate ranged between 85.717 and 223.033 
per 1,000 regular patrol hours worked (m = 148.395, sd = 35.920) and the pre-BWC and post-
BWC period means reflect a decrease of 43.83%. The descriptive statistics for the pre-BWC, 
BWC deployment, and post full BWC deployment periods of the study are contained in Table 
4.7, and the time series is graphed in Figure 4.9. The latter shows a slight downward trend during 
the pre-BWC period, which became more pronounced at the beginning of BWC implementation.  
                   Table 4.7: NNPD Monthly Self-Initiated Enforcement Activity Rate per  
                   1,000 Regular Patrol Hours Worked Descriptive Statistics (May 2010 –  
                   June 2017) 
 
Period M SD Range 
Pre-BWC     
(May 2010 – April 2013) 
 
181.032 16.742 153.526 – 223.033 
BWC Deployment     
(May 2013 – Jun 2016) 
 
132.224 25.157   95.579 – 191.043 
Post-BWC  
(Jul 2016 – June 2017) 
101.693  9.470   85.717 – 120.383 
                  Notes: n = 86 months; M, SD, and Range = rate per 1,000 regular patrol  
                  hours worked in a month during the corresponding period. 
      




















            Figure 4.9: NNPD Monthly Self-Initiated Enforcement Activity Rate per 
            1,000 Regular Patrol Hours Worked (May 2010 – June 2017) 
 
Control variable—calls for service rate. 
 The monthly calls for service rate ranged between 269.653 and 517.487 per 1,000 regular 
patrol hours worked (m = 355.734, sd = 39.272) and the pre-BWC and post-BWC period means 
reflect a decrease of 5.70%. The descriptive statistics for the pre-BWC, BWC deployment, and 
post full BWC deployment periods of the study are contained in Table 4.8, and the time series is 











                   Table 4.8: NNPD Monthly Calls for Service Rate per 1,000 Regular 
                   Patrol Hours Worked Descriptive Statistics (May 2010 – June 2017) 
 
Period M SD Range 
Pre-BWC     
(May 2010 – April 2013) 
 
366.835 44.129 285.585 – 517.487 
BWC Deployment     
(May 2013 – Jun 2016) 
 
348.313 33.110 278.604 – 406.424 
Post-BWC  
(Jul 2016 – June 2017) 
345.930 31.152 269.653 – 389.235 
                  Notes: n = 86 months; M, SD, and Range = rate per 1,000 regular patrol  
                  hours worked in a month during the corresponding period. 
              
 
            Figure 4.10: NNPD Monthly Calls for Service Rate per 1,000 Regular Patrol 










Control variable—average monthly temperature. 
 The monthly average temperature ranged between 33.10° Fahrenheit and 81.64° 
Fahrenheit during the 86-month period under examination (m = 60.76, sd = 14.17). The 
























      Table 4.9: Monthly Average Temperatures in Newport News, Virginia (May 2010 –  
      June 2017) 
 
Month Temp  Month Temp  Month Temp  Month Temp 
05/2010 69.91  03/2012 56.67  01/2014 38.04  11/2015 54.42 
06/2010 79.17  04/2012 57.63  02/2014 42.13  12/2015 53.81 
07/2010 81.02  05/2012 68.35  03/2014 47.32  01/2016 38.51 
08/2010 77.82  06/2012 72.50  04/2014 60.15  02/2016 42.94 
09/2010 73.57  07/2012 80.94  05/2014 70.20  03/2016 53.97 
10/2010 61.05  08/2012 76.82  06/2014 77.93  04/2016 56.584 
11/2010 49.22  09/2012 69.77  07/2014 80.18  05/2016 64.02 
12/2010 33.10  10/2012 60.71  08/2014 78.06  06/2016 73.64 
01/2011 33.84  11/2012 46.73  09/2014 74.67  07/2016 80.38 
02/2011 43.95  12/2012 48.62  10/2014 65.26  08/2016 80.01 
03/2011 47.91  01/2013 43.45  11/2014 49.60  09/2016 74.51 
04/2011 61.22  02/2013 43.34  12/2014 46.00  10/2016 62.47 
05/2011 67.32  03/2013 45.53  01/2015 40.21  11/2016 49.49 
06/2011 75.38  04/2013 60.52  02/2015 34.06  12/2016 43.07 
07/2011 79.70  05/2013 68.55  03/2015 48.43  01/2017 43.28 
08/2011 77.34  06/2013 74.58  04/2015 61.21  02/2017 49.03 
09/2011 72.03  07/2013 81.64  05/2015 72.73  03/2017 48.60 
10/2011 58.72  08/2013 77.38  06/2015 80.49  04/2017 64.32 
11/2011 52.65  09/2013 71.49  07/2015 78.65  05/2017 65.85 
12/2011 47.22  10/2013 64.34  08/2015 76.24  06/2017 75.25 
01/2012 43.73  11/2013 50.87  09/2015 72.57    
02/2012 44.61  12/2013 46.94  10/2015 59.50    
      Notes: n = 86 months; Source: Weather Underground website: https://www.wunderground. 









The first stage of the analysis consisted of t tests to examine each of the dependent 
variables for significant differences between the pre-BWC, BWC deployment, and post-BWC 
period means. Cohen’s d was then calculated for each t test result to examine the effect sizes. 
The results of the t tests and corresponding Cohen’s d are presented in Table 4.10. 
   Table 4.10: Dependent Variable t Test Results and Effect Sizes for pre-BWC vs. 
   BWC Deployment vs. Post-BWC Periods 
  
Variable Period M Mean 
Difference 
      t  Cohen’s d 
Use of Force 
Rate 
Pre-BWC 
(May 2010 – April 2013) 
vs.  
BWC Deployment 





0.088 3.585 ** 0.84 
 BWC Deployment 
 (May 2013 – June 2016) 
vs.  
Post-BWC 





0.104 4.369 *** 1.16 
 Pre-BWC 
(May 2010 – April 2013) 
vs.  
Post-BWC 





0.192 9.149 *** 2.61 




(May 2010 – April 2013) 
vs.  
BWC Deployment 






0.019 0.425  0.10 
 BWC Deployment 
 (May 2013 – June 2016) 
vs.  
Post-BWC 






-0.016 -0.221  0.07 





Variable Period M Mean 
Difference 
     t  Cohen’s d 
 Pre-BWC 
(May 2010 – April 2013) 
vs.  
Post-BWC 





0.003 0.053  0.02 





(May 2010 – April 2013) 
vs.  
BWC Deployment 






0.129 2.903 ** 0.68 
 BWC Deployment 
 (May 2013 – June 2016) 
vs.  
Post-BWC 






0.106 2.493 * 0.67 
 Pre-BWC 
(May 2010 – April 2013) 
vs.  
Post-BWC 






0.236 4.452 *** 1.69 





(May 2010 – April 2013) 
vs.  
BWC Deployment 






0.002 0.046  0.01 
 BWC Deployment 
 (May 2013 – June 2016) 
vs.  
Post-BWC 






-0.054 -0.999  0.29 
 Pre-BWC 
(May 2010 – April 2013) 
vs.  
Post-BWC 
















Variable Period M Mean 
Difference 





(May 2010 – April 2013) 
vs.  
BWC Deployment 






-0.044 -1.912  0.44 
 BWC Deployment 
 (May 2013 – June 2016) 
vs.  
Post-BWC 






-0.086 -2.236 * 0.71 
 Pre-BWC 
(May 2010 – April 2013) 
vs.  
Post-BWC 






-0.130 -3.986 *** 1.17 




(May 2010 – April 2013) 
vs.  
BWC Deployment 






18.522 2.021 * 0.47 
 BWC Deployment 
 (May 2013 – June 2016) 
vs.  
Post-BWC 






2.382 0.216 0.07 
 Pre-BWC 
(May 2010 – April 2013) 
vs.  
Post-BWC 






20.904 1.488 0.53 





(May 2010 – April 2013) 
vs.  
BWC Deployment 






48.808 9.637 *** 2.25 





Variable Period M Mean 
Difference 
     t  Cohen’s d 
 BWC Deployment 
 (May 2013 – June 2016) 
vs.  
Post-BWC 






30.531 6.075 *** 1.58 
 Pre-BWC 
(May 2010 – April 2013) 
vs.  
Post-BWC 






79.339 15.276 *** 5.71 
  Notes: *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001 
The t test results reported in Table 4.10 indicate statistically significant reductions in the 
pre-BWC vs. BWC deployment and the BWC deployment vs. post-BWC period use of force rate 
means. The corresponding Cohen’s d values of 0.837 and 1.158 indicate large and very large 
effect sizes respectively.6 The calculated Cohen’s d of 2.606 for the statistically significant pre-
BWC vs. Post-BWC t test result indicates a huge effect size associated with the overall 58 
percent reduction in the use of force rate between the pre-BWC and post-BWC periods. While 
the t tests indicated no statistically significant changes in the pre-BWC, deployment, and post-
BWC period severity of force means, the increase in the proportion of use of force incidents 
resulting in citizen injury between the BWC deployment and post-BWC periods is noteworthy. 
In terms of citizen complaint measures, the t test results indicate statistically significant 
reductions in the pre-BWC vs. BWC deployment, and the BWC deployment vs. Post-BWC 
period citizen complaint rate means. The corresponding Cohen’s d values of 0.677 and 0.667 
respectively indicate a medium effect size. Like the use of force rate pre-BWC vs. post-BWC t 
                                            
6 Cohen (1988) defined a small effect size as d = 0.20 or less, medium effect size as d > .20 and 
< 0.80, and large effect size as d ≥ 0.80. Sawilowsky (2009) expanded Cohen’s scale to include 





test result, the calculated Cohen’s d of 1.688 for the statistically significant pre-BWC vs. post-
BWC citizen complaint rate indicates a huge effect size associated with the overall reduction of 
more than 47 percent. While the t tests indicated no statistically significant differences in the pre-
BWC, BWC deployment, post-BWC, or the pre-BWC vs. post-BWC means of substantiated 
complaint dispositions, nor in the difference between the pre-BWC and BWC deployment means 
of exonerated complaint dispositions, there was a statistically significant increase between the 
BWC deployment and post-BWC periods for the latter, and the calculated Cohen’s d of 0.705 
indicates a medium effect size. Furthermore, the calculated Cohen’s d of 1.172 for the 
statistically significant pre-BWC vs. post-BWC exonerated complaint disposition reflects a very 
large effect size associated with the overall increase in exonerations of more than 115 percent. 
Lastly, t tests were conducted on the two additional variables included in the 
VAR/VARX endogenous system, calls for service rate and self-initiated enforcement activity 
rate. The t test results indicated a statistically significant reduction in the calls for service rate 
between the pre-BWC and BWC deployment periods. However, the results showed no 
statistically significant differences between the BWC deployment period and the post-BWC 
period, nor between the pre-BWC and post-BWC periods, which suggests that calls for service 
remained relatively stable over the entire 86-month period under examination. The t test results 
for the self-initiated enforcement activity rate indicated statistically significant reductions 
between all three periods with huge effect size of 2.25 and very large effect size of 1.58 
respectively. The statistically significant t test result for the nearly 44 percent decrease in the 
self-initiated enforcement activity rate between the pre-BWC and post-BWC periods generated a 






ARIMA Diagnostics of Dependent Variables 
Use of force rate. 
A downward trend is observed in the plot of the pre-intervention series (Figure 4.2) and 
the autocorrelation (AC) plot reflects a slow decay to zero (Appendix A). However, the 
significant result of an augmented Dickey-Fuller test (Appendix A) indicates no unit root. The 
spikes outside the 95% confidence level of early lags in the autocorrelation (AC) plot indicates 
potential specification of MA (q) = 1 or 2 and a partial autocorrelation (PAC) plot (Appendix A) 
reveals both spikes outside of the 95% confidence level in early lags indicating the potential need 
for an AR (p) = 1 or 2 specification. No indication of a seasonal pattern was observed in the plots 
of the lags.    
Notwithstanding the significant augmented Dickey-Fuller test, the correlogram indicated 
a slow decay to zero in the AC plot and differencing was required to achieve white-noise in the 
pre-series (d = 1 eliminated the trend). L1 of the MA (q) specification was significant and 
retained (q = 1), however, L1 of the AR (p) was not significant therefore not retained (p = 0). A 
check for a SARIMA model found no fit for the data to a seasonal component. Thus, the final 
ARIMA model for use of force rate was specified (0, 1, 1). A correlogram (Appendix A) 
confirmed this specification produces a stationary pre-series (white noise) and insignificant q 
statistics.                    
Severity of force. 
Figure 4.3 shows a downward trend in the severity of force variable (monthly proportion 
of use of force incidents resulting in citizen injury). However, the autocorrelation (AC) plot does 
not reflect a slow decay to zero (Appendix A), and the significant result of an augmented 





lags of the autocorrelation (AC) plot suggests an MA (q) = 0, while a partial autocorrelation 
(PAC) plot (Appendix A) reveals 2 spikes outside of the 95% confidence level at lags 12, 16, and 
24, indicating the potential need for an AR (p) specification, and/or for a seasonal pattern.  
Neither the L1 of the AR (p), nor the L1 of the MA (q) specifications were significant. 
Therefore, neither were retained (p = 0 and q = 0 respectively). A check for a SARIMA model 
found no fit for the data to a seasonal component. Thus, the final ARIMA model for citizen 
complaint rate was specified (0, 0, 0). A correlogram (Appendix A) confirmed this specification 
produces a stationary pre-series (white noise) and insignificant q statistics.  
Citizen complaint rate. 
An upward trend is observed in the plot of the pre-intervention series of the citizen 
complaint rate (Figure 4.4), and the autocorrelation (AC) plot (Appendix A) shows a slow decay 
to zero indicating a trend. The result of an augmented Dickey-Fuller test (Appendix A) also 
indicates that there is a unit root requiring differencing (d = 1). The autocorrelation (AC) plot 
indicates spikes above the 95% confidence level in early lags, as does the partial auto correlation 
(PAC) (Appendix A), indicating the potential need for specification of MA (q) = 1 or 2 and AR 
(p) = 1 or 2 respectively. No seasonal pattern was detected in the plots of the lags.                   
 The differencing (d = 1) eliminated the trend and both L1 and L2 of the AR (p) 
specification were significant and retained. (p = 2). An MA (q) = 1 specification was not 
significant and, therefore, was specified as q = 0. A check for a SARIMA model found no fit for 
the data to a seasonal component. Thus, the final ARIMA model for citizen complaint rate was 
specified (2, 1, 0). A correlogram (Appendix A) confirmed this specification produces a 






Substantiated complaint disposition. 
Figure 4.7 shows an upward trend in substantiated complaints. However, the 
autocorrelation (AC) plot does not reflect a slow decay to zero (Appendix A), and the significant 
result of an augmented Dickey-Fuller test (Appendix A) indicates no unit root and therefore no 
need for differencing (d = 0). The lack of significant spikes in early lags of the autocorrelation 
(AC) plot suggests an MA (q) = 0, while a partial autocorrelation (PAC) plot (Appendix A) 
reveals 2 spikes outside of the 95% confidence level at lags 14 and 20, indicating the potential 
need for an AR (p) specification, and/or for a seasonal pattern. 
L1 of the AR (p) specification was insignificant and therefore not retained (p = 0). A 
check for a SARIMA model found no fit for the data to a seasonal component. Thus, the final 
ARIMA model for substantiated complaint disposition proportion was specified (0, 0, 0). A 
correlogram (Appendix A) confirmed this specification produces a stationary pre-series (white 
noise) and insignificant q statistics.   
Exonerated complaint disposition. 
While an upward trend was indicated in the plot of the pre-intervention series by the pre-
intervention trend line (Figure 4.8), the AC plot (Appendix A) does not reflect a slow decay to 
zero and the results of an augmented Dickey-Fuller test (Appendix A) were significant, 
indicating that the pre-series was stationary (no unit root) and that differencing was not required 
(d = 0). The significant spike at lag 5 in the AC plot indicates the potential need for an MA (q) 
specification of 1, and the PAC plot (Appendix A) reveals 2 spikes outside of the 95% 
confidence level at lags 5, 13, 14, 19, and 24 indicating the potential need for an AR (p) 





Notwithstanding the significant augmented Dickey-Fuller test, a correlogram indicated a 
slow decay to zero in the AC plot and differencing was required to achieve white-noise in the 
pre-series (d = 1 eliminated the trend). L1 of the MA (q) specification was significant and 
retained (q = 1), however, L1 of the AR (p) was not significant therefore not retained (p = 0). A 
check for a SARIMA model found no fit for the data to a seasonal component. Thus, the final 
ARIMA model for exonerated complaint disposition proportion was specified (0, 1, 1). A 
correlogram (Appendix A) confirmed this specification produces a stationary pre-series (white 
noise) and insignificant q statistics.                
ARIMA Results 
 The results of the ARIMA models for each of the outcome variables are presented in 
Table 4.10. The results demonstrate a poor fit of the data to ARIMA models with insignificant 
Wald statistics for all but the citizen complaint rate and substantiated complaint proportion. As 
shown in Table 4.10, BWCs failed to emerge as a significant predictor of any of the dependent 
variables notwithstanding the 50 months following the beginning of BWC implementation. This 
is likely due to the failure to capture the impact of the incremental deployment of BWCs, for 





          Table 4.11: ARIMA Model 1 Results 
 
Dependent Variable Wald 𝑿𝟐        Independent Variable          b      SE 
Use of Force Rate 
  ARIMA (0, 1, 1)     
  2.69 (p = 0.261) 
 




       
      
Severity of Force 
  ARIMA (0, 0, 0) 








       
      
Citizen Complaint Rate 
  ARIMA (2, 1, 0) 










     
Substantiated Complaints 
  ARIMA (0, 0, 0) 








     
Exonerated Complaints 
  ARIMA (0, 1, 1) 
  0.320 (p = 0.854) 
 
 BWCs -0.023 0.041  
           Notes: *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001 





VAR/VARX Diagnostics and Results 
 As described in the analytic plan presented in Chapter 3, the VAR/VARX analyses 
consist of two models. First, the five focal dependent variables (use of force rate, severity of 
force, citizen complaint rate, substantiated complaint dispositions, and exonerated complaint 
dispositions) and the two other system variables (calls for service rate, and self-initiated 
enforcement activity rate) are examined as an endogenous system in a VAR (model 1). Second, 
the exogenous variables (BWC proportion, Ferguson incident, and monthly average temperature) 
are added in a full VARX model (model 2). A Johansen test for cointegration was conducted on 
all seven endogenous variables to be included in system, which indicated six cointegrating 
equations. Second, augmented Dickey-Fuller tests were conducted on each of the endogenous 
variables to ensure they were stationary by the first difference (see Appendix B). The diagnostics 
for each of the models are documented followed by the results of each analysis. 
Model 1 – VAR analysis of endogenous system. 
Model specification. 
Cholesky ordering sequence = calls for service rate, self-initiated enforcement activity 
rate, use of force rate, severity of force, citizen complaint rate, substantiated complaint 
disposition, and exonerated complaint disposition. 
Vector autoregression specification optimization. 
A vector autoregression specification optimization test (results presented in Appendix B) 
indicated an optimal lag of 1 (lowest SBIC value of 14.306) for the specified endogenous 
variable system. 
VAR results.  





 Model 2 – full model VARX analysis. 
VARX model specification. 
Cholesky ordering sequence = calls for service rate, self-initiated enforcement activity 
rate, use of force rate, severity of force, citizen complaint rate, substantiated complaint 
disposition, and exonerated complaint disposition; exogenous variables = BWC proportion, 
Ferguson incident, and monthly average temperature. 
Vector autoregression specification optimization. 
A vector autoregression specification optimization test indicated an optimal lag of 1 
(lowest SBIC value of 11.335) for the specified severity of force target variable system 
(Appendix B). 
VARX results. 








          Table 4.12: Model 1 –VAR Results 
 
Dependent Variable Regressor        b    SE        95% Conf. Interval Cohen’s d 
Calls for Service Rate Self-Initiated Activity Rate -0.256 0.175 -0.599 0.086 -  
 Use of Force Rate -3.640 26.171 -54.935 47.655 - 
 Severity of Force 7.451 14.592 -21.149 36.051 - 
 Citizen Complaint Rate -0.249 14.983 -29.616 29.118 - 
 Substantiated Complaints 5.337 19.853 -33.574 44.249 - 
 Exonerated Complaints -33.329 25.583 -83.471 16.814 - 
       
Self-Initiated Activity Rate Calls for Service Rate -0.640 0.050 -0.162 0.034 - 
 Use of Force Rate 8.156 15.438 -22.102 38.414 - 
 Severity of Force 0.617 8.608 -16.253 17.488 - 
 Citizen Complaint Rate -7.971 8.838 -25.294 9.352 - 
 Substantiated Complaints -0.681 11.711 -23.634 22.272 - 
 Exonerated Complaints 5.245 15.091 -24.334 34.823 - 
       
Use of Force Rate Calls for Service Rate 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.001 - 
 Self-Initiated Activity Rate -0.000 0.001 -0.002 0.001 - 
 Severity of Force 0.027 0.061 -0.093 0.147 - 
 Citizen Complaint Rate 0.129 * 0.063 0.006 0.252 0.39 
 Substantiated Complaints 0.049 0.083 -0.114 0.213 - 
 Exonerated Complaints -0.169 0.107 -0.379 0.042 - 
       
Severity of Force Calls for Service Rate 0.000 0.001 -0.001 0.002 - 
 Self-Initiated Activity Rate -0.000 0.001 -0.003 0.002 - 
 Use of Force Rate -0.138 0.191 -0.513 0.238 - 
 Citizen Complaint Rate -0.118 0.110 -0.333 0.097 - 
 Substantiated Complaints -0.282 0.145 -0.567 0.003 - 
 Exonerated Complaints -0.303 0.187 -0.670 0.064 - 
       
       
  
 
     
       





Dependent Variable Regressor        b    SE        95% Conf. Interval Cohen’s d 
Citizen Complaint Rate Calls for Service Rate -0.000 0.001 -0.001 0.001 - 
 Self-Initiated Activity Rate 0.000 0.001 -0.002 0.002 - 
 Use of Force Rate 0.460 * 0.180 0.106 0.814 2.50 
 Severity of Force 0.001 0.101 -0.196 0.198 - 
 Substantiated Complaints 0.213 0.137 -0.056 0.481 - 
 Exonerated Complaints -0.075 0.176 -0.420 0.271 - 
       
Substantiated Complaints Calls for Service Rate -0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.001 - 
 Self-Initiated Activity Rate 0.000 0.001 -0.001 0.002 - 
 Use of Force Rate 0.099 0.152 -0.198 0.396 - 
 Severity of Force -0.178 * 0.845 -0.344 -0.013 1.15 
 Citizen Complaint Rate 0.002 0.087 -0.169 0.169 - 
 Exonerated Complaints 0.178 0.148 -0.112 0.469 - 
       
Exonerated Complaints Calls for Service Rate 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.001 - 
 Self-Initiated Activity Rate 0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.002 - 
 Use of Force Rate -0.272 ** 0.100 -0.468 -0.076 2.47 
 Severity of Force 0.134 * 0.056 0.025 0.243 1.22 
 Citizen Complaint Rate 0.007 0.057 -0.106 0.119 - 
 Substantiated Complaints 0.208 ** 0.076 0.059 0.357 1.89 











          Table 4.13: Model 2 –VARX Results 
 
Dependent Variable Regressor        b    SE        95% Conf. Interval Cohen’s d 
Calls for Service Rate Self-Initiated Activity Rate -0.140 0.151 -0.437 0.157 - 
 Use of Force Rate -3.502 27.296 -57.001 49.997 - 
 Severity of Force 11.208 12.521 -13.334 35.749 - 
 Citizen Complaint Rate -19.168 14.732 -48.042 9.707 - 
 Substantiated Complaints -21.712 17.652 -56.309 12.885 - 
 Exonerated Complaints -30.622 23.564 -76.808 15.563 - 
 BWC Proportion 4.511 12.848 -20.670 29.692 - 
 Ferguson Incident -9.919 9.722 -28.974 9.137 - 
 Monthly Avg. Temp. 1.253 *** 0.225 0.811 1.694 0.03 
       
Self-Initiated Activity Rate Calls for Service Rate -0.030 0.062 -0.152 0.092 - 
 Use of Force Rate 4.089 18.272 -31.724 39.903 - 
 Severity of Force -1.410 8.382 -17.838 15.019 - 
 Citizen Complaint Rate -11.101 9.862 -30.431 8.228 - 
 Substantiated Complaints -1.709 11.816 -24.868 21.451 - 
 Exonerated Complaints -1.935 15.774 -32.852 28.982 - 
 BWC Proportion 16.098 8.601 -0.759 32.955 - 
 Ferguson Incident -14.632 * 6.508 -27.388 -1.876 0.64 
 Monthly Avg. Temp. -0.106 0.151 -0.402 0.190 - 
       
Use of Force Rate Calls for Service Rate 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.001 - 
 Self-Initiated Activity Rate -0.000 0.001 -0.002 0.001 - 
 Severity of Force 0.008 0.047 -0.085 0.101 - 
 Citizen Complaint Rate -0.060 0.056 -0.169 0.049 - 
 Substantiated Complaints 0.046 0.067 -0.085 0.177 - 
 Exonerated Complaints 0.030 0.089 -0.144 0.205 - 
 BWC Proportion -0.168 ** 0.049 -0.263 -0.073 0.51 
 Ferguson Incident -0.085 * 0.037 -0.157 -0.013 0.26 
 Monthly Avg. Temp. 0.000 0.001 -0.001 0.002 - 
       
  
 
     





Dependent Variable Regressor        b    SE        95% Conf. Interval Cohen’s d 
Severity of Force Calls for Service Rate 0.000 0.001 -0.001 0.002 - 
 Self-Initiated Activity Rate -0.000 0.001 -0.003 0.002 - 
 Use of Force Rate -0.183 0.229 -0.632 0.265 - 
 Citizen Complaint Rate -0.174 0.123 -0.416 0.068 - 
 Substantiated Complaints -0.324 * 0.148 -0.614 -0.034 1.65 
 Exonerated Complaints -0.374 0.197 -0.760 0.013 - 
 BWC Proportion 0.172 0.108 -0.039 0.383 - 
 Ferguson Incident -0.165 * 0.081 -0.325 -0.006 0.84 
 Monthly Avg. Temp. 0.000 0.002 -0.003 0.004 - 
       
Citizen Complaint Rate Calls for Service Rate -0.000 0.001 -0.002 0.001 - 
 Self-Initiated Activity Rate 0.000 0.001 -0.002 0.002 - 
 Use of Force Rate 0.069 0.202 -0.327 0.465 - 
 Severity of Force -0.020 0.093 -0.201 0.162 - 
 Substantiated Complaints 0.141 0.131 -0.115 0.397 - 
 Exonerated Complaints 0.039 0.174 -0.302 0.381 - 
 BWC Proportion -0.009 0.095 -0.196 0.177 - 
 Ferguson Incident -0.195 ** 0.072 -0.336 -0.054 1.06 
 Monthly Avg. Temp. 0.002 0.002 -0.001 0.006 - 
       
Substantiated Complaints Calls for Service Rate -0.001 * 0.001 -0.002 -0.000 0.01 
 Self-Initiated Activity Rate 0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.003 - 
 Use of Force Rate 0.171 0.176 -0.174 0.516 - 
 Severity of Force -0.177 * 0.081 -0.336 -0.019 1.14 
 Citizen Complaint Rate -0.037 0.095 -0.224 0.149 - 
 Exonerated Complaints 0.091 0.152 -0.207 0.389 - 
 BWC Proportion 0.167 * 0.083 0.004 0.329 1.08 
 Ferguson Incident -0.117 0.063 -0.240 0.006 - 
 Monthly Avg. Temp. 0.003 0.001 0.000 0.006 - 
       
       
       
  
 
     





Dependent Variable Regressor        b    SE        95% Conf. Interval Cohen’s d 
Exonerated Complaints Calls for Service Rate 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.001 - 
 Self-Initiated Activity Rate 0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.002 - 
 Use of Force Rate -0.157 0.118 -0.387 0.074 - 
 Severity of Force 0.129 * 0.540 0.023 0.235 1.17 
 Citizen Complaint Rate 0.058 0.064 -0.067 0.183 - 
 Substantiated Complaints 0.218 ** 0.076 0.069 0.368 1.98 
 BWC Proportion 0.119 * 0.055 0.010 0.227 1.08 
 Ferguson Incident -0.035 0.042 -0.117 0.047 - 
 Monthly Avg. Temp. -0.001 0.001 -0.003 0.001 - 











The VAR analysis (model 1) examined the impact of each of the variables in the 
endogenous system on one another absent exogenous variables. Table 4.13 lists each of the 
system variables in the Cholesky ordering schema in the first column, calls for service rate, self-
initiated activity rate, use of force rate, severity of force, citizen complaint rate, substantiated 
complaints, and exonerated complaints. The endogenous system regressors and exogenous 
variables are listed in the second column, and the corresponding b coefficients, standard errors, 
95 percent confidence intervals, and Cohen’s d values of effect size in the columns that follow. 
The results of the post estimation Breusch–Godfrey serial correlation LM, Jarque-Bera, and 
VAR estimate stability tests indicated no autocorrelation in the residual errors, that the errors are 
normally distributed, and that the modulus of each eigenvalue was less than one respectively.  
Neither the first variable in the endogenous system, calls for service rate (the 
contemporaneously exogenous variable), nor the second variable, self-initiated enforcement 
activity rate, were significantly impacted by any of the other system variables. However, the 
negative impacts of the calls for service rate (b = -0.640), citizen complaint rate (b = -7.971), and 
substantiated complaint disposition proportion (b = -0.681) and the positive impact of exonerated 
complaint disposition proportion (b = 5.245) on the self-initiated enforcement activity rate are 
noteworthy.  
In terms of the focal dependent variables, citizen complaint rate emerged as having a 
statically significant impact on the use of force rate (b = 0.129, p = 0.040) with a Cohen’s d of 
0.39 indicating a small effect size. While none of the other variables in the endogenous system 
had a statistically significant impact on severity of force, of interest are the negative impacts of 





exonerated complaint dispositions (b = -0.303). Use of force rate emerged as the only variable in 
the endogenous system having a statistically significant impact on the citizen complaint rate (b = 
0.460, p = 0.011) with the Cohen’s d of 2.50 indicating a huge effect size. However, the positive 
impact of substantiated complaint dispositions (b = 0.213) and negative impact of exonerated 
complaint dispositions (b = -0.075) are also noteworthy. Of the endogenous system variables, 
perhaps contrary to logic, severity of force had a statistically significant negative impact on 
substantiated complaints (b = -0.178, p = 0.035) with a Cohen’s d of 1.15 indicating a very large 
effect size, and though not statistically significant, exonerated complaint dispositions had a 
positive impact on substantiated complaint dispositions (b = 0.178). Conversely, severity of force 
had a statistically significant positive impact on exonerated complaint dispositions (b = 0.134, p 
= 0.016) with a Cohen’s d of 1.22 also indicating a very large effect size. While substantiated 
complaint dispositions had a statistically significant positive impact on exonerated complaints (b 
= 0.208, p = 0.006) with a Cohen’s d of 1.89 indicating a very large effect size, use of force rate 
had a statistically significant negative impact (b = -0.272, p = 0.006) with a Cohen’s d of 2.47 
indicating a huge effect size. 
 VARX results. 
The VARX analysis (model 2) examined the impact of each of the variables in the 
endogenous system on one another and the impact of the exogenous variables on each in the 
endogenous system. The format of Table 4.14 is consistent with that of 4.13 for model 1 except 
for the inclusion of the exogenous variables in the regressor column. The results of the post 
estimation Breusch–Godfrey serial correlation LM, Jarque-Bera, and VAR estimate stability tests 
indicated no autocorrelation in the residual errors, that the errors are normally distributed, and 





Consistent with the model 1 VAR analysis, neither the first variable in the endogenous 
system, calls for service rate (the contemporaneously exogenous variable), nor the second 
variable, self-initiated enforcement activity rate, were significantly impacted by any of the other 
system variables. However, of the exogenous variables, monthly average temperature had a 
positive impact on calls for service rate (b = 1.253, p = 0.000) with a Cohen’s d of 0.03 
indicating a small effect size, and the Ferguson incident had a statistically significant negative 
impact on the self-initiated enforcement activity rate (b = -14.632, p = 0.025) with a Cohen’s d 
of 0.64 indicating a medium effect size. Although not statistically significant, the negative 
impact of the Ferguson incident on the calls for service rate (b = -9.919) and the negative impact 
of severity of force (b = -1.410), citizen complaint rate (b = -11.101), and both substantiated (b = 
-1.709) and exonerated (b = -1.935) complaint dispositions is of interest. Likewise, the positive 
impact of BWC proportion on the self-initiated enforcement activity rate, though not statistically 
significant, is noteworthy. 
While none of the endogenous system variables had a statistically significant impact on 
the use of force rate, two of the exogenous variables emerged as significant. BWC proportion 
had a negative impact on the use of force rate (b = -0.168, p = 0.001) with a Cohen’s d of 0.51 
indicating a medium effect size, as did the Ferguson incident (b = -0.085, p = 0.020) with a 
Cohen’s d of 0.26 indicating a small effect size. Of the endogenous system variables 
substantiated complaint dispositions had a statistically significant negative impact on severity of 
force (b = -0.324, p = 0.028) with a Cohen’s d of 1.65 indicating a very large effect size. Of the 
exogenous variables, the Ferguson incident emerged as statistically significant having a negative 
impact (b = 0.165, p = 0.042) with a Cohen’s d of 0.84 indicating a large effect size. While not 





complaint rate (b = -0.174), and exonerated complaint dispositions (b = -0.374) are of interest as 
well. 
The Ferguson incident was the sole variable to emerge as statistically significant in 
regard to the citizen complaint rate, curiously having a negative impact (b = -0.195, p = 0.007) 
with the Cohen’s d of 1.06 indicating a large effect size. Like the use of force rate, the citizen 
complaint rate was not significantly impacted by any of the other endogenous system variables. 
However, though not statistically significant and minimal, the negative impact of BWC 
proportion (b = -0.009) and severity of force (b = -0.020) are noteworthy, as are the positive 
impacts of the use of force rate (b = 0.069), substantiated complaint dispositions (b = 0.141), and 
exonerated complaint dispositions (b = 0.039). 
In terms of the complaint disposition variables, calls for service had a minimal but 
statistically significant negative impact on substantiated complaint dispositions (b = -0.001, p = 
0.044) with a Cohen’s d of 0.01 indicating a very small effect size, but negligible on exonerated 
complaint dispositions. Neither the self-initiated enforcement activity rate, nor the use of force 
rate had a statistically significant impact on either disposition. However, the positive impact of 
the use of force rate on substantiated complaint dispositions (b = 0.171) and, conversely, the 
negative impact on exonerated complaint dispositions (b = -0.157) is also of interest. Severity of 
force emerged as statistically significant for both dispositions, but curiously having a negative 
impact on substantiated complaint dispositions (b = -0.177, p = 0.028) with a Cohen’s d of 1.14 
indicating a large effect size and a positive impact on exonerated complaint dispositions (b = 
0.129, p = 0.017) with a Cohen’s d of 1.17 also indicating a large effect size. Although not 
statistically significant, interestingly, the citizen complaint rate had a negative impact on 





dispositions (b = 0.058). Substantiated complaints emerged as statistically significant having a 
positive impact on exonerated complaint dispositions (b = 0.218, p = 0.004) with a Cohen’s d of 
1.98 indicating a very large effect size, while exonerated complaint dispositions did not have a 
statistically significant impact on substantiated complaint dispositions (b = 0.091). Of the 
exogenous variables, BWC proportion had a statistically significant positive impact on both 
substantiated complaint dispositions (b = 0.167, p = 0.045) with a Cohen’s d of 1.08 indicating a 
large effect size, and exonerated complaint dispositions (b = 0.119, p = 0.032) with a Cohen’s d 
of 1.08 indicating a large effect size as well. While the Ferguson incident did not have a 
significant impact on either disposition, the direction was negative for both but more impactful 
for substantiated complaint dispositions (b = -0.117) than exonerated complaint dispositions (b = 
-0.117). The results of the post estimation Breusch–Godfrey serial correlation LM, Jarque-Bera, 
and VAR estimate stability tests indicated no autocorrelation in the residual errors, that the errors 
are normally distributed, and that the modulus of each eigenvalue was less than one respectively. 
These results, limitations of the study, conclusions, implications, and future research needs are 














DISCUSSION & CONCLUSIONS 
While several randomized controlled trials have examined the impact of BWCs on use of 
force in the past few years, the results are mixed. Only a handful of studies have examined these 
impacts over a substantial period of time. Sutherland and colleagues (2017) examined four years 
post BWC implementation at the Rialto, CA Police Department and found that the initial 
reductions in use of force and citizen complaints had been sustained. Conversely, Koslicki and 
colleagues’ (2019) analysis of four years pre- and three years post-BWC implementation data 
from an unnamed agency in the Northwest U.S. indicated a significant increase in use of force 
reports over the three years following device deployment. Furthermore, adequate controls for 
officer-initiated enforcement activity and staffing have not been included in the extant research, 
and the potential impact on citizen complaint dispositions have received scant attention. The 
Newport News, Virginia Police Department’s experience with BWCs offered a unique 
opportunity to address these gaps in the research. 
The objective of this dissertation was to explore the impact of a staggered rollout of 
BWCs with multiple deployments on the frequency and severity of use of force and the 
frequency and outcomes of citizen complaints while controlling for staffing and officer-initiated 
enforcement activity. This overarching objective was broken down into ten research questions, 
which were posed in Chapter 1. This chapter begins by addressing each of those research 
questions in turn, followed by a discussion of the results, how the findings build on the extant 
body of knowledge, and the implications of the findings. The chapter concludes with the 






Answers to the Research Questions 
 1. What were the effects of BWCs on use of force?  
The descriptive statistics indicated that the mean use of force rate decreased by 58.01% 
between the pre-BWC period (May 2010 through April 2013) and the post-BWC period (July 
2016 – June 2017). Similar to the Rialto, CA (Farrar & Ariel, 2013), Orlando, FL, (Jennings et 
al., 2015), Tampa, FL (Jennings et al., 2017), and Las Vegas, NV (Braga et al., 2018) studies, the 
findings in the current study indicated that BWCs were a significant factor in the notable 
decrease in use of force. 
1a. If the frequency of use of force incidents was reduced, was the reduction 
sustained? 
Similar to Sutherland and colleagues’ (2017) follow-up study of the Rialto, CA results, 
but in stark contrast to Koslicki and colleagues’ (2019) results, the reduced use of force rate in 
the current study appears to remain stable during the 12-month (July 2016 through June 2017) 
post-BWC period (see Table 4.2 and Figure 4.2).   
1b. If the frequency of use of force incidents was reduced, was there an incremental 
decline with waves of BWC implementation, or did any decline plateau or decay 
over the course of implementation? 
A relatively continuous decline is observed during the BWC implementation period, 
which appears to flatten during the post-BWC (full deployment) period (see Figure 4.2).  
1c. Was there a change in the severity of force used (monthly proportion of use of 
force incidents resulting in citizen injuries)?  
The monthly proportion of use of force incidents resulting in citizen injuries decreased 





1.00 proportions occurred in the post-BWC period and none of that magnitude occurred prior to 
BWC implementation (see Figure 4.3). The analysis results indicated that BWCs were not a 
significant factor in severity of force.       
1d. Did BWCs have a significant impact on these outcomes when simultaneously 
considering staffing and volume of officer-initiated enforcement activity?  
The proportion of BWCs was statistically significant factor in the reduced use of force 
rate while controlling for officer-initiated enforcement activity rate, calls for service rate, neither 
of which were statistically significant. 
2. What were the effects of BWCs on the frequency of citizen complaints?  
The descriptive statistics indicated that the mean citizen complaint rate decreased by 
47.39% between the pre-BWC period (May 2010 through April 2013) and the post-BWC period 
(July 2016 – June 2017). Contrary to the Rialto, CA (Farrar & Ariel, 2013), Mesa, AZ (Mesa 
Police Department, 2013), Phoenix, AZ (Katz et al., 2014),  Orlando, FL, (Jennings et al., 2015), 
Denver, CO (Ariel, 2017), Arlington, TX (Goodison & Wilson, 2017), and Las Vegas, NV 
(Braga et al., 2018) studies, the proportion of BWCs was not statistically significant in the 
notable reduction in the citizen complaint rate. However, the results of the analysis indicated that 
the Ferguson incident was a significant factor in that reduction.  
2a. If the frequency of citizen complaints was reduced, was the reduction sustained?  
Notwithstanding the findings above, the reduced citizen complaint rate in the current 
study appears to remain stable.  
2b. If the frequency of citizen complaints was reduced, was there an incremental 
decline with waves of BWC implementation, or did any decline plateau or decay 





A relatively continuous decline is observed during the BWC implementation period, 
which, like the use of force rate, appears to flatten during the post-BWC (full deployment) period 
(see Figure 4.4). 
2c. Was there a change in the proportion of sustained complaints compared to those 
unfounded, not substantiated, or in which the officer was exonerated?  
Both unfounded and not substantiated complaint disposition proportions decreased (by 
19.20% and 40.00% respectively) while proportions of substantiated and exonerated complaint 
dispositions increased (40.35% and 115.38% respectively). While BWC proportion did not 
emerge as a statistically significant factor in the substantiated complaint disposition increase (as 
noted just beyond statistical significance), it had a statistically significant impact in the 
exonerated disposition increase.  
2d. Did BWCs have a significant impact on these outcomes when simultaneously 
considering staffing and volume of officer-initiated enforcement activity?  
While BWC proportion was the sole statistically significant factor in the exonerated 
complaint proportion model, calls for service rate emerged as significant in the substantiated 
complaint proportion model. 
Discussion 
 The theoretical framework first proposed by Farrar and Ariel (2013) to predict the impact 
of BWCs on officer behavior was reviewed in Chapter 2. First, Tedeschi and Felson’s (1994) 
social interactionist theory of coercive actions explains how the dynamics of police-citizen 
interactions can lead to the outcomes of concern (use of force, abuse of authority, and citizen 
complaints) and verbal/psychological, legal/civil rights, or physical abuse of authority. In 





deference from all citizens (Alpert & Dunham, 2004). Moreover, the lower the social capital of 
the citizen, the more deference and respect is expected by an officer. Thus, the theory proposes 
that a hostile and disrespectful citizen demeanor, “contempt of cop,” would likely be met with 
coercive means to compel compliance, such as threats, physical force, or punishments. The 
theory also posits that coercion will be utilized for retribution when the officer’s social identity 
has been threatened. In short, a police officer engaged in an enforcement encounter with a 
recalcitrant and disrespectful citizen would be likely to engage in coercive tactics, and perhaps 
verbal/psychological, legal/civil rights, and/or physical abuse of authority. However, Farrar and 
Ariel (2013) assert that BWCs deter officers from acting on these impulses through what Duvall 
and Wicklund (1972) termed objective self-awareness.  
According to Duvall and Wicklund (1972), one becomes keenly self-aware when he or 
she knows they are being observed and subsequently tend to modify their behavior to conform to 
social expectations. This state of objective self-awareness, produced by having their actions 
recorded by a BWC, would not only result in deterring officers from engaging in the 
aforementioned retaliatory coercive actions, but likely increase procedurally just professional 
behavior. Specifically, this phenomenon is expected to result in officer attentiveness to treating 
all citizens fairly, with dignity and respect, and attempting to deescalate before utilizing force 
when possible. This impact on officer behavior is, in turn, is expected to decrease use of force 
incidents and citizen complaints.        
 The review of applicable literature in Chapter 2 also generated several expectations that, 
in turn, guided the inclusion of several variables in addition to BWCs thought to impact the focal 
outcomes in the current study. While the results demonstrated a poor fit of the data to ARIMA 





VAR/VARX was ideal with post-estimation tests demonstrating good fit and reliable results. 
VAR/VARX analysis, which has rarely been employed in criminology and criminal justice 
research, allowed for a unique examination of the impacts of those variables included in the 
endogenous system. Utilizing the VARX results, the impacts of those variables on the focal 
variables, and on one another, is examined in comparison to previous findings in the research 
and support for the related theoretical frameworks is assessed. First, for the ease of reference, 
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  Notes: * indicates statistically significant relationship. 
 Use of force frequency. 
The results of the VARX analysis indicated that both BWCs and the Ferguson incident 
were statistically significant contributors to the 58 percent decrease in the use of force rate 
between the pre-BWC period and the post full implementation of BWCs, and Cohen’s d 
calculations indicated a medium effect size for both.  However, contrary to previous research 





predictor of the use of force rate (see Bolger, 2015). This finding is interesting considering the 
nearly 44 percent decrease in the officer-initiated activity rate between the pre-BWC and post 
full BWC deployment periods. Likewise, although thought to be impactful, none of the other 
variables included in the VARX endogenous system (calls for service rate, severity of force, 
citizen complaint rate, substantiated complaint dispositions, or exonerated complaint 
dispositions), nor the other exogenous variable (monthly average temperature) had a significant 
impact on the use of force rate.  
While the current study’s findings are similar to those previous studies listed in the 
answer to research question 1 above as to the positive impact of BWCs on a notable decrease in 
use of force, they are in stark contrast to Koslicki and colleague’s (2019) finding of an increase 
in use of force over 3 years post-BWC deployment. Furthermore, the current study’s finding of 
the concurrent Ferguson incident’s significance in the use of force reduction (which has not been 
previously controlled for) is noteworthy. Collectively, these findings may suggest that the 
combined effects of increased public scrutiny of police use of force incidents following the 
Ferguson incident, and the implementation of BWCs not only decreased use of force frequency 
at NNPD overall, but that officers may have been particularly careful in how they handled 
interactions that they had initiated, even prior to the Ferguson incident.   
The VARX results indicated that severity of force, substantiated complaint dispositions, 
exonerated complaint dispositions, calls for service rate, and monthly average temperature all 
had a positive impact on the use of force rate. While the positive relationship of exonerated 
complaints, calls for service, and monthly average temperature are consistent with previous 
research reviewed in Chapter 2, at first glance the positive impact of severity of force and 





complaint dispositions suggests that fewer of these complaints were related to force after BWC 
implementation began, which is supported by the negative impact of the overall citizen 
complaint rate. This remains a matter of speculation, however, as the types of allegations were 
not examined in the current study. The self-initiated activity rate and the Ferguson incident had a 
negative impact as well. While, as mentioned above, the negative impact of the self-initiated 
activity rate on the use of force is incongruent with previous research (see Bolger, 2015), the 
negative impact of the Ferguson incident is to be expected considering the increased public 
scrutiny of use of force in general across the country. These results concerning the influence of 
BWCs and the Ferguson incident seem to support the theoretical framework.   
Severity of force. 
The current study is the first known to examine the impact of BWCs on severity of force 
and, as such, was exploratory in nature. The finding that the proportion of use of force incidents 
resulting in citizen injury spiked post BWC implementation is curious. As an anticipated benefit 
of BWCs is reduced use of force incidents, and the current study found that was the case at 
NNPD, one might expect that the severity of force would be reduced as well. However, 
substantiated complaint disposition proportion and the Ferguson Incident did have statistically 
significant negative impacts on severity of force with Cohen’s d calculations indicating a very 
large effect size and large effect size respectively. In addition, although not statistically 
significant, BWCs had a positive impact.  
These findings seem to be contradictory at first glance, however, they may be 
reconcilable. The negative impact of substantiated complaint dispositions and the Ferguson 
incident are intuitive. It seems logical that officers would not only avoid use of physical force 





scrutiny of any use of force post-Ferguson. The finding that BWCs increase severity of force, on 
the other hand, is counterintuitive. However, it seems likely that two factors may be in play that 
would potentially explain this finding. First, perhaps a large proportion of the use of force 
reduction was at the lower end of the force continuum and more of the force that is used 
following the implementation of BWCs is in response to serious resistance. Second, having 
evidence of citizen resistance captured on BWC recorded video may make officers less inclined 
to attempt to negotiate for cooperation. In any event, this remains a matter of speculation as 
neither the types of force nor citizen resistance were examined in the current study. 
In addition to substantiated complaint dispositions and the Ferguson incident, the use of 
force rate, citizen complaint rate, exonerated complaint dispositions, and self-initiated activity 
rate all had a negative impact on severity of force. While one would intuitively predict the 
negative impacts of the citizen complaint rate, substantiated complaint dispositions, and the 
Ferguson incident, and these impacts fall in line with the abuse of authority literature, the similar 
impacts of exonerated complaint dispositions and self-initiated activity are puzzling. Lacking 
additional data, including surveys of officers, one can only speculate as to the sources of these 
impacts. Perhaps officers avoid receiving a complaint, especially an allegation of unnecessary or 
excessive force regardless of the outcome, such that even exonerations negatively impact 
severity of force. In terms of the negative impact of self-initiated activity, it is plausible that 
officers react more quickly utilizing lower levels of force to control a subject when they have 
initiated a contact. But again, this remains a matter of speculation as the types of force were not 
examined in the current study. 
Citizen complaint frequency. 





statistically significant factor in the model. Based on the findings of Lersch (2002) and Lersch 
and Mieczkowski (1996) that officers who engage in more proactive (officer-initiated) and 
aggressive enforcement activities receive more citizen complaints, one would think that this 
reduction is also likely a function of the nearly 44 percent decrease in the officer-initiated 
activity rate. However, while the officer-initiated activity rate had a positive impact on the 
citizen complaint rate, it was not a statistically significant factor in the model either. However, 
the Ferguson incident’s statistically significant negative impact with a Cohen’s d calculation 
indicating a large effect size is notable. 
 As stated earlier, these findings suggest that NNPD officers may have been particularly 
careful in how they handled interactions that they initiated, even prior to BWC implementation 
and the Ferguson incident. This seems to be supported by Terrill and Ingram’s (2016) findings 
that discourtesy makes up a substantial proportion of citizen complaints. However, the Ferguson 
incident’s statistical significance with a Cohen’s d calculation indicating a large effect size 
suggests that officers were more courteous and professional overall following the event. Perhaps 
officers are more concerned about citizen captured video of their actions and potential public 
scrutiny than BWC captured video. 
 The use of force rate, substantiated complaint dispositions, exonerated complaint 
dispositions, and monthly average temperature also had positive impacts on the citizen complaint 
rate. The positive impact of the use of force rate on the citizen complaint rate is predictable based 
on Terrill and Ingram’s (2016) finding that a large proportion of citizen complaints are 
allegations of improper force. Likewise, the findings of Brandl and colleagues (2001), that some 
citizens may believe that officers protect one another and filing a complaint would be futile, 





to report perceived misconduct. With increased contacts between officers and citizens, as well as 
increased use of force incidents, the positive impact of the monthly average temperature on the 
citizen complaint rate is also logical. However, the positive impact of exonerated citizen 
complaints on the overall citizen complaint rate seems counterintuitive, especially in light of 
Brandl and colleague’s (2001) findings. Although a matter of speculation, perhaps exonerations 
motivated Newport News citizens to file complaints rather than simply feeling defeated. 
Particularly in the post-Ferguson era. With more than 40 percent of the Newport News 
population African American, perhaps movements such as Black Lives Matter influenced 
citizens in such a way that exonerations were questioned and angered citizens, and ultimately 
generated more citizen complaints. 
 Severity of force had a negative relationship with the citizen complaint rate. While 
counterintuitive as well, this finding might suggest that the more severe force incidents were 
justified and produced fewer citizen complaints. Collectively, the results concerning the citizen 
complaint rate do not offer much support for the theoretical framework as it applies to BWCs. 
However, findings pertaining to the impact of the Ferguson incident seem applicable to the 
support of the theoretical concepts. 
Substantiated and Exonerated complaint dispositions.  
As related in Chapter 1, BWC advocates have anticipated that the captured video would 
aid in complaint investigations by providing an objective record of an encounter (While, 2014). 
A logical extension of this notion is that the two dispositions that reflect a high level of 
uncertainty about allegations of misconduct (unfounded and not substantiated) should be reduced 
and the more definitive dispositions (substantiated and exonerated) should increase. The current 





Exonerations more than doubled and BWC proportion was a statistically significant 
factor with the inclusion of the other explanatory variables. The proportion of substantiated 
complaints and severity of force also had a significant impact on exonerations. The latter 
significant positive relationship between severity of force and exonerated complaints supports 
the earlier suggestion that more severe force incidents were justified and not only produced 
fewer citizen complaints, but also more exonerations when complaints were filed in these 
instances. In addition, the calls for service rate, and the self-initiated activity rate had a positive 
impact on exonerations while the Ferguson incident had a negative impact. These first findings 
further suggest that officers were more professional overall, but the latter suggests that citizen 
complaints may have been investigated more thoroughly or officer actions were subjected to 
greater scrutiny post-Ferguson.    
BWCs were a statistically significant factor in the 40 percent increase in substantiated 
complaints as well, as were severity of force, calls for service rate, and monthly average 
temperature. As in the case of exonerations, BWC captured video likely provided evidence 
enhancing internal investigators’ ability to determine what occurred, and thus producing these 
more definitive dispositions. The negative impact of severity of force on substantiated complaint 
dispositions further supports the suggestion that the more severe force incidents were justified in 
many cases. The calls for service rate had a negative impact on substantiated complaints, 
meaning the higher the call volume, the fewer substantiated complaints. This suggests that 
perhaps when officer have more time to engage in an interaction, the greater the possibility of 
engaging in some form of misconduct, perhaps an abuse of authority. The positive relationship 
between average monthly temperature and substantiated complaints is not surprising as warmer 





policing of disorder. 
Calls for service rate. 
The calls for service rate remained fairly stable during the study period and the results 
indicated that the only statistically significant factor was the monthly average temperature. The 
seasonality of crime and calls for service is well documented, and therefore this is to be 
expected. However, although not statistically significant, the negative impact of the Ferguson 
incident on the calls for service rate is noteworthy. It suggests that citizens were less likely to call 
for police services post Ferguson. Based on the findings of Kochel (2019) regarding the impact 
of the events on African American attitudes regarding police in particular, this impact might be 
explained by the proportion of Newport News citizens who are African Americans, more than 40 
percent.           
Self-initiated activity rate. 
The only statistically significant variable that impacted the self-initiated activity rate in 
the VARX model was the Ferguson incident with a negative relationship. The results indicated 
that the Ferguson incident was the sole significant factor among the variables in the nearly 40 
percent reduction in self-initiated activity. This finding falls in line with those of the Pew 
Research Center (2017), Morin and colleagues (2017), and Shjarback and colleagues (2017), all 
of whom indicated a de-policing effect related to the Ferguson incident. The results of these 
studies indicated that the reduction in self-initiated activities is tied to officer fears of public 
scrutiny of aggressive policing techniques.  
Although not statistically significant, two other findings are notable. First, BWCs were 
positively related to the self-initiated activity rate which is important to the ongoing potential 





Wallace and colleagues (2018) and White and colleagues (2018), all of whom found either a 
positive impact or null findings, the dissertation found no evidence of BWC induced passivity. 
Second, the citizen complaint rate had a negative impact on self-initiated activity but, as 
indicated earlier, self-initiated activity had a nominal impact on citizen complaints. This suggests 
that officers might believe that self-initiated activities produce more complaints even though the 
findings indicate that is not the case at NNPD during this 86-month period. 
Discussion summary. 
 In summary, the results indicated that BWCs were a statistically significant factor in the 
substantial reduction of use of force (58 percent) and increases in both substantiated (40 percent) 
and exonerated (115 percent) citizen complaint dispositions, but not in the 47 percent reduction 
in citizen complaints. In addition, there was no plateau in these outcomes during the staggered 
BWC implementation period, but rather continuous trends that seemed to level off after full 
implementation was achieved. While the results offer some support for the theoretical framework 
proposed by Farrar and Ariel (2013) and subsequently embraced by BWC advocates, as 
discussed, inclusion of the Ferguson incident control variable complicates application of the 
theories to the impact of BWCs on use of force and citizen complaints. These results suggest 
some important implications and future research needs, but several limitations must be 
acknowledged first. 
Limitations 
While the dissertation contributes to the current body of knowledge as outlined above, 
there are several limitations that must be noted. Although likely not an exhaustive list, foremost, 
the study utilizes a nonprobability purposive sample, a single large mid-Atlantic municipal 





officers were not randomly selected to be equipped with BWCs through the staggered 
deployment of the devices. Supervisors and command staff assigned the devices to officers as 
they deemed appropriate. These facts alone may limit the generalizability of the results. Second, 
the study utilizes secondary data, internal agency records that were not collected with the 
purposes of the researcher in mind. That fact, combined with the “low visibility” nature of police 
work, means that some omissions in the CAD data and use of force reporting are likely. 
However, the latter may be less likely post-BWC implementation due to video documentation. 
Nevertheless, the researcher had to rely on the data collection and recording techniques utilized 
by the agency, which had been gathered for the internal purposes of NNPD, not for the purposes 
for which the investigator intended to utilize it.  
Third, there are methodological issues related to time series analysis which must be 
noted. While time-series analysis is a quasi-experimental design which suffers relatively few 
threats to the validity of the results, there are a few specific potential threats that must be 
considered. First, that of history. According to Cook and Campbell (1979), ‘history’ refers to 
“the possibility that forces other than the treatment under investigation came to influence the 
dependent variable immediately after [the treatment was introduced]” (p. 211). Another potential 
threat to validity is in regard to changes in policy or procedures during the post ‘interruption’ 
period, a threat that Cook and Campbell (1979) refer to as “instrumentation.”  In addition, the 
possibility of seasonal variations must be considered, and such patterns accounted for (Cook & 
Campbell, 1979). While no major changes in policy were discovered and seasonality is 
controlled for, as with any law enforcement agency of similar size, promotions, retirements, 
resignations, and shifts in responsibilities resulted in various changes in supervisory and 





changes may have impacted department culture and contributed to the results of the study must 
be considered. In addition, time series-based models require a minimum of 50 observations as a 
rule of thumb (Box & Tiao, 1975). While the current study includes 86, the study would have 
been more robust with an increased number of observations, particularly post-BWC. 
Fourth, the Ferguson incident was utilized as a proxy measure for a potential de-policing 
effect. While, as stated earlier, it was arguably a watershed moment in the current police 
legitimacy crisis, there have been several high-profile incidents both before and after. Therefore, 
it might not capture the cumulative effects of these incidents. And fifth, while the results seem to 
offer support for the proposed theoretical framework regarding the anticipated impact of BWCs 
on use of force and citizen complaints, the actual testing of theory was a delimitation of the 
dissertation. Thus, the mechanism of the BWC impacts remains an open question. As suggested 
by White (2014) and others, it is possible that BWCs have an impact on citizen behavior as well.  
Implications 
 Notwithstanding the aforementioned limitations, there are five specific implications 
derived from the results of this study. First, a handful of extant studies have sought to identify 
correlates of officer acceptance (buy-in) of BWCs. The most salient issue identified to date has 
been that of organizational justice (see Ariel et al. 2014; Gaub, et al., 2016; Jennings et al., 2014; 
Katz et al., 2014; Kyle & White, 2016; Pelfrey & Keener, 2016; Smykla, Crow, Crichlow, & 
Snyder, 2015; Young & Ready, 2015), which has generally been discovered through surveys of 
officer attitudes. Recommendations that law enforcement leadership executives ensure high 
levels of organizational justice in their agency prior to BWC implementation abound based on 
these findings. However, empirical evidence of direct benefits of BWCs for the officer has been 





(115.38% increase), and that BWCs were a significant factor in that increase cannot be 
overstated. Law enforcement leadership should utilize this information to relieve officers’ 
apprehensions about the devices and bolster buy-in. 
 Second, the significant impact on both of the more conclusive complaint dispositions 
(substantiated and exonerated) and coinciding decreases in the less conclusive complaint 
dispositions indicates that BWC captured video does indeed aid in complaint investigations. This 
is an anticipated benefit of BWCs that has received little empirical support (see Lum et al., 
2015). Third, there is a dearth of knowledge regarding staggered rollouts of BWCs, which is not 
uncommon due to budget constraints. The results of the current study indicate that the impact of 
BWCs on use of force frequency and complaint resolution begin to manifest with the start of 
implementation. Moreover, the benefits increased sequentially with implementation and were 
sustained long term. Law enforcement leadership should consider staggered implementation if 
their budgets do not allow a full deployment. 
 Fourth, notwithstanding the specific limitation concerning utilizing the Ferguson incident 
as a proxy measure noted above, the results of the current study indicate that the Ferguson 
incident was a significant factor in a substantial (nearly 40 percent) reduction in the officer self-
initiated activity rate. However, there was no indication of camera induced passivity. While some 
law enforcement leaders may view this as problematic, as mentioned in Chapter 2, Brunson 
(2007) and Epp and colleagues (2014), among others, suggest that aggressive officer-initiated 
enforcement contacts negatively impact police legitimacy and Sharback and colleagues (2017) 
suggest that reductions in these types of contacts might serve to improve police-community 
relations. 





understood as this is likely counter to expectations of the public. While the increased proportion 
of use of force incidents resulting in citizen injury can be disturbing at first glance. 
Understanding the underlying fact that some use of force will always be necessary due to 
resistance and issues of safety is paramount. The reductions in use of force are likely attributable 
to those that could have been avoided through de-escalation or were unnecessary, but this 
remains a matter of speculation and will be addressed in the concluding future research needs 
section below. 
Future Research Needs 
 The mixed results of the extant research regarding the impact of BWCs on use of force 
and citizen complaints—the two anticipated benefits of the devices most important for improving 
police legitimacy—are problematic. The lack of studies that examine those impacts long term is 
even more problematic given the continuing rapid implementation of BWC programs at 
substantial expense and with the high expectations of the public concerning their effectiveness. 
Although the current study produced some results consistent with the anticipated benefits and in 
line with the proposed theoretical framework. The inclusion of additional variables in a 
multivariate time series analysis demonstrated that there are other relevant factors that must be 
considered, and which may guide future research. 
 The current study examined the impact of BWCs on severity of force and complaint 
dispositions. The importance of the findings cannot be overstated but also reveal more questions 
to be answered. Future studies should examine specific types of force in order to investigate the 
impact of BWCs on severity of force further. Regarding the latter, the significant increases in 
both substantiated complaints and officer exonerations support this anticipated benefit of BWCs, 





were not examined, and as stated in the discussion, there may be important nuances in terms of 
dispositions still to be discovered. While these results provide further evidence of the value of 
BWCs, considering this is a single study of a single agency, more research in this area is crucial.  
 Perhaps most important, while the theoretical framework first proposed by Farrar and 
Ariel (2013) has been reiterated in several of the studies that followed (including this one), it has 
not been tested. The data available to the investigator did not allow a test of the theory in this 
study, although the results seem to support it. Such research is a crucial need as the relationship 
between BWCs and reductions in use of force and citizen complaints is not fully understood. 
While a test of the theoretical framework would likely require direct observation of officer 
behavior prior to BWC implementation (thus time consuming and expensive), post-BWC 
observation could feasibly be conducted by coding BWC captured video, which might make 
such a study possible.  
Conversely, null and negative results of several studies indicate that additional 
explanatory variables need to be explored. Research to identify variables that differentiate 
agencies that experience reductions from those that do not is the next logical step. Without 
further research to both understand how the devices can produce the desired benefits, and 
establish realistic expectations regarding their effectiveness, BWCs could ultimately further 
erode police legitimacy. 
Final Conclusions 
Law enforcement agencies continue to adopt BWCs at a rapid rate. While BWC research 
initially trailed introduction of the devices in large numbers, scholars have employed aggressive 
research agendas generating results from several studies in just a few years’ time. Although this 





gaps in need of empirical research. As technological advances continue and occur more quickly, 
it is increasingly important for research to keep pace. May the information contained in this 
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Use of Force Rate ARIMA Diagnostics 
Autocorrelation (AC) Plot of Use of Force Rate Pre-Series 
  
 
                     
 
 
                               Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test of Use of Force Rate 






             
MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 0.0086
                                                                              
 Z(t)             -3.477            -3.696            -2.978            -2.620
                                                                              
               Statistic           Value             Value             Value
                  Test         1% Critical       5% Critical      10% Critical
                                          Interpolated Dickey-Fuller          



































Correlogram of Use of Force Rate Pre-Series –  










40      -0.0348   0.0546   41.812  0.3920                                      
39       0.0498  -0.1695   41.613  0.3577                                      
38       0.0188  -0.0832   41.214  0.3319                                      
37      -0.0500   0.0897   41.158  0.2935                                      
36       0.0201   0.0619   40.773  0.2685                                      
35      -0.2447  -0.0754   40.712  0.2335                                      
34      -0.1078  -0.0101   31.858  0.5730                                      
33      -0.0578  -0.2048   30.172  0.6087                                      
32      -0.0349  -0.1616   29.696  0.5836                                      
31      -0.0067  -0.0621   29.526  0.5419                                      
30      -0.1429  -0.3443    29.52  0.4904                                      
29       0.0238   0.0232   26.775  0.5838                                      
28       0.0001   0.0022     26.7  0.5346                                      
27       0.0090  -0.0302     26.7  0.4801                                      
26       0.1318   0.1996    26.69  0.4257                                      
25      -0.1028   0.0175   24.513  0.4899                                      
24      -0.1499  -0.0526    23.21  0.5074                                      
23       0.0425  -0.1018   20.486  0.6124                                      
22      -0.0224  -0.1180   20.271  0.5661                                      
21       0.0648   0.0490   20.212  0.5079                                      
20      -0.0578   0.0694   19.728  0.4751                                      
19       0.0644   0.0222   19.347  0.4348                                      
18      -0.1526  -0.2712   18.883  0.3991                                      
17       0.0979   0.1940   16.312  0.5018                                      
16       0.1567   0.2106    15.27  0.5049                                      
15       0.0634   0.0668   12.639  0.6301                                      
14      -0.1249  -0.1488   12.215  0.5891                                      
13       0.0709  -0.0160   10.591  0.6451                                      
12      -0.0760  -0.1657   10.074  0.6095                                      
11       0.1063   0.1663   9.4884  0.5769                                      
10       0.2021   0.2584   8.3603  0.5937                                      
9       -0.1090  -0.0879   4.3313  0.8883                                      
8       -0.0675  -0.0908   3.1754  0.9229                                      
7       -0.0991  -0.1090   2.7379  0.9081                                      
6        0.0391   0.0404   1.8071  0.9366                                      
5        0.0197   0.0061   1.6642  0.8934                                      
4        0.0050  -0.0152   1.6284  0.8037                                      
3        0.0509   0.0502   1.6261  0.6535                                      
2        0.1243   0.1256   1.3927  0.4984                                      
1        0.0134   0.0134   .01577  0.9001                                      
                                                                               
 LAG       AC       PAC      Q     Prob>Q  [Autocorrelation]  [Partial Autocor]





Severity of Force ARIMA Diagnostics 







                               Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test of Citizen Injury 







MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 0.0144
                                                                              
 Z(t)             -3.311            -3.696            -2.978            -2.620
                                                                              
               Statistic           Value             Value             Value
                  Test         1% Critical       5% Critical      10% Critical
                                          Interpolated Dickey-Fuller          





            Partial Autocorrelation (PAC) Plot of Citizen Injury Proportion 






























                  Correlogram of Citizen Injury Proportion Pre-Series –  












40      -0.0066   0.0205   24.914  0.9703                                      
39       0.0586   0.0517   24.907  0.9612                                      
38      -0.0279  -0.1392   24.355  0.9578                                      
37       0.0193  -0.0970   24.232  0.9474                                      
36      -0.0464  -0.1398   24.175  0.9336                                      
35       0.0133   0.0241   23.849  0.9231                                      
34      -0.0160  -0.1175   23.823  0.9034                                      
33      -0.0331   0.1440   23.786  0.8804                                      
32       0.0455  -0.0383   23.629  0.8575                                      
31      -0.0386  -0.0797   23.339  0.8365                                      
30       0.0252  -0.0832   23.134  0.8097                                      
29      -0.1466  -0.1416   23.049  0.7743                                      
28      -0.0220  -0.0116   20.194  0.8573                                      
27       0.0211   0.1210   20.131  0.8252                                      
26       0.1050   0.1070   20.074  0.7880                                      
25       0.0555   0.0798   18.684  0.8120                                      
24       0.0775   0.0111   18.302  0.7881                                      
23      -0.1396  -0.2747   17.569  0.7804                                      
22       0.0062  -0.1313   15.228  0.8523                                      
21       0.0169   0.0352   15.224  0.8116                                      
20       0.0629   0.0888    15.19  0.7654                                      
19      -0.0106  -0.0398   14.736  0.7392                                      
18      -0.0514  -0.1011   14.723  0.6809                                      
17       0.1638   0.2279   14.429  0.6365                                      
16      -0.1641  -0.2677   11.485  0.7786                                      
15       0.0509   0.0021   8.5749  0.8987                                      
14      -0.1090  -0.1441   8.2983  0.8732                                      
13       0.0092   0.0176   7.0488  0.8996                                      
12      -0.1725  -0.2372     7.04  0.8550                                      
11      -0.0216  -0.0439   3.9958  0.9700                                      
10      -0.0438  -0.0673   3.9486  0.9496                                      
9       -0.0354  -0.0451   3.7574  0.9266                                      
8       -0.0857  -0.0723   3.6339  0.8886                                      
7       -0.0088  -0.0125   2.9214  0.8922                                      
6        0.0130   0.0002   2.9139  0.8196                                      
5        0.1181   0.1265   2.8978  0.7157                                      
4       -0.0005  -0.0009   1.5937  0.8099                                      
3       -0.1321  -0.1356   1.5937  0.6608                                      
2        0.0039   0.0037   .00298  0.9985                                      
1        0.0043   0.0042   .00161  0.9680                                      
                                                                               
 LAG       AC       PAC      Q     Prob>Q  [Autocorrelation]  [Partial Autocor]





Citizen Complaint Rate ARIMA Diagnostics 






                              Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test of Citizen Complaint 






MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 0.1742
                                                                              
 Z(t)             -2.293            -3.696            -2.978            -2.620
                                                                              
               Statistic           Value             Value             Value
                  Test         1% Critical       5% Critical      10% Critical
                                          Interpolated Dickey-Fuller          




































                  Correlogram of Citizen Complaint Rate Pre-Series –  













40       0.0051   0.1953    53.83  0.0708                                      
39       0.0982  -0.0267   53.826  0.0574                                      
38       0.0131   0.5762   52.275  0.0615                                      
37      -0.1463  -0.0030   52.248  0.0495                                      
36      -0.0126  -0.3394    48.95  0.0735                                      
35       0.2631   0.1388   48.926  0.0592                                      
34       0.0803  -0.4496   38.691  0.2661                                      
33      -0.2063  -0.3388   37.757  0.2608                                      
32      -0.0027  -0.1270   31.705  0.4814                                      
31       0.0034  -0.3022   31.704  0.4312                                      
30       0.1404   0.2659   31.702  0.3815                                      
29      -0.1718  -0.2250   29.053  0.4623                                      
28       0.0252  -0.0683   25.156  0.6193                                      
27       0.0085   0.1256   25.074  0.5703                                      
26      -0.0166  -0.1003   25.065  0.5153                                      
25      -0.0750  -0.0600    25.03  0.4607                                      
24      -0.0150  -0.0033   24.336  0.4425                                      
23      -0.0320  -0.0444   24.309  0.3869                                      
22       0.1080   0.0844   24.187  0.3375                                      
21       0.1525   0.0272   22.817  0.3538                                      
20       0.0149  -0.0496   20.131  0.4498                                      
19      -0.0064  -0.0794   20.106  0.3883                                      
18       0.0095  -0.1021   20.101  0.3272                                      
17      -0.1079  -0.1450   20.091  0.2696                                      
16      -0.0792   0.0075   18.825  0.2778                                      
15      -0.2086  -0.1910   18.152  0.2547                                      
14       0.1453   0.1946   13.555  0.4834                                      
13      -0.0374   0.0062   11.356  0.5810                                      
12       0.0590   0.0333   11.213  0.5108                                      
11       0.0335  -0.0339   10.861  0.4550                                      
10       0.0656   0.0565   10.748  0.3775                                      
9        0.0358  -0.0699   10.324  0.3249                                      
8        0.0165  -0.0988   10.199  0.2513                                      
7        0.0213  -0.0226   10.173  0.1790                                      
6       -0.2143  -0.2796    10.13  0.1193                                      
5       -0.0676  -0.1405   5.8326  0.3228                                      
4        0.0669   0.0378   5.4101  0.2477                                      
3       -0.1797  -0.1909   5.0018  0.1717                                      
2       -0.1526  -0.1548   2.0888  0.3519                                      
1       -0.0120  -0.0119   .01269  0.9103                                      
                                                                               
 LAG       AC       PAC      Q     Prob>Q  [Autocorrelation]  [Partial Autocor]





Substantiated Citizen Complaint Disposition ARIMA Diagnostics 
 








                              Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test of Substantiated  







MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 0.0012
                                                                              
 Z(t)             -4.043            -3.682            -2.972            -2.618
                                                                              
               Statistic           Value             Value             Value
                  Test         1% Critical       5% Critical      10% Critical
                                          Interpolated Dickey-Fuller          





            Partial Autocorrelation (AC) Plot of Substantiated Complaint Disposition 




















                Correlogram of Substantiated Complaint Disposition 












40       0.0614  -0.0688   40.119  0.4650                                      
39      -0.0333  -0.2732   39.499  0.4476                                      
38       0.0295  -0.1348    39.32  0.4106                                      
37       0.0417  -0.1511   39.182  0.3722                                      
36       0.0105  -0.4274   38.914  0.3399                                      
35      -0.0040  -0.3385   38.897  0.2985                                      
34      -0.1052  -0.4432   38.895  0.2587                                      
33      -0.0618  -0.0726   37.285  0.2784                                      
32      -0.0365  -0.2290   36.739  0.2585                                      
31      -0.0102  -0.0718   36.552  0.2265                                      
30      -0.1317  -0.1112   36.538  0.1910                                      
29       0.0398   0.0916   34.195  0.2322                                      
28      -0.1565  -0.2181   33.985  0.2014                                      
27      -0.1074  -0.1707   30.787  0.2800                                      
26      -0.1220  -0.0879   29.308  0.2973                                      
25      -0.1791  -0.1320   27.432  0.3347                                      
24      -0.0383  -0.1593   23.451  0.4933                                      
23      -0.0268  -0.1421   23.272  0.4450                                      
22      -0.0901  -0.1638   23.186  0.3913                                      
21       0.1423   0.1484   22.225  0.3866                                      
20      -0.2269  -0.3205   19.867  0.4663                                      
19       0.0489   0.1355   13.961  0.7859                                      
18      -0.0727  -0.1229   13.691  0.7490                                      
17       0.0364  -0.0066   13.104  0.7292                                      
16       0.0849  -0.0040   12.958  0.6758                                      
15       0.0344   0.1017   12.179  0.6654                                      
14       0.1780   0.3451   12.053  0.6020                                      
13      -0.0287   0.0173   8.7222  0.7936                                      
12      -0.1523  -0.1963   8.6366  0.7336                                      
11      -0.0810  -0.1481   6.2641  0.8552                                      
10      -0.0539  -0.1033   5.6016  0.8476                                      
9       -0.0101  -0.0151   5.3128  0.8062                                      
8        0.0717   0.0752   5.3027  0.7248                                      
7        0.0280   0.0438   4.8038  0.6839                                      
6        0.0283   0.0738   4.7284  0.5791                                      
5        0.0667   0.0448   4.6525  0.4597                                      
4       -0.1021  -0.1534   4.2362  0.3750                                      
3        0.1043   0.1332   3.2737  0.3513                                      
2        0.1521   0.1785   2.2824  0.3194                                      
1       -0.0471  -0.0555    .1974  0.6568                                      
                                                                               
 LAG       AC       PAC      Q     Prob>Q  [Autocorrelation]  [Partial Autocor]





Exonerated Citizen Complaint Disposition ARIMA Diagnostics 
            Autocorrelation (AC) Plot of Exonerated Complaint Disposition 






                              Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test of Exonerated  






MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 0.0000
                                                                              
 Z(t)             -5.492            -3.682            -2.972            -2.618
                                                                              
               Statistic           Value             Value             Value
                  Test         1% Critical       5% Critical      10% Critical
                                          Interpolated Dickey-Fuller          





            Partial Autocorrelation (AC) Plot of Exonerated Complaint Disposition 






























                Correlogram of Exonerated Complaint Disposition 













40      -0.0629   0.4138   46.518  0.2218                                      
39       0.0052   0.0107   45.867  0.2088                                      
38       0.1603   0.4214   45.863  0.1784                                      
37       0.1067   0.4221   41.819  0.2695                                      
36      -0.0506   0.1012   40.064  0.2946                                      
35      -0.1596  -0.1547   39.678  0.2693                                      
34       0.0173  -0.3839   35.909  0.3791                                      
33       0.0705   0.3532   35.865  0.3356                                      
32       0.0658   0.2702   35.158  0.3209                                      
31      -0.0542  -0.2404   34.554  0.3018                                      
30      -0.0974  -0.1827   34.152  0.2748                                      
29      -0.0289  -0.1544   32.876  0.2828                                      
28      -0.1492  -0.1276   32.765  0.2445                                      
27      -0.0803   0.0834   29.879  0.3196                                      
26      -0.0651  -0.1410   29.058  0.3085                                      
25      -0.0935  -0.2460   28.527  0.2842                                      
24       0.1274   0.2453   27.449  0.2840                                      
23      -0.0987  -0.1939   25.482  0.3259                                      
22      -0.1983  -0.2796    24.32  0.3307                                      
21      -0.0087  -0.0814   19.707  0.5399                                      
20      -0.0071  -0.0388   19.698  0.4770                                      
19       0.2261   0.2445   19.692  0.4133                                      
18      -0.0577  -0.2052   13.963  0.7315                                      
17       0.0402   0.1098   13.595  0.6955                                      
16      -0.0668  -0.0614   13.419  0.6419                                      
15       0.0117  -0.0173   12.941  0.6068                                      
14       0.0915   0.2097   12.927  0.5323                                      
13       0.0780   0.2197   12.055  0.5231                                      
12      -0.0106  -0.0733    11.43  0.4925                                      
11      -0.0393  -0.1706   11.419  0.4089                                      
10       0.0350  -0.0106   11.265  0.3373                                      
9       -0.0777  -0.1007   11.144  0.2660                                      
8       -0.0994  -0.0082   10.556  0.2281                                      
7        0.0445   0.0339   9.6085  0.2119                                      
6        0.0928   0.0428   9.4206  0.1513                                      
5        0.2348   0.3066   8.6139  0.1255                                      
4        0.0064   0.0175   3.5164  0.4754                                      
3       -0.1904  -0.1963   3.5126  0.3191                                      
2        0.0459   0.0463   .24365  0.8853                                      
1        0.0252   0.0255   .05586  0.8132                                      
                                                                               
 LAG       AC       PAC      Q     Prob>Q  [Autocorrelation]  [Partial Autocor]







Johansen Test for Cointegration 
 
 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Tests for Stationarity                            




                           
 
                              Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test of Self-Initiated Enforcement 
                              Activity Rate – 1st Difference 
 
 





                                                                               
    7      56     -476.33788     0.04440
    6      55     -478.26805     0.24412      3.8603     3.76
    5      52     -490.16267     0.34118     27.6496    15.41
    4      47     -507.89821     0.46913     63.1207    29.68
    3      40     -534.81071     0.54468    116.9457    47.21
    2      31     -568.24782     0.61770    183.8199    68.52
    1      20     -609.11343     0.70573    265.5511    94.15
    0      7       -661.1019           .    369.5280   124.24
  rank    parms       LL       eigenvalue  statistic    value
maximum                                      trace    critical
                                                         5%
                                                                               
Sample:  2010m6 - 2017m6                                         Lags =       1
Trend: constant                                         Number of obs =      85
                       Johansen tests for cointegration                        
MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 0.0005
                                                                              
 Z(t)             -4.248            -3.532            -2.903            -2.586
                                                                              
               Statistic           Value             Value             Value
                  Test         1% Critical       5% Critical      10% Critical
                                          Interpolated Dickey-Fuller          
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test for unit root         Number of obs   =        84
MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 0.0000
                                                                              
 Z(t)             -8.737            -3.534            -2.904            -2.587
                                                                              
               Statistic           Value             Value             Value
                  Test         1% Critical       5% Critical      10% Critical
                                          Interpolated Dickey-Fuller          









      
 
                  Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test of Severity 





                               Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test of Citizen Complaint 





                              Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test of Substantiated Complaint 




MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 0.0060
                                                                              
 Z(t)             -3.590            -3.532            -2.903            -2.586
                                                                              
               Statistic           Value             Value             Value
                  Test         1% Critical       5% Critical      10% Critical
                                          Interpolated Dickey-Fuller          
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test for unit root         Number of obs   =        84
MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 0.0000
                                                                              
 Z(t)             -6.335            -3.532            -2.903            -2.586
                                                                              
               Statistic           Value             Value             Value
                  Test         1% Critical       5% Critical      10% Critical
                                          Interpolated Dickey-Fuller          
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test for unit root         Number of obs   =        84
MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 0.0001
                                                                              
 Z(t)             -4.619            -3.532            -2.903            -2.586
                                                                              
               Statistic           Value             Value             Value
                  Test         1% Critical       5% Critical      10% Critical
                                          Interpolated Dickey-Fuller          
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test for unit root         Number of obs   =        84
MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 0.0000
                                                                              
 Z(t)             -5.145            -3.532            -2.903            -2.586
                                                                              
               Statistic           Value             Value             Value
                  Test         1% Critical       5% Critical      10% Critical
                                          Interpolated Dickey-Fuller          





                              Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test of Exonerated Complaint 




           
          Vector Autoregression Specification Optimization for Model 1 – VAR Analysis  
 
 
                Notes: Endogenous system variables included = calls for service rate, self-initiated 
                enforcement activity rate, use of force rate, severity of force, citizen complaint rate, 
                substantiated complaint disposition, and exonerated complaint disposition. 
 
          Vector Autoregression Specification Optimization for Model 2 – VARX Analysis  
 
 
                Notes: Endogenous system variables included = calls for service rate, self-initiated 
                enforcement activity rate, use of force rate, severity of force, citizen complaint rate, 
                substantiated complaint disposition, and exonerated complaint disposition; 
                exogenous variables = BWC proportion, Ferguson incident, and monthly average 
                temperature. 
 
MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 0.0000
                                                                              
 Z(t)             -5.185            -3.532            -2.903            -2.586
                                                                              
               Statistic           Value             Value             Value
                  Test         1% Critical       5% Critical      10% Critical
                                          Interpolated Dickey-Fuller          
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test for unit root         Number of obs   =        84
 Endogenous:  CFSRT TOTSIART UOFRT CITINJPN CMPTRT SBSTNPN EXNRTPN
                                                                               
     4   -352.892  72.015*  49  0.018  .002281   13.5583   15.9504   19.5164   
     3     -388.9   76.14   49  0.008   .00146   13.2415   15.0561   17.7614   
     2    -426.97  72.382   49  0.017  .001048   12.9749   14.2122   16.0566   
     1   -463.161  230.75   49  0.000  .000748*  12.6625*  13.3223*  14.3061*  
     0   -578.534                      .003758   14.2813   14.3638   14.4868   
                                                                               
   lag      LL      LR      df    p      FPE       AIC      HQIC      SBIC     
                                                                               
   Sample:  2010m9 - 2017m6                     Number of obs      =        82
   Selection-order criteria
                                                                               
     4   -165.563  83.972*  64  0.048  8.3e-06   10.6065   13.7376   18.4106   
     3   -207.549  88.978   64  0.021  3.8e-06   10.0629    12.435   15.9752   
     2   -252.038  97.663   64  0.004  2.1e-06   9.58118   11.1942   13.6015   
     1   -300.869  475.36   64  0.000  1.4e-06*  9.20665*  10.0606*   11.335*  
     0   -538.548                        .0001    13.495   13.5899   13.7315   
                                                                               
   lag      LL      LR      df    p      FPE       AIC      HQIC      SBIC     
                                                                               
   Sample:  2010m10 - 2017m6                    Number of obs      =        81
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